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Introduction
Modern macroeconomic theory has largely developed into a positive discipline seek-
ing to set up models which improve our understanding of economic mechanisms and
interrelations among key economic variables. This development has been paralleled
by a natural complementary step, namely the use of macroeconomic models to make
positive, but also normative judgements about government policies. Along both of
these dimensions, the analysis of monetary policy stands out prominently. The rea-
son for this interest among academics, policy makers and the general public alike is
the by now robust empirical evidence ”that monetary policy significantly affects the
short-term course of the real economy ... [and] that the choice of how to conduct
monetary policy has important consequences for aggregate activity” [Clarida, Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999, p. 1661)] both over the business cycle and with respect to an
economy’s long-run growth performance.
This dissertation aims at contributing to the literature investigating the positive
and normative framework for monetary policy. It provides an assessment of macro-
economic (i.e. monetary and to some extent also fiscal) policies by focusing on two
rather distinct dynamic general equilibrium environments which help shed light on
a number of critical aspects regarding the dynamic conduct of monetary policy. The
main questions asked are of both theoretical and empirical nature and concern the
way monetary policy interacts with fiscal policy and financial markets: How does
nominal government debt shape the incentives faced by monetary policy makers?
What is the nature of the monetary time consistency problem when there is inter-
action with sequential fiscal policy makers? Can the dynamic interplay of monetary
and fiscal policies explain the evolution of government debt and inflation? How can
we rationalize the negative correlation between inflation and aggregate productivity
observed at business cycle frequency? What role do nominal interest rates and the
provision of liquidity play in this context?
A unifying starting point for the set of models laid out in this thesis are specifi-
cations proposing that monetary policy does not operate in isolation, but interacts
with other agents or institutions. The first two chapters concentrate on the strate-
gic aspects underlying the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies in an economy
characterized by positive amounts of government debt in nominal denomination.
Specifically, in order to reexamine the time consistency properties of optimal mone-
1
2tary policy, chapter one poses a dynamic optimal taxation problem where not only
monetary, but also fiscal policies are sequentially implemented. Starting from this
scenario, the next chapter provides a positive theory of dynamic monetary-fiscal
interactions and a reflection on the institution of monetary conservatism, whose role
is shown to be inherently determined via its implications for the interaction with
fiscal policy. The third chapter takes a different and more empirically oriented route:
It elaborates on an incomplete markets environment in order to demonstrate how
monetary policy systematically affects an economy’s aggregate productivity. Key
for this conclusion is to acknowledge that nominal fluctuations induced by mone-
tary policy on the one hand and financial markets’ capacity to intermediate scarce
liquidity on the other hand interact in a way that has an important influence on
corporate activity, thus affecting aggregate productivity.
In trying to answer the questions raised above, this dissertation concentrates on
a few selected issues within the vast field of monetary economics. The selection
of problems as well as the modelling framework represent a view of monetary
policy which stresses its systematic role and largely abstracts from stabilization
considerations. In a way, this emphasis is motivated by the observation that ”the
potential for welfare gains from better long-run, supply-side policies exceeds by far
the potential from further improvements in short-run demand management” [Lucas
(2003, p.1)]. As hinted above, we devote particular attention to the interaction of
monetary policy with fiscal policy on the one hand and financial markets on the
other hand. The emphasis on these interactions, in turn, brings game-theoretic
and contract-theoretic problems to the forefront. By embedding these aspects into
a dynamic general equilibrium environment, this thesis attempts to enhance our
understanding of how and where government policies can impinge on the economy.
The relevant arguments to be developed in the following hinge on policies’ impact
on interest rates and inflation as well as on the associated frictions: In the public
finance model underlying the first two chapters, the equilibrium nominal interest
rate is the relative price at which private agents are willing to hold government
debt, but it also affects their trade-off between consumption and leisure. The
financial markets friction stressed in the third chapter gives rise to a well-defined
concept of corporate liquidity demand, whereby it is shown that the premium at
which liquid assets trade is a function of the rate of inflation.
The following section provides a short discussion of a number of conceptual and
methodological questions. Moreover, it reviews some of the general literature1 and,
1For excellent reviews on monetary theory and policy, see e.g. the textbook treatments in Walsh
(2003) and Woodford (2003), the review article on monetary policy by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler
(1999), the study by McCandless and Weber (1995) or the lecture on the welfare costs of inflation
by Lucas (2000).
3in passing by, highlights the links to the respective chapters in this dissertation. The
review is organized according to five broad themes, starting with models of money
and the transmission of monetary policy, then addressing concepts of optimal (mon-
etary) policy and the role of government debt in the dynamics of monetary-fiscal
interactions, before concluding with a remark on the merits of general equilibrium
approaches to the problems at hand. Necessarily, this synopsis will remain rather
coarse; throughout, we abstain from synthesizing the relevant empirical evidence in
order to concentrate on theoretical issues. A more detailed review of the literature
which is of specific interest to the problems raised in this dissertation is deferred to
the individual chapters.
Literature, framework and methodology
Models of money and monetary policy: Evidently, any theoretical analysis of
monetary policy is conditional on a specific conceptual foundation. In the context
of the present dissertation, a number of modelling approaches to monetary theory
deserve particular attention. A common characteristic they share is their focus on
monetary policy’s systematic public finance role (chapters one and two) and on its
supply-side effects (chapter three) rather than on the effects on aggregate demand
familiar from New Keynesian setups.2
To begin with, there are modifications of the basic neoclassical growth model set
up to embrace monetary phenomena by deriving a demand for real balances from a
transactions motive; often, this is achieved via a cash-in-advance restriction.3 These
models are generally built on the presumption of flexible prices and are thus partic-
ularly suited for investigating long-run interrelations and structural problems, while
they have only limited success in replicating the stylized empirical facts regarding
the short-run comovement of monetary and real variables over the business cycle.
2Faced with both the advances and the shortcomings of the real business cycle literature, models
summarized under the heading ”New Keynesian” came into existence in an effort to match the
empirical short-run dynamics in response to exogenous shocks and especially to policy innovations.
This family of models is based on the notion of nominal rigidities in the formation of prices and/or
wages and is generally cast in a framework of monopolistic competition; compare e.g. Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987). New Keynesian models feature versions of the Phillips curve as their key
building block and turned out well-suited for the analysis of monetary policy which works via
its effect on aggregate demand and is generally seen as commissioned with the task of stabilizing
economic fluctuations. For a recent example of monetary policy analysis based on a (significantly
extended) version of a prototype New Keynesian model, compare Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005). Since the individual chapters of this dissertation do not rest on such a New Keynesian
framework, at this stage, we refrain from reviewing it more extensively; the same applies for the
recent advances adopting a sticky information perspective, see e.g. Mankiw and Reis (2002).
3An alternative and for the most part equivalent specification stipulates real balances as directly
yielding utility.
4Nevertheless, this branch of models constitutes an analytically convenient and in-
sightful laboratory for studying, among other things, (i) the fundamental quantity
relation between money, output and prices, (ii) the expectations-driven interrela-
tion between inflation and nominal interest rates underlying the Fisher equation,
(iii) fundamental issues in asset pricing, (iv) the role of inflation as a tax and its
induced welfare costs, as well as (v) the public finance considerations of monetary
policy arising via the consolidated intertemporal government budget constraint. The
first two chapters in this dissertation employ a formal structure which pertains to
this class of models. The rationale for this choice is that the chapters elaborate on
a monetary time consistency problem stemming from the lump-sum aspect of the
inflation tax in an economy with positive amounts of nominal government debt. A
basic perfectly competitive economy without any nominal rigidities is sufficient to
analyze the key mechanisms involved and has the additional advantage of resting
on a conceptually more stringent foundation.4
Relatedly, following a seminal contribution by Lucas (1990) another category of
monetary business cycle models maintains the assumption of flexible prices, but,
in addition to the cash constraint on transactions, imposes short-run restrictions
on certain financial transactions for a subset of economic agents. In these limited
asset market participation models, the non-neutrality of monetary policy arises
as a consequence of the implicit nominal rigidity in agents’ asset portfolios which
cannot be promptly reorganized as new information hits the economy. A central
empirical prediction derived from this setup is the liquidity effect, i.e. a negative
correlation of unanticipated money expansions and nominal interest rates in the
short-run. The third chapter of this dissertation employs a model of the limited
participation variety because this framework allows to conveniently incorporate
supply-side effects of monetary policy under the additional assumption that firms
need to finance part of their factor remuneration in advance.5 Moreover, with
limited asset market participation, it is straightforward to include institutions
of financial intermediation into the model in a meaningful way. In view of the
chapter’s objective to establish a link from monetary fluctuations to the endogenous
selection of available production technologies which is transmitted via monetary
policy’s implications for the comprehensiveness of financial intermediation, this is
an important consideration.6
4The point is that the literature starting from nominal rigidities and imperfect competition
generally assumes, either explicitly or implicitly, that the government has access to lump-sum taxes
to finance its budget as well as to production subsidies for the purpose of eliminating monopoly
distortions in product and factor markets; these assumptions are not well-aligned with the public
finance problem addressed in this thesis. See, however, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) for a
unifying approach which reconciles the two frameworks.
5This assumption gives rise to a cost channel of monetary transmission; compare e.g. Barth
and Ramey (2001).
6Finally, to give a balanced account of the literature, the recent strand of research addressing
5Monetary transmission: The key aspect of the monetary transmission mech-
anism which is formalized in the basic models of the neoclassical growth and limited
participation varieties is an interest rate channel. Interest rates influence economic
activity by affecting various relative prices in the economy. In a closed economy,
these are primarily the relative prices of capital and of future consumption in terms
of current consumption; moreover, nominal interest rates act as an additional op-
portunity cost of consumption on the consumption-leisure margin because the cash
constraint on transactions implies that agents need to forego interest rate earnings
on assets which, unlike cash balances, have a positive rate of return. Government
bonds constitute an important class of such alternative assets. In the spirit of Lucas
and Stokey (1983), chapters one and two employ a deterministic monetary model
without capital, but with nominal government debt; this framework is useful for
illustrating the role of expectations for the determination of nominal interest rates.
At the same time, the conduct of monetary policy is crucial for shaping the pub-
lic’s expectations. Under the maintained benchmark hypothesis of a sequentially
optimal implementation of monetary policy, there results an interesting fixed point
property in that an equilibrium requires (i) that monetary policy is optimal, given
predetermined private expectations, and (ii) that the formation of expectations must
rationally anticipate the ex post incentives faced by monetary policy. However, it
will be illustrated that the determination of such equilibrium does critically hinge
on the specification of fiscal policy. This underpins that monetary-fiscal interactions
are an important factor in the transmission of monetary policies.7
The interest rate channel encompasses a set of mechanisms which basically
unfold even in a Modigliani-Miller environment, i.e. independent of the existence
of any financial market frictions. However, financial frictions can play a crucial
role in amplifying the transmission mechanism and may even be a source of
fluctuations on their own.8 Against this background, the bank lending channel
questions in monetary theory and policy from a search-theoretic perspective should also be men-
tioned; see e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) for an early example. In contrast to the previously
discussed approaches, which start from an exogenously stipulated role for money, this literature is
explicit about the deep determinants of money demand by endogenously deriving it from a search
and matching framework. For some time, a drawback with this line of research has been that it
rests on highly stylized models which, in order to maintain tractability, abstract from empirically
important phenomena and thus preclude plausible business cycle analysis or policy recommenda-
tions. Although, as reported in Lagos and Wright (2005), there has been much progress along
these latter dimensions, this dissertation throughout retains the standard assumption of Walrasian
markets in order to focus on the particular problems it aims to analyze in greater detail.
7See chapter 23 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for a textbook illustration of how the infla-
tionary consequences of a given monetary open market operation depend on the specification of
fiscal policy.
8On these issues, compare e.g. Kocherlakota (2000) and Suarez and Sussman (1997).
6and the credit channel, each resting on the interaction of monetary policy with
particular financial market frictions, are important concepts.9 The bank lending
channel attributes the effects of monetary policy to movements in the supply
of bank credit. The essential feature of this transmission mechanism is that
monetary policy can affect the supply of credit by financial intermediaries by
altering the quantity of base money, thus changing the cost of capital faced by
bank-dependent borrowers. The credit channel, in stressing a role for credit in
general and not just bank lending, adopts a broader perspective. In a nutshell, the
credit channel draws the line not between bank and non-bank sources of funds,
but between internal and external sources of financing available to firms.10 The
generic implication of financial frictions then is that there exists an external finance
premium and that corporate activity is constrained below its first best level due
to the restricted availability of external funds. Since there is a wedge between the
cost of internal and external finance, firm level investment becomes sensitive to
variables such as net worth or cash flow. Whereas the bulk of the literature focuses
on the interaction of monetary policy, capital market imperfections and overall
investment (either at the aggregate, industry or firm level),11 the third chapter of
this dissertation considers the effects of nominal fluctuations on the composition of
overall investment (again, at the three relevant levels of aggregation). Specifically,
it allows for endogenous technology choice by entrepreneurial firms and stipulates
a moral hazard problem for a subset of the available technologies. This facilitates
a distinction between general short-term credit and liquidity, whereby the latter is
used to hedge technology-specific production risks. Based on a limited participation
setup, the model establishes a link from monetary policy to nominal interest rates
and the liquidity premium, thus endogenizing the composition of aggregate in-
vestment and making the case for a liquidity-based notion of monetary transmission.
Optimal policy and commitment versus discretion: The problem of op-
timal monetary and fiscal policy is the problem of assigning monetary and fiscal
instruments in a way such as to maximize social welfare. As will be argued below,
the respective problems facing monetary and fiscal policy makers cannot be treated
9For an overview, compare e.g. chapter 7 in Walsh (2003). The starting point for these trans-
mission channels are agency problems arising from assymmetric information in financial markets;
the latter can give rise to adverse selection, moral hazard or monitoring costs. Important theoret-
ical foundations are due to, among others, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Hart and Moore (1994) and
Townsend (1979).
10The credit view also stresses the importance of heterogeneity among corporate borrowers, e.g.
between small and large firms; compare e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) or, more recently, Cooley and Quadrini (2006) for a setup with explicit dynamics
among heterogenous, financially constrained firms.
11For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of financial frictions on
corporate investment see Hubbard (1998).
7separately from one another, the main reason being the consolidated government
budget constraint. From an optimal taxation perspective,12 the literature on opti-
mal policy can broadly be classified according to two criteria. The first one relates
to restrictions of the set of instruments available to a policy maker and differenti-
ates the Ramsey approach from the Mirrlees (1971) approach to optimal taxation.
The solution to an optimal policy problem from a Ramsey perspective is restricted
due to the policy maker having access only to distortionary instruments, thus ruling
out lump-sum taxes. Conversely, the Mirrlees approach does not restrict the set of
policy instruments in an ad hoc way, but starts from informational frictions which
endogenously restrict the set of instruments implementing the optimal allocation. In
any case, for an allocation to be implementable, it must be possible to decentralize
the allocation as a competetive equilibrium, given the planner’s restrictions on dis-
posable instruments and information; this means that implementability and, where
applicable, incentive-compatibility constraints need to be respected. The reformu-
lation of the policy problem in terms of these restrictions on the set of allocations
which can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium is called a primal approach.
The second classification criterion relates to the question of whether policy mak-
ers have access to a commitment technology in the sense of being able to make
intertemporally binding policy choices. This question is of central importance if
optimal policies are dynamically inconsistent, i.e. in situations where a sequential
policy maker who reconsiders a previously announced optimal policy plan faces in-
centives to revise her choices. Indeed, it is a pervasive feature of dynamic models
of optimal policy making that socially desirable policies may suffer from a lack of
credibility. Specifically, absent a commitment technology the prediction is that such
policies cannot be implemented because the costs of policy decisions are not fully
internalized by the policy maker. The well-known reason behind this time incon-
sistency problem is that a sequential decision maker, in taking private expectations
as given, neglects the influence of her current policy choices on the past formation
of the public’s forward-looking expectations. Optimal policies implemented under
commitment are called Ramsey policies. The relevant protocol for optimal policies
without commitment depends on how precisely the history of past behavior impinges
on current agents’ strategies, i.e. the analysis needs to be formalized as a dynamic
game. If the class of admissible strategies is reputation-free and restricted to map-
12For a review of the literature as well as an exposition of the methodology see Chari and Kehoe
(1998). There is a closely related branch of the literature which frames optimal policy problems in
terms of stabilization policies in response to stochastic shocks hitting an economy subject to a set
of frictions such as price stickiness and monopolistic competition. The main concern there is to
investigate how optimal policies (within a restricted class) depend on the type of shocks affecting
the economy as well as to design policies such as to rule out indeterminacy of equilibria. Compare
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004, 2006) for important examples of the two strands of the literature
in the context of monetary and fiscal policies.
8pings whereby the past influences the current play only through its effect on a set
of endogenous state variables, which summarize the direct effect of the past on the
current environment, the relevant equilibrium concept is Markovian.13
The policy problems posed in chapters one and two are set up in the tradition
of the Ramsey (as opposed to the Mirrlees) literature as far as the assumptions on
the information and the set of instruments available to policy makers is concerned.
However, considering an environment where there is no explicit commitment
technology, the chapters focus on sequential implementation of policies, whereby
an equilibrium under optimal policy obtains as a Markov-perfect equilibrium (as
opposed to a Ramsey equilibrium).14 Against this background, an important
innovation proposed there is to take prevailing policy institutions seriously and to
consider optimal policies implemented not by a ficticious monolithic policy maker
controlling the complete set of available instruments, but by a sequence of pairs
of interacting policy makers who are each independently commissioned with the
conduct of monetary and fiscal policy, respectively. This highlights an important
aspect of monetary-fiscal interactions, which has not yet been addressed in the
existing literature on optimal macroeconomic policies because it either proceeds
under a monolithic agency assumption or dichotomizes the relevant policy problems.
Monetary-fiscal interactions and government debt: The fact that mone-
tary and fiscal policies are interdependet with respect to their effects on the economy
is well-recognized. In their unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, Sargent and Wallace
(1981) demonstrate the importance of the intertemporal government budget con-
straint and hence the role of fiscal policy for the determination of the inflationary
consequences of monetary policies. At the same time, the authors stress that the
conclusions to be drawn from a joint analysis of monetary and fiscal policies crucially
depend on the assumptions about the applicability of certain policy regimes. These
propositions have been taken up by the fiscal theory of the price level as developed
by, among others, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994). The basic
tenet of this theory is that a change in a dynamic fiscal policy, organizing a debt-
financed tax cut today under the maintained unconditional commitment to a given
sequence of future primary budget deficits, induces wealth effects which trigger an
adjustment of the current price level to restore an equilibrium. The theoretical foun-
dation underlying this mechanism is controversial. Moreover, it is not clear whether
the policies needed to generate fiscalist dynamics can be rationalized as part of an
optimal government plan. Models of optimal policy, endogenizing monetary and
13Alternatively, allowing for reputational mechanisms, the analysis can be cast within the frame-
work of sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990) or more general techniques for solving repeated
games (Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1990).
14In contrast, chapter three does not pursue a normative, but a positive agenda.
9fiscal policy choices as the result of explicit optimization exercises with well-defined
constraints, lend themselves to analyze these questions. However, a drawback with
these contributions is that they generally start from the assumption that there is
only one entity which effectively decides about the complete set of policy instru-
ments. Alternatively, when the focus of the analysis is on monetary (fiscal) policy,
it is essentially assumed that fiscal (monetary) policy is absent or exogenously given
to the model. Consequently, such approaches offer only limited insights into dynamic
monetary-fiscal interactions. Therefore, it is important to understand (i) how and
(ii) which policies are implemented under the decentralized authority of interacting
and sequentially optimizing policy makers; the first two chapters of this dissertation
are concerened with precisely this exercise for two different economic environments.
Against this background, the dynamic evolution of government debt plays a cru-
cial role because the intertemporal government budget constraint, which keeps track
of the indebtedness of the public sector against the private sector, consolidates the
budgets of monetary and fiscal authorities. Hence, government debt is both an
important primitive for the determination of macroeconomic policy choices and a
source of interdependence between monetary and fiscal policies.15 Indeed, the argu-
ments put forward in the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the fiscal theory of
the price level hinge on the existence of outstanding government debt. Moreover, in
stochastic environments government debt constitutes an important device for insur-
ing against macroeconomic (e.g. budgetary) and idiosyncratic risks, i.e. it serves as
a cyclical shock absorber.16 In this context, an important consideration is the fact
that government debt is generally issued in nominal terms.17 On the one hand, the
real ex-post returns on nominal bonds can be made state contingent by engineering
appropriate changes in the price level; hence, even if the government is constrained
15In their review on government debt, Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) argue that, apart from
its short-run effects on aggregate demand if Ricardian equivalence fails to hold and its long-run
effects on capital accumulation (Diamond, 1965), government debt affects the economy also via the
following economic mechanisms: (i) it can affect monetary policy; (ii) it gives rise to a deadweight
loss due to the taxes needed to service public liabilities; (iii) it alters the political process that
determines fiscal policy; (iv) it may make the economy more vulnerable to confidence crises and
impose further constraints on policies.
16As regards aggregate risk, the main arguments evolve around the opportunity of tax smoothing
in the face of shocks to aggregate productivity and government expenditures; compare Barro (1979),
Lucas and Stokey (1983) or Aiyagari et al. (2002). Insurance against idiosyncratic risks plays a
role in incomplete markets environments, where government debt facilitates precautionary savings
or helps to relax incentive problems; compare e.g. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) or Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1998). Shin (2006) provides a synthesis in terms of competing private and public
insurance motives.
17At the end of 2003, the ratio of central government debt to GDP was 38.8% in Germany, 24.7%
in Mexico, 40.1% in the UK and 35.3% in the US; for the same countries, the share of index-linked
bonds in total bonds amounted to 0.0%, 6.8%, 24.0% and 6.5%, respectively, the remainder being
nominal non state contingent bonds; compare OECD (2005).
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to issue nominally risk-free bonds, monetary policy can be used to complete markets
by appropriately taxing the returns on nominal government debt.18 On the other
hand, since outstanding government debt in nominal denomination constitutes an
inelastic tax base, sequentially optimizing policy makers will generally face incen-
tives to relax their debt burden by eroding the real value of their liabilities through
the inflation tax; in other words, nominal government debt is the source of a time
consistency problem.
A recurring theme regarding the optimal conduct of monetary policy is the
Friedman (1969) rule, i.e. the prescription of zero nominal interest rates in order to
minimze the deadweight loss due to the implicit tax on consumption.19 However,
Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) point out the difficulty of credibly implementing
such a policy in economies with outstanding nominal government debt because
of the temptation to inflate in order to reduce the real value of the liabilities.
Following ideas evolving around managing the maturity structure of government
debt in a way such as to make markets complete even with non-contingent debt,20
there have been proposals to overcome the time consistency problem caused by
the existence of nominal government debt. In particular, Alvarez, Kehoe and
Neumeyer (2004) consider a variety of monetary models and show that, if the
optimal monetary policy under commitment is to follow the Friedman rule, then the
time consistency problem can be solved by issuing a mixture of nominal and real
(indexed) bonds in a way such that the present value of nominal claims is zero.21
The first chapter in this dissertation shows that the decentralization of decision
authority between monetary and fiscal policy makers may be another possibility
to achieve this objective; there, what helps to sustain non-inflationary equilibria
is a coordination failure among monetary and fiscal policy makers. Against the
background of the empirical fact of substantial amounts of nominal government li-
abilities (cf. fn. 16 for data on a set of OECD countries), this is an important result.
Dynamic general equilibrium: It has been argued above that the problems
addressed in this dissertation blend normative and positive aspects. Especially the
normative and quantitative dimensions of this program make it necessary to consider
microfounded dynamic general equilibrium models rather than ad hoc specifications
of reduced forms. While this comes at some cost in terms of modeling effort, there
are a number of decisive advantages. First of all, models cast in a dynamic general
18Compare Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991).
19Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) identify sufficient conditions for the optimality of the
Friedman rule and relate their results to principles of optimal taxation.
20See Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004).
21Persson, Persson and Svensson (2006) generalize this result to an economy where the Friedman
rule is not optimal. Alternative approaches to overcome of mitigate monetary time consistency
problems are reviewed in chapters one and two.
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equilibrium framework allow to investigate the pertinent quantitative implications
in greater detail and hence generate more robust empirical predictions. This is for
a variety of reasons. Most importantly, a dynamic general equilibrium framework
is indispensable to understand the formation and role of intertemporal prices such
as real and nominal interest rates and their interplay with agents’ dynamic deci-
sions with respect to the intertemporal accumulation of real or financial wealth in
the form of physical capital, money, bonds or other assets. In particular, dynamic
general equilibrium models comprise explicitly forward-looking behavior of all eco-
nomic agents; hence, current equilibrium outcomes are influenced by expectations
with respect to the future. To the extent that macroeconomic policies implemented
in the future affect the ensuing set of allocations and prices, this is incorporated into
the formation of rational expectations. On the other hand, which set of policies is
optimal from a government authority’s perspective generally depends on the public’s
expectations formed in the past. This reasoning illustrates that, for many macro-
economic policy problems, a well-defined concept for economic welfare, deriving
from first principles rather than a postulated loss function, is inherently dynamic.22
Similarly, the formulation of optimal policy problems based on reduced forms in
general or linear-quadratic approximations in particular may result in misleading
conclusions because often (or by construction in case of a linear-quadratic setup)
the prediction is a unique equilibrium, whereas the true model allows for multiple
equilibria.23 The point is that the nonlinearities implied by a general equilibrium
economy subject to endogenous policies may provide scope for (additional) self-
fulfilling feedback mechanisms. Expectation traps, i.e. situations where a change in
agents’ expectations induces them to take ”defensive actions” which, in turn, trap
the policy maker into accommodating the change in expectations, are an instance
of such equilibrium multiplicity.24
These arguments forcefully underpin the necessity of a dynamic general equilib-
rium setup to meaningfully investigate the determination of macroeconomic policies
and the way they interact with the economy. A fortiori, this is true for the analyis
of the interaction among distinct macroeconomic policymakers (chapters one and
two) and the interaction of government policies with specific contract relationships
22For an instructive example clarifying what can go wrong when a dynamic policy problem is
represented in terms of a (sequence of) static loss function(s), see the discussion of Krugman (1996)
by Kehoe (1996).
23It is important to distinguish this concept of multiplicity (of locally unique equilibria) from
the notion of local indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria. Compare King and Wolman
(2004) for an excellent discussion.
24In the context of monetary policy, an interesting example for a diverging pattern of predictions
depending on the respective model specification can be obtained by comparing the linear-quadratic
setup in Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) with its generalization to a full general equilibrium economy
in Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2001, 2003); other examples include Calvo (1988), King and
Wolman (2004) and Siu (2005).
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among private agents (chapter three). It is for these reasons that the chapters of
this dissertation all share the principle that they embed a set of game-theoretic and
contract-theoretic bulding blocks into fully articulated dynamic general equilibrium
economies rather than working out their implications in isolation.
In the next section, we summarize the contents and contributions of the individ-
ual chapters in this dissertation. Chapters one and two are concerned with problems
of dynamic monetary-fiscal interactions, whereas chapter three considers the inter-
play between monetary policy and financial markets’ capacity to provide liquidity
to the productive sector as well as the pertinent implications for an economy’s ag-
gregate productivity.
Chapter summaries
Chapter one: The first chapter reconsiders the problem of the dynamic inconsis-
tency of optimal policies on the basis of a deterministic model formalizing the in-
teraction of monetary and fiscal policies. Drawing on Lucas and Stokey (1983), the
environment is a monetary production economy with nominal government debt, but
without physical capital. The government sector, consisting of a fiscal and a mone-
tary authority who interact subject to a consolidated government budget constraint,
faces the task of optimally financing an exogenous sequence of public expenditures.
The sources of revenue are a linear consumption tax as well as seignorage from in-
flationary monetary expansions; since money is required to purchase goods, both of
these instruments are distortionary. However, given that government debt is issued
in nominal terms, the inflationary distortions introduced by monetary policy have
the additional effect of deflating the real value of the outstanding government liabil-
ities. Under single agency, the situation considered by orthodox optimal taxation
models, this makes it attractive for a benevolent planner to create inflation because
the latter lump-sum aspect of the inflation tax allows to economize on future distor-
tionary taxation. The result is a time consistency problem, whereby in equilibrium
the public correctly anticipates the policy maker’s incentive to generate unantici-
pated expansions, thus increasing the interest rate costs of outstanding debt even
if there are no unanticipated inflation episodes. Since non-inflationary policies can-
not be credibly implemented, there is an inflation bias,25 and from this perspective
nominal government debt constitutes a burden on monetary policy. Consequently,
absent a commitment technology, the optimal sequential policy is to progressively
deplete the outstanding stock of debt until the extra liability costs vanish.
Against this background, we argue that above reasoning critically hinges on
25Here, and in what follows, inflation bias refers to a situation where the rate of money growth
is systematically related to the stock of real government debt.
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the assumption that there is only a single monolithic policy maker who controls
the complete set of available policy instruments. For that purpose, the policy
problem described above is recast in a way such that both the fiscal authority
and an independent central bank do implement their respective policies separately
from one another. In contrast, the assumption that there is no intertemporal
commitment technology is maintained. This means that the authorities interact
strategically in a dynamic game, where - because it shapes the monetary incentives
to create inflation - a measure of the real debt burden inherited from the past
takes the role of the decisive state variable. Now, employing game-theoretic tools,
we (i) establish the existence of a Markov-perfect equilibrium under decentralized
authority and (ii) analyze its key properties. Of central interest is the finding
that the separation of decision power among the two authorities can eliminate
the inflation bias and make the optimal policies under sequential implementation
time consistent. The reason for this is that the fiscal authority’s policy choices
give rise to an additional constraint faced by the monetary authority in that now
the distortions imposed by the fiscal consumption tax cannot be substituted away
by means of a monetary expansion. Formally, this is an instance of coordination
failure, and the consequence is that the monetary time consistency problem may
vanish even for positive amounts of public liabilities such that a non-inflationary
policy can be credibly implemented. However, this favorable result is conditional
on a fiscal policy keeping the stock of real government debt constant. In detail,
decentralized authority allows for the emergence of multiple equilibria. Specifically,
a first equilibrium, called quasi-single agency equilibrium, perfectly replicates the
allocation implemented by a monolithic sequential policy maker controlling the
complete set of monetary and fiscal instruments. Here, monetary policy is always
marginally responsive to the real value of outstanding liabilities. Additionally, there
is another equilibrium, denoted quasi-indexation equilibrium, which implements
the allocation otherwise attainable only in an economy with indexed debt. With
indexed debt, there is no time consistency problem by construction; it follows
that decentralized authority provides scope for overcoming the time consistency
problem: Monetary policy is no longer systematically related to the real value of
the stock of debt, and fiscal policy imposes taxes such as to keep the level of real
debt constant (”balance the budget”). Although the two equilibria can be ranked in
welfare terms, we do not offer a strong equilibrium selection argument. What can
be said, though, is that fiscal behavior is a decisive determinant of the incentives
faced by the monetary authority. In this sense, inflation is to be seen as a fiscal
phenomenon.
Chapter two: The next chapter further elaborates on the this conclusion and
argues that the long-term level of public liabilities and inflation can be explained as
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the endogenous outcome of a dynamic game played between the interacting fiscal
and monetary policy authorities. Specifically, the benchmark model from the first
chapter is perturbed in that (i) the central bank is assumed to be ”conservative” in
the sense of attaching excessive weight on an inflationary loss term and (ii) the fiscal
authority is modelled as ”impatient” in the sense of discounting future payoffs at
a higher rate that the public does. These modifications are best understood in the
light of politico-economic considerations, and, importantly, do reflect empirically
relevant institutions such as the expressed concern for price stability in many central
bank statutes. Thus, the chapter’s principal objective is to provide a positive theory
of the dynamics of government debt and inflation. The key implication of the
assumption of fiscal impatience is that the conduct of fiscal policy is characterized
by a tendency to accumulate public debt. This means that the monetary authority
faces a situation where the fiscal policy maker is unwilling to periodically balance
the budget. The consequence is that the monetary incentives to create inflation
necessarily reappear, thus eliminating the favorable quasi-indexation equilibrium
existing in the unperturbed setup of chapter one. The equilibrium outcome of
the dynamic game is a path of real debt converging to a finite positive level and
associated with a steady state inflation bias. Two conclusions can be drawn: First,
the inflation bias is the result of the fiscal authority gaining leverage also over the
nominal properties of the equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the model can be seen
as providing a game-theoretic foundation for the propositions made in the fiscal
theory of the price level; importantly, however, the mechanics generating fiscalist
equilibrium outcomes are driven by the sequential optimality of the authorities’
policy choices rather than perceived wealth effects of private agents and are
therefore different from those proposed in the fiscal theory itself. Specifically, the
fiscal authority has the power to reject certain (classes of) equilibria,26 while the
monetary authority is always marginally responsive to the stock of debt. Second,
variations in the two critical parameters, the degrees of monetary conservatism and
fiscal impatience, respectively, lead to the interesting observation that increased
monetary conservatism, i.e. a higher weight on the inflationary loss term in the
monetary authority’s objective function, may have adverse welfare implications.
The reason for this is that increased inflation aversion gives rise to a superior, but
still incomplete commitment capacity not to engage in inflationary expansions.
While this direct effect is desirable, there is also an indirect strategic effect with
adverse consequences: The monetary authority’s increased conservatism implies
that any given level of real government debt can be sustained at a lower inflation
rate. Since the fiscal authority, despite its relative impatience, also cares about
the economy’s future performance and hence about future inflation, it issues more
debt the more inflation averse the central bank is. This debt has to be serviced by
26On this point, compare e.g. Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) or Bassetto (2002, 2005).
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means of distortionary government activity, crowds out private consumption and
results in lower welfare.
Conceptually, the main innovation of the framework underlying the first two
chapters is to formalize the problem of dynamic monetary-fiscal interactions
from a game-theoretic perspective. The central question asked is: What is the
nature of optimal monetary and fiscal policies if interacting policy makers decide
on their respective instruments in a decentralized fashion? This question also
motivates the key modification of the modelling approach, which differentiates the
approach from conventional models of optimal macroeconomic policy and reflects
the institutional provisions observed in most advanced economies, namely that
monetary and fiscal policies are generally implemented by distinct and autonomous
authorities. Formally, this converts the dynamic optimal taxation setup into a
dynamic game. Throughout, the focus is on sequentially optimal policies without
commitment, which further complicates the analysis because, in addition to the
respective opponent’s play, each policy maker has to take into account also the
forward-looking formation of private expectations. Critical in this context is that
the game is not of a simple repeated variety, but features an endogenous state
variable (a measure of the real value of inherited public liabilities). Abstracting
from reputational effects, the focus is on Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies and
outcomes.27 Then each policy authority’s calculus comprises both the effects of
the respective policy choice on current payoffs and the effects from strategically
manipulating the endogenous state variable because the latter shapes the incentives
faced by future policy makers. Methodologically, the analysis builds on a solution
procedure proposed by Klein, Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (2005), which is modified to
accommodate multiple policy makers solving their primal policy problems over the
same allocation. Chapter one proves existence of a Markov-perfect equilibrium,
which is of some importance since so far the knowledge about the structure
of policy games in general equilibrium economies is limited. The qualitative
characterization of the equilibrium outcomes proceeds via first order conditions
with a neat economic interpretation; quantitatively, the explicit solution for equi-
librium outcomes relies on numerical methods. The setup does not lend itself to a
linear-quadratic approximation or, more generally, any local solution method. The
reason is that the application of local approximation methods requires knowledge
about the steady state, which is not available before the policy game is not solved;
27The justification for this restriction on the set of admissible strategies is that Markovian
equilibria are self-reinforcing in a natural way (the best response to a Markov strategy is again a
Markov strategy) and that they hinge on minimal informational requirements. Moreover, because
history does not matter except for its direct influence transmitted via the inherited endogenous
state variable, Markov equilibria have very clear-cut equilibrium predictions and, if differentiable,
are numerically relatively tractable.
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moreover, as argued above, linear-quadratic methods may fail to detect equilibrium
multiplicity. Therefore, as advocated by Judd (1998), the numerical analysis ap-
plies global projection methods, here a collocation on a one-dimensional state space.
Chapter three: The third chapter has a different focus. It employs a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with a financial market friction to rationalize
the empirically observed negative relationship between inflation and total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP).28 Specifically, an empirical inspection of US data establishes that,
at business cycle (i.e. quarterly and yearly) frequencies, there is a negative causal
effect of inflation on aggregate productivity; conversely, inflation is found to be ex-
ogenous with respect to aggregate productivity. This latter piece of information is
important since it is at odds with the argument that negative supply shocks are the
principal reason for why inflation and aggregate productivity are negatively related
over the cycle. Against this background, we put forward the hypothesis that the
interaction between monetary policy and financial markets’ capacity to intermediate
scarce liquidity is an important factor which helps to explain the empirical evidence.
For that purpose, rather than taking the productivity process as exogenous, we set
up a model featuring an endogenous component of aggregate productivity. This is
achieved by allowing for endogenous technology choice on behalf of entrepreneur-
ial firms subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, whereby a moral hazard problem
in the spirit of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) prevents complete insurance against
this risk. In detail, firms’ physical investment can be channelled into two different
technologies: a safe, but return-dominated ”basic” technology and an ”advanced”
technology yielding higher expected returns, but subject to liquidity risk.29 Firms
can hold a buffer stock of readily marketable assets to partially insure their ad-
vanced activities, but this comes at the cost of a liquidity premium. In the model,
this liquidity premium coincides with the nominal interest rate. Given the under-
lying limited participation structure, monetary policy affects nominal interest rates
in two ways: (i) systematically, because higher rates of money growth feed into
higher nominal interest rates, and (ii) on impact, because unexpected monetary ex-
pansions have a liquidity effect. In this environment, the model demonstrates how
nominal interest rate distortions influence not only the overall amount, but also the
qualitative composition of aggregate investment. The transmission mechanism is
shown to hinge on the differential importance of holding costly liquidity across the
set of available technologies; hence, there results an investment composition effect
triggered by variations in monetary policy. At the level of an aggregate production
function, understood as an equilibrium relationship mapping aggregate inputs into
28Here, and in what follows, TFP is to be understood as the Solow residual generated from a
calibrated aggregate production function employing capital and effective labor.
29For a similar setup, compare Aghion et al. (2006).
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aggregate output, this means that shocks to monetary policy and aggregate pro-
ductivity are not orthogonal; in contrast, there is a systematic negative supply-side
effect of inflation on aggregate productivity.
In summary, the theoretical model makes a number of empirical predictions
linking the adverse effects of inflation to nominal interest rate distortions which,
by increasing the costs of corporate liquidity holdings, shift the composition of
aggregate investment towards less productive activities. As a first step, in order
to gain insights with respect to the quantitative importance of these effects, the
model is calibrated to US business cycle data and then subjected to a number of
numerical experiments; the pertinent findings further corroborate the conclusion
that monetary policy shocks can account for a significant proportion of the variation
in TFP. Moreover, we complement the empirical results relating to US aggregate
data on inflation and TFP by a detailed analysis of disaggregate industry-level and
firm-level panel data. This analysis provides comprehensive evidence consistent
with (i) the implications of constrained-efficient contracting with respect to the
postulated agency problem, (ii) the notion that liquidity risk is indeed concentrated
in industrial sectors which are relatively exposed to advanced technologies, as well
as (iii) the hypothesis that corporate liquidity holdings are used as a precautionary
buffer stock to hedge investment into advanced technologies (as proxied by firm
level R&D expenditures). In addition, the scope of such insurance is negatively
affected by the level of inflation and, as predicted by the model, depends on a set of
industry-level characteristics. Overall, we view the empirical evidence as strongly
supportive of the particular theory proposed in the theoretical model.
The main contribution of chapter three is an empirical one. On the theoretical
side, it embeds the contracting problem due to Homstro¨m and Tirole (1998) into
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. This facilitates the derivation
of some higher-order implications of the contracting scheme which are driven by
general equilibrium effects. Moreover, the model’s structure is exploited as an
explicit device to aggregate quantities from the menue of available technology into
an implied aggregate production function. These aspects make the underlying
monetary business cycle model a coherent system within which the theoretical ar-
guments are formalized. Turning to the chapter’s empirical perspective, we address
the following set of questions: What is the relation between inflation and aggregate
productivity? Which role does monetary policy play for the determination of
aggregate productivity? How do nominal distortions affect the allocation of firms’
physical investment? Utilizing dynamic panel estimation methods due to Arellano
and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), we investigate these questions on
the basis of panel data at different levels of aggregation. Relying on instruments
whose validity is testable, this approach allows for identification of causal effects
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rather than mere correlations. As hinted above, the evidence emerging from the
panel regressions is consistent with the theoretically postulated chain running
from inflation over corporate liquidity demand and the composition of physical
investment to the evolution of aggregate productivity.
This introductory preview has summarized the contents of the chapters follow-
ing below; it has emphasized a number of overarching themes that the individual
approaches have in common. A short concluding chapter will take up a number of
these issues again. Notwithstanding, the following three chapters are each devised
as independent, self-contained units.
Chapter 1
On the Time Consistency of
Optimal Policies with Interacting
Authorities
1.1 Introduction
The issue of the credibility of macroeconomic policies has been first analyzed from
a formal perspective by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978). In the
subsequent literature, it has turned out as a pervasive feature of dynamic models of
optimal policy making that desirable policies may suffer from a lack of credibility
when the policy maker cannot command a non-distortionary policy instrument. In
such environments, the socially optimal policy in the absence of ex-post incentive
constraints generally yields a second best outcome. However, if the policy maker
does not have access to a commitment technology, the prediction is that such second
best policies cannot be implemented because the costs of policy decisions are not
fully internalized by the policy maker. The well-known reason behind this time con-
sistency problem is that a sequential decision maker, in taking private expectations
as given, neglects the influence of his current policy choices on the past formation of
the public’s forward-looking expectations. The problem of time inconsistency can
then be dealt with in several ways. The ideas generally evolve around introducing
some form of indirect commitment through the design of appropriate institutions
like rules, contracts, delegation or a richer set of policy instruments with built-in ir-
reversibilites. With an infinite time horizon, another way to reach ”good” outcomes
even without commitment is to rely on reputational mechanisms. For example,
Barro and Gordon (1983b) have illustrated in a repeated setting how reputational
forces can substitute for formal rules by constructing a policy equilibrium where a
simple trigger strategy governs the public’s formation of expectations.
In the present paper, we explicitly acknowledge the fact that policies are imple-
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mented sequentially and assume that (i) a commitment technology is not available
and that (ii) reputational mechanisms are not at work. We then identify a new
mechanism which can help to overcome the time consistency problem faced by a
single decision making unit. Specifically, we show how the decentralization of deci-
sion authority over the available policy instruments among interacting policy makers
can change the latters’ dynamic incentive constraints in a way that eliminates the
temptation to surprise the public. It is worthwhile to stress that our concept of
decentralization does not employ reputation or other history-dependent punishment
mechanisms. While our results are derived in the context of a particular model, we
believe that the identified mechanism has more general relevance.
The model framework considered is a simple monetary dynamic general equilib-
rium economy without capital, as introduced by Lucas and Stokey (1983). In such an
economy, Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) analyze from an optimal taxation perspective
the dynamic distortions that are caused by outstanding nominal government debt.
With a particular specification of preferences,1 their central findings for the case of
a monolithic single policy maker who controls both monetary and fiscal policy in-
struments are the following: With nominal one-period debt (and unindexed bonds),
there is an incentive to reduce the stock of debt through unanticipated inflation be-
cause the lump-sum aspect of the inflation tax allows to economize on distortionary
taxation; this creates the standard time inconsistency problem. In the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium, the ex-post incentive to generate inflation increases the costs
of outstanding debt even if there are no unanticipated inflation episodes. Therefore,
the optimal policy under sequential choice and no commitment is to progressively
deplete the outstanding stock of debt until the extra liability costs vanish. The au-
thors’ general message thus is that, with nominal debt and sequential policy making,
the optimal policy (inflation) will not only depend on elasticities as in a standard
model of Ramsey-optimal taxation, but also on the marginal gain from changing the
real value of the existing debt.
In the present paper, we reconsider this dynamic policy making problem from
a strategic perspective with interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. This
makes it necessary to resort to game-theoretic methods. Since our starting point is
that reputational mechanisms cannot be relied upon, a natural way to analyze the
dynamic evolution of the economy is to consider Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE)
only. With this class of strategies, the past influences the current play only through
its effect on a set of state variables which summarize the direct effect of the past
on the current environment. While the restriction to MPE comes at the cost of not
being able to identify all equilibria that can possibly be sustained (e.g. by means
of history-dependent reputational mechanisms), it has the advantage of imposing
1Martin (2006) generalizes the results obtained by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006); we will return
to this issue below.
21
only minimal informational requirements on the policy makers and of facilitating
the identification of differentiable equilibria by first order conditions which allow for
a straightforward economic interpretation.
Our model setup differs from a standard model of optimal policy only along one
dimension, namely the introduction of a second policy authority. Given the institu-
tional provisions prevailing in most advanced economies, we see the assumption of
two interacting policy authorities who take their decisions independently, but sub-
ject to a consolidated government budget constraint as a realistic one. Nevertheless,
the paper’s main point is of a conceptual nature. Starting from the results in Dı´az-
Gime´nez et al. (2006), we deal with the case of a dynamic game where policies are
implemented sequentially, but, in each period, the two authorities move simultane-
ously. The key finding is that with decentralized authority over the relevant policy
instruments, the supply of money balances and a linear consumption tax, there is
scope for coordinating private expectations in a favorable way. Specifically, the MPE
allocation from the case of a single policy maker is no longer the only equilibrium out-
come, and the previously identified inflation bias may vanish even for positive levels
of outstanding government debt. With such multiplicity of equilibria, expectations
about the future play are key to pin down current policy choices. The presence of an
independent fiscal authority lacking access to a non-distortionary policy instrument
introduces an additional constraint on implementable allocations faced by the mon-
etary policy maker; the reason is that the current fiscal policy needs to be taken as
given rather than as a free choice variable. Hence, unlike the standard setup where a
monolithic sequential policy maker uses the inflation tax to substitute for the fiscal
consumption tax, under interaction it is the case that distortions introduced by the
current fiscal play cannot be removed. The consequence is that the welfare costs of
imposing on private agents the inflation tax in addition to the fiscal consumption tax
may become excessively high. Therefore, private expectations about a continuation
play not subject to an inflation bias become rational. And given such expectations,
there is room for current policies generating enough fiscal revenue to keep the level of
government debt constant without recurring to the inflation tax. Hence, besides the
single-agency equilibrium described in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) there exists also a
MPE where the associated dynamically consistent policies implement a true second
best outcome. Thus, while the established view from the public finance literature
suggests that fiscal (mis)behavior may contribute to the monetary time consistency
problem, this paper highlights a mechanism working in the opposite direction: It is
precisely the presence of a dynamically optimizing fiscal authority which may help
to put discipline on the monetary authority’s dynamic choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section sets up the
model and defines a competitive equilibrium for our economy. Then, section 3 lays
out the structure of the policy game between the monetary and the fiscal authority.
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Section 4 briefly comments on the solution strategy to find the MPE, before the
subsequent section establishes the existence of a MPE and describes the equilibrium
outcomes. Finally, the paper concludes with a review of the related literature and
some further remarks. Technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 The model
The object of our analysis is a monetary dynamic general equilibrium model econ-
omy which is made up of a government sector and a private sector. As in Lucas and
Stokey (1983) there is no capital. The government sector consists of a monetary
authority and a fiscal authority who take their decisions independently. The fiscal
authority collects consumption taxes2 τ ct in order to finance an exogenously given
stream of public expenditures gt. For the time being, we let gt = g be determin-
istic and constant over time. The policy instrument controlled by the monetary
authority is the supply of money M gt+1 (the superscript g is used to distinguish an
aggregate variable from an individual variable where necessary), whereby seignorage
revenues from money creation M gt+1 −M gt are used to purchase g from the private
households. Hence, the two government authorities interact via a consolidated gov-
ernment budget constraint, but decision power remains decentralized among the two
independent institutions. Finally, we assume that the fiscal authority, besides its
tax policy, issues nominal one-period bonds Bgt+1, whereby the quantity of bonds
traded is determined by the following flow budget constraint for the government
sector which has to be satisfied for all t ≥ 0:
M gt+1 +B
g
t+1 + Ptτ
c
t ct ≥M gt +Bgt (1 +Rt) + Ptg (1.1)
Here, Pt is the price level prevailing at time t, while Rt is the nominal interest rate
paid on the bonds issued at date t−1. The initial stock of moneyM g0 and the initial
debt liabilities Bg0(1+R0) are given. However, we will impose the additional consis-
tency condition that, in the rational expectations equilibrium, there is no surprise
inflation in the initial (t = 0) period; thus, by linking the nominal interest rate R0 to
the equilibrium rate of inflation in the first period, we prevent the authorities from
taking advantage of the inelasticity of the amount of oustanding nominal balances
M0 and B0 in the initial period.
On the private side, the economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical
infinitely-lived households whose preferences over sequences of consumption ct and
2An alternative specification would be to use labor taxation, τnt . However, against the back-
ground of the general equivalence results for different forms of taxation, the choice of the tax
instrument assigned to the fiscal authority is irrelevant so that our specification is without loss of
generality.
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labor nt can be represented by the following additively-separable expression:
∞∑
t=0
βt {u(ct)− v(nt)} , (1.2)
where the discount factor β satisfies 0 < β < 1. In what follows, we will assume
u(ct) = log(ct) and v(nt) = αnt.
3 Each consumer faces the following sequence of
budget constraints:
Mt+1 +Bt+1 ≤Mt − Pt(1 + τ ct )ct +Bt(1 +Rt) +Wtnt, (1.3)
where Wt is the nominal wage and Bt+1 andMt+1 are nominal government debt and
nominal money balances taken over from period t to period t+ 1. We assume that
each consumer faces a no-Ponzi condition that prevents him from running explosive
consumption/debt schemes:
limT→∞βT
BT+1
PT
≥ 0 (1.4)
As a shortcut for introducing a well-defined money demand we additionally as-
sume that the gross-of-tax consumption expenditure in period t must be financed
using currency carried over from period t − 1, which implies the following cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint:
Mt ≥ Pt(1 + τ ct )ct (1.5)
The timing structure underlying this CIA constraint follows Svensson (1985). Specif-
ically, we assume that newly injected money transfers are not available for purchasing
private consumption until the next period. Consequently, the purchases of goods
have to be undertaken before nominal balances can be reshuffled optimally, and the
CIA constraint may not allow to realize the desired consumption. Moreover, the
information about the money injection leads to an immediate price reaction. Hence,
the effects of inflation are twofold: First, expected inflation leads to a distortion
via its effect on the nominal interest rate. Second, surprise inflation is distortionary
since the households are constrained in their consumption decisions by the value of
3The assumption of linear disutility of labor is made to sharpen the discussion, but implies
also that the government sector cannot affect the real interest rate. Conversely, the assumption
of log utility from consumption allows to focus on the role of nominal debt as a source of time
inconsistency rather than on the effects due to private holdings of nominal money balances. That
is, we abstract from seignorage on base money and focus on the implications of changing the real
value of nominal debt. Importantly, this focus is consistent with the situation in most developed
economies where government debt is arguably more important than money holdings as a source
of dynamically inconsistent incentives. See also Nicolini (1998) for an instructive exposition of the
nature of the time inconsistency of monetary policy and Martin (2006) for results with a more
general specification of preferences.
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the money balances taken over from the previous period.4 Importantly, therefore,
monetary policy has wealth effects and is not neutral. For a benevolent monetary
authority this means that it trades off the reduction in the households’ current
utility and the increase in future utility which results from the reduction in future
distortions when it considers whether or not to carry out a surprise inflation.
The productive side of the model economy is extremely simple since there is no
capital. In each period, labor nt can be transformed into private consumption ct
or public consumption g at a constant rate, which we assume to be one. Then,
the equilibrium real wage is wt ≡ WtPt = 1 for all t ≥ 0, and aggregate feasibility is
reflected by the following linear resource constraint:
ct + g ≤ nt (1.6)
We are now ready to define a competitive equilibrium for given government policy
choices {τ ct ,M gt+1, Bgt+1, g}∞t=0.
Definition 1.1 A competitive equilibrium for this economy is composed of the gov-
ernment sector’s policies {τ ct ,M gt+1, Bgt+1, g}∞t=0, an allocation {ct, nt, Bt+1,Mt+1}∞t=0,
and prices {Rt+1, Pt}∞t=0 such that:
1. given Bg0(1 + R0) and M
g
0 , the policies and the prices satisfy the sequence of
budget constraints of the government sector described in expression (1.1);
2. when households take B0(1+R0), M0 and prices as given, the allocation solves
the household problem of maximizing (1.2) subject to the private budget con-
straint (1.3), the CIA constraint (1.5) and the no-Ponzi condition (1.4);
3. markets clear, i.e.: Bgt = Bt, M
g
t = Mt, and g and the allocation satisfy the
economy’s resource constraint (1.6) for all t ≥ 0.
On the basis of our assumptions on household preferences it is straightforward to
show that in the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy the household
budget constraint (1.3) and the aggregate resource constraint (1.6) are both satisfied
at equality. Moreover, the first order conditions of the Lagrangean representing
the household’s constrained optimization problem are both necessary and sufficient
conditions to characterize the solution to the household problem. Finally, when
Rt+1 > 0, the CIA constraint (1.5) is binding, and the competitive equilibrium
allocation for given government policies can be determined from the government
budget constraint (1.1), the aggregate resource constraint (1.6) and the following
conditions that must hold for all t ≥ 0:
Mt = Pt(1 + τ
c
t )ct (1.7)
4This second effect is not present in a CIA economy with the alternative timing structure
underlying the model of Lucas and Stokey (1983) where monetary surprises are lump-sum.
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u′(ct)
v′(nt)
= (1 +Rt)(1 + τ
c
t ) (1.8)
(1 +Rt+1) =
v′(nt)
βv′(nt+1)
Pt+1
Pt
(1.9)
limT→∞βT
MT+1 +BT+1
PT
= 0 (1.10)
1.3 The policy game
Since our focus is on an environment where there is no explicit commitment technol-
ogy, we now seek to find a time consistent policy rule which is sequentially optimal
from the two authorities’ perspectives. The sequential decisions about policy are
decentralized. In each period, the two authorities move simultaneously and take
their respective counterpart’s policy choice as well as their successors’ future policy
mappings as given. We define a policy rule to be the combination of a fiscal and
a monetary policy rule; each of these latter rules is determined independently by
the subsequent incarnations of the respective authority. We limit the analysis to
Markov-stationary policy rules, where a policy rule is a mapping that returns pol-
icy choices as a time-invariant function of the current (payoff-relevant) state of the
economy. We denote the policy function by ϕ(zg) = (ϕf (z
g), ϕm(z
g)), where ϕf (z
g)
and ϕm(z
g) are the fiscal and monetary parts of the rule which give the respective
policy instruments τ c and M ′g as functions of the aggregate state zg ≡ Bg(1+R)
Mg
, the
government sector’s real debt burden inherited from the past.5 In order to identify
the equilibrium policy rule, we therefore need to find the optimal time-invariant
strategies in the strategic game between the two authorities.
The policy problem in the present economy can be described as an
infinite-horizon dynamic game of almost perfect information whose build-
ing block is a two-player6 simultaneous-moves stage game G(zgt ;ϕ) =(
f,m;Af (z
g
t ), Am(z
g
t ), Vˆ (z
g
t ; pi, ϕ), Wˆ (z
g
t ; pi, ϕ)
)
, where zgt is the payoff-relevant state
variable and pi and ϕ denote arbitrary policy rules in place in the current period (pi)
and from the next period onwards (ϕ). We are now going to define the components
of the stage game.
As already hinted above, the game is not of a repeated variety due to the pres-
ence of the endogenous state variable zgt ≡ B
g
t (1+Rt)
Mgt
which can be manipulated over
time and is informative about (i) the composition of the nominal claims with which
5For most of what follows, we will switch to recursive notation where primes denote variables
pertaining to the next time period.
6To be precise, we deal with a three-player game where the two policy authorities play in
a Stackelberg relation towards the third player, the continuum of private agents. Although an
individual household’s choices have no strategic weight, their presence - via their formation of
expectations - is key to the construction of an equilibrium.
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the households enter a given period t and (ii) the real value of the debt burden
the government sector inherits from the past. To understand why zgt serves as the
aggregate state variable, notice that neither nominal variables such as money and
bonds nor their real values are sufficient statistics. The reason is that the con-
temporaneous price level, being endogenous, cannot be used to normalize nominal
variables. Moreover, because of the CIA constraint only money, but not the revenue
from maturing bonds, is available for current consumption expenditure such that we
need information on the composition of the nominal asset portfolio held by private
agents. Finally, to appropriately reflect the real debt burden inherited from the
past, also the interest payments on maturing bonds must be accounted for.
The players are the fiscal and the monetary authority, indicated by i = f,m
respectively. In each period, their actions are af = τ
c and am = M
′g. The strat-
egy/action spaces7 for the two players are compact and time-invariant and are given
by Af (z
g) = [τ cmin(z
g), τ cmax(z
g)] and Am(z
g) = [M ′min(z
g),M ′max(z
g)], where, for all
zg, τ cmin(z
g) > −1, M ′min(zg) > 0 and τ cmax(zg),M ′max(zg) < X¯ for some finite X¯.
We assume the aggregate state variable zg to live in a compact interval I = [Z, Z¯],
so consistency dictates that the admissible action spaces depend on zg. However,
the interval I can be assumed sufficiently large such as not to constrain the players’
equilibrium choices. Finally, the restriction of the players’ strategy spaces to com-
prise only mappings from the aggregate state zg into actions qualifies the model as
a discounted Markov-stationary game with uncountable state and action spaces.
The data of the economy introduced so far are sufficient to characterize a com-
petitive equilibrium for a sequence of arbitrary policy choices. What is lacking to pin
down these policy choices are (i) the preferences of the two policy making authorites
as represented by their objective functions, and (ii) an appropriate definition of a
game-theoretic equilibrium. We now turn to the former issue. For that purpose,
let U(z, zg;ϕ) be the lifetime utility enjoyed by a household with individual state
z = B(1+R)
M
when the aggregate state is zg and the policy rule employed by the two
authorities is ϕ. We assume that both the monetary and the fiscal authority are
benevolent in the sense that their payoffs derive from the lifetime utility enjoyed
by the representative consumer. Specifically, for both authorities, the objective
function is:
∞∑
t=0
βt {log(ct)− αnt}
Let V (zg;ϕ) denote the fiscal value function induced by a given aggregate state zg
and policy rule ϕ; similarly, the monetary value function is given by W (zg;ϕ). The
7Note that in the setup considered here, where the players in each stage game G move only once
and take the strategies of both authorities’ future incarnations as given, strategies and actions
coincide.
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payoff functions Vˆ (zgt ; pi, ϕ) and Wˆ (z
g
t ; pi, ϕ), which are relevant in the stage game
G(zgt ;ϕ) indexed by the aggregate state zg and a continuation play ϕ, derive from
these value functions and will be defined in Section 1.3.2.
Finally, our concept to pin down policy choices is Markov-perfect equilibrium
(MPE). Accordingly, the main goal is to identify a policy rule ϕ(zg) which is time
consistent.8 This means that the authorities must not have an incentive to deviate
from this rule when they noncooperatively choose their policy instruments, taking
their future incarnations’ continuation play as given. Finding such a policy rule
involves three steps:9
1. Define the economic equilibrium for arbitrary policy rules ϕ. This allows to de-
termine the representative household’s welfare level as well as the authorities’
value functions for arbitrary policy rules ϕ.
2. Define the optimal equilibrium policy pi in the current period when future
policies are determined by some arbitrary policy rule ϕ. Since the optimal
current policy depends on the current state, this step determines the optimal
current policy rule pi(ϕ), given a future rule ϕ.
3. Define the conditions under which the authorities will not deviate from the
rule assumed for the future, i.e. impose time consistency on the policy rule.
Time consistency will obtain if the policy rule assumed for the future is equal
to the rule that is optimal in the current period (policy fixed point): ϕ = pi(ϕ).
With this structure, the policy equilibrium can be represented recursively.
1.3.1 Equilibrium for arbitrary policy rule
We define the household’s problem recursively, whereby it is important to note that
the problem is conditional on the policy functions for the fiscal and the monetary
authority; this influence is summarized by the argument ϕ of the value function.
We have:
U(z, zg;ϕ) = maxc,n,B′,M ′ {[log(c)− αn] + βU(z′, z′g;ϕ)} , (1.11)
8That is, we are looking for time consistent Markov policies rather than dynamically inconsistent
Ramsey policies. In the language of Ortigueira (2006), we are considering quasi time consistent
policies since we assume that the two authorities move first and determine their policies before
the households decide about their individual variables. This modelling choice can have important
implications for the interpretation of what commitment is as well as for the quantitative equilibrium
outcomes. Moreover, it implicitly stipulates that the equilibrium targeted by the authorities is
actually implemented. This implies that the households’ beliefs must presume that, within a
period, the authorities can commit to their choices of τ c and M ′g, even if this is physically not
feasible.
9The procedure has been developed by Klein, Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (2005) who apply it to
analyze a model of international tax competition.
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where the maximization is subject to the private budget constraint (1.3), the CIA
constraint (1.5), the no-Ponzi condition (1.4) and conditional on policies:
τ c = τ c(zg;ϕ)
M ′g = M ′g(zg;ϕ)
and a perceived law of motion for the endogenous aggregate state:
z¯′g = Ge(zg;ϕ)
The solution to the private household problem are the individual decision rules
c(z, zg;ϕ), n(z, zg;ϕ), B′(z, zg;ϕ) and M ′(z, zg;ϕ). These decision rules are charac-
terized by the following first order conditions:
1
αct
= (1 +Rt)(1 + τ
c
t )
(1 +Rt+1) =
1
β
Pt+1
Pt
We can now formulate our definition of a competitive equilibrium in a recursive
manner.
Definition 1.2 A recursive competitive equilibrium for given policies ϕ con-
sists of a household value function U(z, zg;ϕ), individual decision rules
{c(z, zg;ϕ), n(z, zg;ϕ), B′(z, zg;ϕ),M ′(z, zg;ϕ)} and an aggregate function Ge(zg;ϕ)
such that:
1. households optimize, i.e. given the states (z, zg), policies ϕ and a perceived
law of motion Ge(zg;ϕ), the value function U(z, zg;ϕ) and the decision rules
{c(·), n(·), B′(·),M ′(·)} solve the household problem;
2. the perceived law of motion is the actual law of motion, i.e. households are
representative and form rational expectations:
z′ = z′g = Ge(zg;ϕ)
3. the pursued policies are feasible, i.e. the consolidated budget constraint of the
government sector is satisfied in every period:
M ′g +B′g + Pτ cc =M g +Bg(1 +R) + Pg.
Thus, using the optimal household decisions in response to a policy rule ϕ, we can
solve for the houshold value function U(z, zg;ϕ). If the authorities’ policy choices
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are governed by the policy rule ϕ, their value functions can be described as follows.10
For the fiscal authority, conditional on the policy rule ϕ, we have:
V (zg;ϕ) = {[log(c(zg;ϕ))− α(c(zg;ϕ) + g)] + βV (z′g;ϕ)}
s.t.
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′g
(1 + µ(z′g;ϕ))
− c(zg;ϕ)− β
α
zg
(1 + µ(zg;ϕ))
= 0,
where µ ≡ M ′g
Mg
− 1 is the rate of money expansion. Similarly, for the monetary
authority, we have:
W (zg;ϕ) = {[log(c(zg;ϕ))− α(c(zg;ϕ) + g)] + βW (b′g;ϕ)}
s.t.
β
α
− g + βz′gc(z′g;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′g;ϕ))− c(zg;ϕ)− zgc(zg;ϕ)(1 + τ c(zg;ϕ)) = 0
1.3.2 Optimal current policy rule for given future policy
rule
We look for a MPE where both authorities know the other one’s policy function
and take it as given. Clearly, the optimal control laws depend on each other, but
in the MPE with simultaneous moves each authority ignores the influence that its
choice exerts on the other authority’s current choice. Nevertheless, due to the con-
solidated government budget constraint there is two-sided interaction. Specifically,
the government budget constraint determines the law of motion for the endogenous
aggregate state variable zg. For a given future policy rule, which conditions on
the aggregate state, this means the following: Each authority, taking the respective
other authority’s current policy choice as well as the future continuation play as
governed by ϕ as given, faces a situation where its own current policy choice affects
both its current payoff and its value from the next period onwards.
Let pi = (pif , pim) denote the current policy rule, and let ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm) denote the
future policy rule. Taking the policies as given, the household problem then is as
follows (all variables which are affected by the current policies pi are denoted with a
hat; note that the relevant next period value function for given policies ϕ is the one
derived in the previous section):
Uˆ(z, zg; pi, ϕ) = maxc,n,B′,M ′{[log(c)− αn] + βU(z′, z′g;ϕ)}, (1.12)
where the maximization is subject to the private budget constraint (1.3), the CIA
constraint (1.5), the no-Ponzi condition(1.4) and conditional on policies:
τ c = τˆ c(zg; pi, ϕ)
M ′g = Mˆ ′g(zg; pi, ϕ)
10The equations presented in the following are derived from a primal approach to the authorities’
problems; the respective problems are conditional on the other authority’s policy rule as well as on
the mapping governing the formation of private expectations. The primal approach reformulation
of the relevant decision problems is done in Appendix A.2.
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and and a perceived law of motion for the endogenous aggregate state:
z¯′g = Gˆe(zg; pi, ϕ)
With the appropriate notational changes, a recursive competitive equilibrium for
arbitrary current policy actions pi followed by future policy rule ϕ is then defined
like above recursive competitive equilibrium for given policies ϕ.
Faced with a continuation policy rule ϕ, the authorities’ problem consists of
optimally determining their contemporaneous policies pi. For the fiscal authority,
we have the following:
Vˆ (zg; pi, ϕ) = maxpif{[log(c(zg; pi))− α(c(zg; pi) + g)] + βV (z′g;ϕ)},
where the maximization is subject to the fiscal implementability constraint derived
from the periodically consolidated government budget constraint (with µ(zg; pim) de-
termined by the monetary authority’s contemporaneous policy choice as prescribed
by the monetary rule pim):
β
α
− g + β β
α
z′g
(1 + µ(z′g;ϕ))
− c(zg;pi)− β
α
zg
(1 + µ(zg;pim))
= 0 (1.13)
For the monetary authority, we have:
Wˆ (bg; pi, ϕ) = maxpim{[log(c(zg; pi))− α(c(zg; pi) + g)] + βW (z′g;ϕ)},
where the maximization is subject to the monetary implementability constraint
derived from the periodically consolidated government budget constraint (with
τ c(zg; pif ) determined by the fiscal authority’s contemporaneous policy choice as
prescribed by the fiscal rule pif ):
β
α
− g + βz′gc(z′g;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′g;ϕ))− c(zg;pi)− zgc(zg;pi)(1 + τ c(zg;pif )) = 0 (1.14)
Note that the two authorities maximize directly over their current policies (pif
and pim, respectively), taking their respective opponent’s current action as given
and, via ϕ, facing given functions governing the continuation play by succeeding
government authorities. The current authorities make their policy choices simulta-
neously: Conditional on a continuation play ϕ, the fiscal authority chooses pif to
maximize Vˆ (zg; pi, ϕ), given pim, and the monetary authority chooses pim to maximize
Wˆ (zg; pi, ϕ), given pif . This leads to the following definition:
Definition 1.3 Given the functions ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm), a Nash equilibrium of the
stage game is a pair of functions {pi∗i (zg;ϕ)}i=f,m such that (i) pi∗f (zg;ϕ) maxi-
mizes Vˆ (zg; pi, ϕ), given pi∗m(z
g;ϕ), and (ii) pi∗m(z
g;ϕ) maximizes Wˆ (zg; pi, ϕ), given
pi∗f (z
g;ϕ).
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By construction, the Nash equilibrium will consist of feasible policies. However,
out of equilibrium the payoffs may not be well-defined. For example, this will
be the case for policy choices which are jointly inconsistent with a competitive
equilibrium. Then, the question is what will happen out of equilibrium. Noting
that the described environment and the rules according to which the two authorities
interact in this environment fall short of the formal description of a proper game,
we will nevertheless proceed to analyze the MPE outcomes.11
1.3.3 Policy fixed point
Now, we can define the equilibrium time consistent policies:
Definition 1.4 The policy rules ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm) define time consistent policies if
they are the Nash solution of the stage game when the two authorities expect ϕ to
determine future policies. Formally: ϕi(z
g) = pii(z
g;ϕ), i = f,m.
Finally, a MPE of the policy game described above is a profile of Markov strate-
gies for the two authorities that yields a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame.12
1.4 Solution strategy
The implementation of the program defining the solution of the problem described
above makes use of a primal approach representation, where the authorities max-
imize directly over their preferred allocation variables c and z′g rather than over
their true policy instruments.13 Finding the equilibrium time consistent policy rule
involves the three steps described in the previous section, the details of which are
laid out in Appendices A.4 to A.6. While formulating the policy game directly in
the primal space comes at the additional cost that one has to take care that the
authorities’ preferred allocations are mutually consistent, a primal approach has the
advantage that it is much easier to recover the policies - if they are uniquely deter-
mined - from the allocation compared to the problem when the inference goes in the
reverse direction: To recover the policies from the allocation requires nothing but
the solution of a set of equations for the unknown policies. Conversely, to infer the
11The problem is that the outcome and the associated payoffs are not well-defined in situations
where a consistency condition, defined by equation (1.15) below, is not satisfied for some positive
consumption level. In such situations, the authorities’ policy choices τ c and M ′ are incompatible
with a competitive equilibrium. In a related context, but with only one authority, a possible
solution to this lack of formal structure has been suggested by Bassetto (2002, 2005) who proposes
the introduction of an explicit market microstructure and the adoption of a modified notion of
government policy within a period as contingent strategy rather than as uncontingent plan.
12For formal definitions of MPE in general games, see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1993).
13Compare Chari and Kehoe (1998) for a general exposition of the methodology.
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allocation from the policies requires to solve a nonlinear optimization problem. The
latter complication stems from the fact that one has to solve the private household’s
optimization problem for the given policies to obtain the allocation, while a pri-
mal approach, in deriving the respective implementability constraints, takes care of
this problem by substituting the private first order conditions into the government
budget constraint.
The qualification for the applicability of a primal approach to a dynamic game
is the question of whether, for a given continuation policy ϕ, there is a one-to-one
mapping between the set of Nash equilibria in policies and the set of Nash equilibria
in allocations. It turns out that indeed this mapping is one-to-one. The reason for
this result is that, in each period, no matter whether the authorities’ optimization
problems are cast in terms of their true policy instruments, i.e. τ c and M ′g, or
directly in terms of the allocation variables, i.e. c and z′g, the equilibrium choices
must not only give rise to a competitive equilibrium, but simultaneously consti-
tute a Nash equilibrium in the stage game interaction between the two authorities.
The second requirement is taken care of in both strategic setups by making the
constraints faced by the two authorities contingent on the (belief about) the policy
instrument employed by the respective opponent. Then, it is straightforward to see
that the two representations of the problem are strategically equivalent. Therefore,
the solution of the dynamic policy game is immune with respect to changes in the
choice variables.
1.5 Markov-perfect equilibrium outcomes
Starting from the primal approach representation of the dynamic game developed in
the Appendix and assuming differentiable Markov strategies, it is useful to present
the two authorities’ first order conditions with respect to their choice variables c
and z′g for a given continuation policy ϕ (step 2 above). These first order conditions
together with a consistency condition, which requires that the implementability con-
straints faced by the two authorities are mutually compatible, are necessary condi-
tions characterizing a MPE under rational expectations.14 Formally, an equilibrium
with rational expectations is characterized as a fixed point between expectations
and realizations; that is, in the equilibrium of the deterministic model, we require
that private expectations and realizations as governed by the authorities’ first order
conditions conditional on these given expectations must coincide. Moreover, as an
implication of a Nash equilibrium prevailing in every stage game, it must be the case
that the two authorities’ conjectures about their respective opponent’s contempora-
14The relevant equations are derived in Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.5, respectively. In what
follows, we drop the superscript g since in equilibrium the representative household’s individual
state z and the aggregate state zg must coincide.
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neous play as well as about the future continuation play are correct. Specifically, in
any MPE, the following consistency condition, which guarantees that the two au-
thorities’ dynamic programs and their respective solutions are mutually consistent
and decentralizable as a competitive equilibrium, must hold:
c(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))(1 + µ(z;ϕ)) =
β
α
(1.15)
Then, the fiscal authority’s first order conditions with respect to c and z′ are:
1
c
− α = λf (1.16)
V ′(z′;ϕ) = −λf β
α
(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))−1 [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)] , (1.17)
where λf is the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint (1.13) faced
by the fiscal authority and εµ(z;ϕ) ≡ ∂(1+µ(z;ϕ))/∂z(1+µ(z;ϕ))/z is defined to be the elasticity of
(gross) monetary expansions (1 + µ(z;ϕ)) in response to changes in the aggregate
state z. Importantly, we have 1 > εµ(z;ϕ) ≥ 0 because the monetary authority’s
incentives to monetize outstanding government liabilities via the inflation tax are a
non-decreasing function of the stock of inherited debt burden z. Combining above
equations and making use of the consistency condition (1.15) to substitute for β
α
(1+
µ(z′;ϕ))−1 gives:
1
c
− α = − V
′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (1.18)
This condition requires that the marginal benefit from current consumption be equal
to the amplified marginal cost of future government liabilities. The amplification,
reflected via the term [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 ≥ 1, results from the fact that the increased
public liabilities, which must be accumulated to order to facilitate higher current
consumption, make future consumption more costly not only because higher debt
crowds out consumption, but also because of its expectational effects: A higher debt
burden (weakly) increases the future monetary authority’s incentives to resort to the
inflation tax which is anticipated by the public and leads to a distortion in nominal
interest rates; this, in turn, constitutes an opportunity cost of consumption due to
the CIA constraint. The implications of this distortion become more apparent if an
envelope condition and the optimality condition (1.16) are used to substitute for the
value function term in (1.18) to arrive at:
1
c
− α =
(
1
c(z′;ϕ)
− α
)
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (1.19)
Equation (1.19) reveals that the current fiscal authority, although it is not per se
subject to a time consistency problem, is not guaranteed to act like a Ramsey policy
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maker, but, in trying to smooth distortions over time, will also take into account
future incentive problems. The latter depend on the continuation play ϕ and are
reflected by the term [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 which, taking into account future commitment
problems, scales up the marginal benefit of future consumption.
The situation for the monetary authority is slightly different, as can be seen from
its relevant first order conditions:15
1
c
− α = λm[1 + z(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))] (1.20)
W ′(z′;ϕ) = −λmc(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)] , (1.21)
where λm is the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint (1.14) faced
by the monetary authority. Combining above equations gives:
1
c
− α
[1 + z(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))]
= − W
′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (1.22)
In contrast to the fiscal optimality condition (1.18), optimality from the monetary
authority’s perspective dictates not only that the marginal costs from increased
future liabilities need to be scaled up by the term [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1, but also that
the current marginal benefit from consumption is reduced. While the former aspect
reflects the same commitment problem of future policy makers that was also relevant
for the current fiscal authority, the latter aspect is specific to monetary policy.
The reason is that, at the monetary margin for a given fiscal policy, increasing
current consumption, by virtue of the (binding) CIA constraint, necessitates a lower
price level which has the effect that the real value of the outstanding liabilities
is increased; this additional cost of higher consumption is captured via the term
[1+z(1+τ c(z;ϕ))] ≥ 1 in the denominator on the LHS. Another way to understand
this discounting of the marginal benefit from current consumption is to realize that
higher current consumption requires that, at the margin, the monetary authority
refrains from using the inflation tax which would operate as a lump-sum levy on
the outstanding liabilities; rather, the intertemporal budget constraint has to be
satisfied via future distortions. It is this trade-off between the lump-sum aspect
of the inflation tax against the necessary distortions induced via future policies
which is the source of the monetary time consistency problem. Similar to the fiscal
problem, an envelope condition and the optimality condition (1.20) can be used to
gain further insights from a simple intertemporal condition for the current monetary
15With the difference that the tax policy is fully specified here, these are essentially the first
order conditions derived by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) in their model of optimal monetary policy.
However, the decentralization of authority over policies will be shown to fundametally change their
dependence on the continuation play ϕ.
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policy maker:
1
c
− α
[1 + z(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))]
=
1
c(z′;ϕ) − α
[1 + z′(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))]
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 , (1.23)
which highlights that consumption smoothing proceeds under two distortions:
First, the distortion due to the lack of commitment of future policy makers as
captured by the term [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1. And second, the current incentive problem
reflecting the possibility to reduce the real value of the inherited nominal liabilities
z; as we will show below, this latter incentive probelm is crucially shaped by the
current fiscal authority’s behavior.
Having established the necessary conditions that characterize a differentiable
MPE, its existence should be verified. Existence results for MPE in games of the
class considered here are generally hard to obtain. In our specific context, we can
establish the following:
Proposition 1.1 The infinite-horizon game has a (differentiable) Markov-perfect
equilibrium in stationary strategies.
The proof for this proposition is adapted from Amir (1996) and can be found
in Appendix A.3. Basically, it proceeds by showing that a player’s best response
to a monotone and Lipschitz-continuous time-invariant strategy employed by the
respective other player is again monotone and Lipschitz-continuous. Then, since
the space of Lipschitz-continuous functions is a compact and convex subset of the
Banach space of bounded continuous functions and since the best response mapping
is continuous, Schauder’s fixed point theorem can be invoked to establish the exis-
tence of a MPE in stationary strategies. It turns out that there are two classes of
differentiable equilibria whose outcomes satisfy the necessary conditions (1.15) to
(1.17) and (1.20), (1.21) established above. Apart from these differentiable MPE,
additional non-differentiable MPE may exist;16 in what follows, our focus will be
entirely on differentiable MPE. It is convenient to classify the differentiable MPE
corresponding to the allocations they implement. In particular, we will see that the
16Multiplicity of equilibria has been found to be an issue in environments whose key elements are
discontinuities in decision rules and conflicting objective functions of the players at different points
in time, e.g. in (single-agency) optimal policy problems without commitment or in problems with
quasi-geometric discounting. For an analysis of Markov strategies characterizing consumption-
savings decisions with quasi-geometric discounting, see e.g. Krusell and Smith (2003). However,
the nature of multiplicity in these single-agency problems is fundamentally different from the one
that arises in our two agency context as an instance of coordination failure among the interacing
authorities. In papers exploring single-agency MPE of dynamic games in macroeconomic settings,
e.g. Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003), Klein, Krusell and R´ıos-Rull (2003) or Krusell, Kuruscu and
Smith (2002), the focus is generally on differentiable policy functions.
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respective equilibrium outcomes reproduce either the allocation implemented under
a single policy maker who controls the complete set of policy instruments (quasi-
single agency) or the allocation in an economy with indexed debt (quasi-indexation).
1.5.1 The quasi-single agency MPE
It is immediate that the MPE outcome identified in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006)
for the single-agency economy also constitutes a MPE outcome with interacting
authorities. The reason for this result is that an optimal policy outcome under
single-agency must have been decentralized by choices for the different policy in-
struments which have the property of being mutual best responses. If this was not
the case, there would be an incentive to revise the policies which would contradict
an equilibrium. To further verify the claim in the context of the specific policy
game considered, it is sufficient to start from the assumption that the policy rule
ϕ governing the continuation play is precisely the equilibrium policy these authors
have identified in their single-agency environment. This continuation policy involves
a gradual decumulation of debt by means of the inflation tax; the consequence is
that εµ(z
′;ϕ) > 0. We denote an economy with εµ(z′;ϕ) > 0 as subject to an infla-
tion bias. Accordingly, an inflation bias characterizes a situation where outstanding
debt, because it is the source of dynamically inconsistent incentives for the monetary
policy maker, causes extra liability costs beyond those due to the need to balance
the intertemporal government budget via distortionary taxation. The authorities’
optimal response to such a constellation is to decumulate the stock of debt today
because in doing so future incentive constraints can be relaxed. At the beginning
of any given period, private expectations are predetermined, so that the inflation
tax, apart from constraining consumption via the CIA constraint, will operate in a
lump-sum fashion on the stock of debt, an inelastic tax base. Therefore, the assumed
future equilibrium policy will optimally be reproduced in the current period, and
a MPE with interacting authorities is established. The allocation associated with
this MPE solves equations (1.15) to (1.17) and (1.20), (1.21), whereby εµ(z
′;ϕ) is
strictly positive as long as there are positive amounts of outstanding debt because
the public rationally anticipates the inflation bias induced by sequential optimiza-
tion and nominal debt; the result is an upward distortion in nominal interest rates
which crowds out private consumption. We summarize our results in:
Proposition 1.2 In the policy game with interacting authorities, there exists a (dif-
ferentiable) Markov-perfect equilibrium which reproduces the Markov-perfect equilib-
rium allocation implemented by a single, sequentially optimizing authority control-
ling the same policy instruments. In particular, nominal debt bears liability costs
and gives rise to an inflation bias as long as there are positive amounts of nominal
debt.
37
In order to illustrate the dynamics implied by the this MPE, we resort to a nu-
merical example. The algorithm used to compute the MPE is detailed in Appendix
A.7. To carry out the numerical exercise, we choose the following parameterization,
which, for the purpose of comparison, draws largely on Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006):
α = 0.45, β = 0.98, b0 =
z0
(1+R0)
= 1.28, g = 0.5. The dotted trajectories in Figures
1.1 and 1.2 give the time paths of the real stock of debt b ≡ z
(1+R)
and consumption
associated with the quasi-single agency MPE; this MPE under interaction coincides
with the equilibrium reported in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) for the case of a single
policy maker who cannot commit. As expected, the stock of debt is progressively
depleted until it disappears.17 This pattern is inversely reflected in the path of con-
sumption which increases until it reaches its stationary long-run level corresponding
to the long-run level of zero debt.
1.5.2 The quasi-indexation MPE
We now demonstrate that the separation of authority over macroeconomic policies
facilitates the existence of another class of MPE. Such MPE are constructed based
on the conjecture that the continuation policy ϕ will be such that (i) the sequence of
future monetary authorities will remain passive in the sense of not being marginally
responsive to the stock of real liabilities, i.e. εµ(z
′;ϕ) = 0 for all z′ and that
(ii) the sequence of future fiscal authorities will be such as to keep the aggregate
state z constant over time. Since the assumed continuation play implies that future
monetary policy makers will refrain from monetary expansions, we have εµ(z
′;ϕ) =
0. How will the pair of current best response policies to such a continuation rule look
like? Given εµ(z
′;ϕ) = 0, outstanding liabilities do not have adverse expectational
effects and the optimal monetary policy in the current period will be to stay passive,
provided the current fiscal policy generates sufficient revenue via the consumption
tax such as to keep the stock of real liabilities z constant. The reason is that, taking
as given a fiscal policy that keeps the stock of real liabilities z constant, it is too costly
to further drive down this stock of debt by an additional monetary expansion,18 if
the motive of relaxing future incentive constraints is not present. But precisely this
is the case if ϕ is such that εµ(z
′;ϕ) = 0. On the other hand, the current fiscal
authority will find it optimal to balance the budget via the consumption tax when
facing a sequence of current and subsequent monetary policy makers who refrain
from the inflation tax. This reasoning verifies the existence of a MPE characterized
17As shown by Martin (2006), this particular result follows from the unitary intertemporal
elasticity of substitution implied by log-utility in consumption, which, for any positive level of
debt, makes the incentive to inflate prices dominate over the incentive to defer distortions into the
future by maintaining a higher stock of debt.
18Recall that unexpected monetary expansions constrain consumption by virtue of the CIA
constraint.
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by a policy rule that gives rise to εµ(z;ϕ) = 0.
The outcomes associated with this MPE are characterized as follows: From (1.19)
and (1.23), it follows that both the aggregate state z and the level of consumption
c must be constant over time. Thus, abstracting from potential fluctuations in
government spending, the environment is completely stationary. Inspection of either
implementability constraint, evaluated at a stationary allocation, then reveals that
the flat path for consumption is given by:19
c =
β
α
[1− (1− β)z]− g (1.24)
With εµ(z;ϕ) = 0, but irrespective of the constant rate of money growth (1 +
µ(z)), the stationary allocation implemented by this equilibrium with decentralized
authority mimics the real allocation resulting from a single-agency problem with
indexed debt. In the latter scenario, by construction, there is no monetary time
inconsistency problem; this leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3 In the policy game with interacting authorities, there exists a (dif-
ferentiable) Markov-perfect equilibrium which reproduces the Markov-perfect equilib-
rium allocation under indexed debt, provided the initial level of liabilities z0 is such
that c(z0) > 0 in (1.24). There are no transitory dynamics, and there is no inflation
bias.
The allocation associated with the quasi-indexation equilibrium under interac-
tion is graphically depicted by the solid trajectories in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 which
were constructed using the same parameter values as for the previous example. The
numerical results confirm the theoretical argument that the implemented alloca-
tion is stationary. Comparison with the allocation implemented by the quasi-single
agency MPE reveals that the quasi-indexation MPE involves a superior balancing of
distortions over time: While the long-run level of consumption is lower, the initial
levels are not depressed downwards, and the result is a higher lifetime utility enjoyed
by the representative household. This last argument is summarized graphically in
Figure 1.3 which compares the equilibrium levels of welfare under the two regimes.
1.5.3 The role of interaction
It is interesting to investigate from a game-theoretic perspective why the decentral-
ization of authority over policy decisions allows for the emergence of a new MPE
19In deriving (1.24), we have exploited the rational expectations consistency condition which
links the initial interest rate (1 + R0) to the initial rate of money expansion (1 + µ0). The impli-
cation is that the ratio z0(1+µ0) =
B0
M0
(1+R0)
(1+µ0)
does not depend on the initial rate of money growth.
Consequently, (1.24) holds for any stationary allocation, irrespective of the stationary rate of money
growth (1 + µ).
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which was not sustainable in a single-agency economy where the policy maker con-
trols both policy instruments, τ c and M ′. Specifically, it may not be immediately
clear why the quasi-indexation MPE with interacting authorities is not an equilib-
rium with a single policy maker. The point is that a single decision maker should in
principle be able to replicate anything that could be implemented as an equilibrium
with interaction among separate government authorities. This issue is of particular
relevance because the quasi-indexation equilibrium which becomes available under
interaction dominates the single-agency equilibrium both in welfare terms and in a
Pareto sense from the two authorities’ perspective.
So why is the stationary equilibrium under interaction not an equilibrium with
a single decision maker? The answer to this question lies in the underlying time in-
consistency problem of the monetary authority and the properties of the respective
policy instruments. With a monolithic policy maker, it is the case that, once private
expectations are fixed, whatever is done via the consumption tax τ c can be done
more efficiently via the inflation tax induced by money injections M ′. The reason
is that, while both policy instruments operate on the same distortionary margin,
the inflation tax has the additional benefit of relaxing future implementability con-
straints by deflating the inelastically supplied real stock of debt. Thus, the single
policy authority has always an incentive to substitute M ′ for τ c and is thus sub-
ject to a time inconsistency problem which makes a non-inflationary equilibrium
unsustainable.
Conversely, with interacting authorities, the quasi-indexation equilibrium is sus-
tainable due to the asymmetry of the dynamic constraints faced by the two author-
ities. While the monetary authority is still subject to a time inconsistency problem,
the fiscal authority is not subject to such a problem because, even when private ex-
pectations are fixed, its policy instrument does not allow for non-distortionary rev-
enue generation. Indeed, with decentralized decision power, each authority makes
its current policy choice not only for given private expectations, but - as an implica-
tion of the Nash equilibrium prevailing in any stage game - also for a given current
policy choice by the respective other authority. That is, unlike in standard optimal
policy models, decentralized decision making does not allow to substitute one pol-
icy instrument for another because the respective other authority’s policy rule is a
given constraint rather than a free choice variable. In other words, the reason why
a time consistent policy rule ϕ implying εµ(z;ϕ) = 0 can be sustained is an instance
of coordination failure among the two interacting authorities. The consequence is
that there is scope for a favorable coordination of private expectations under de-
centralized decision power over policies: A fiscal policy which keeps the level of real
debt constant without the need to recur to the inflation tax makes zero-inflation
expectations rational.20 But given such expectations, the extra liability costs of
20As indicated by (1.8), what ultimately matters is the composite distortion (1 + R)(1 + τ c)
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nominal debt vanish, and consequently the rationale for an erosion of the stock of
outstanding debt via surprise inflation disappears. The point is that the monetary
authority is not willing to subject the economy to additional distortions on top of
those already caused by the fiscal authority in order to drive down the stock of real
debt.21
Crucial for this conclusion is that not only the current fiscal authority’s play is
taken as given (i.e. τ c(z) is a given number), but that the same is true also for the
continuation play (i.e., in the proposed equilibrium, τ c(z′;ϕ) and µ(z′;ϕ) are given
nondecreasing functions). This makes the current monetary authority’s problem
different from the situation faced by a Ramsey planner who can simultaneously
control future policies when deciding about the current allocation. Indeed, even
when constrained by current taxes being fixed at a level that, absent a monetary
expansion, would keep the aggregate state z constant, a Ramsey planner would
decide to additionally use the inflation tax in order to relax the implementability
constraint she will face in the subsequent period. In contrast, under sequential policy
implementation, there is an additional feedback induced via the given future policy
rule ϕ; this feedback makes the current monetary authority prefer to refrain from
using the inflation tax.22
The stationarity of the allocation implemented via the quasi-indexation MPE
suggests that the time inconsistency problem of optimal policy is not necessarily
relevant with interacting authorities. To clarify this statement, two remarks are
expedient: First, as a consequence of the fact that the two policy instruments con-
sidered are equivalent with respect to the margins that they distort, there may be
multiple combinations of time invariant policy rules for τ c and M ′ which decentral-
ize the same allocation. This is true also for the quasi-single agency MPE, because
what ultimately matters for the determination of a MPE is the value taken by the
variable εµ(z
′;ϕ) and not the specific policy rule ϕ that decentralizes the allocation.
rather than the interest rate distortion in isolation. Indeed, there are also inflationary (in the
sense of (1+µ(z)) > 1) policy rules which implement the quasi-indexation allocation. The critical
property of these policy rules is that monetary policy does not respond to marginal variations in
the stock of real debt, i.e. εµ(z;ϕ) = 0.
21This is a consequence of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one implied by log-
utility. Specifically, the same forces that make a single policy maker implement policies that
asymptotically drive the stock of real debt to zero (and not to negative or positive values) imply
that the monetary authority, when faced with a budget balancing fiscal policy, does not want to
inflate the economy any more. For a general specification of preferences, the described effect would
emerge in a modified version, where the MPE outcome involves the authorities implementing a
negative (positive) long-run level of real debt if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is larger
(smaller) than one.
22In this context, Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) discuss an interesting constellation where the
period t fiscal authority commits its policy (as a fixed number) one period in advance such that
the feedback via the reaction of the period t+ 1 fiscal policy is absent; then, the quasi-indexation
equilibrium collapses.
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Hence, the key difference between the two classes of MPE is that, in the quasi-single
agency MPE, inflation is always systematically related to the dynamic inconsistency
in the policy problem which results in an inflation bias as long as there are posi-
tive amounts of outstanding public liabilities; in contrast, in the quasi-indexation
MPE, the responsiveness of inflation to the stock of public liabilities z is always
zero. Second, it has been established that the decentralization of authority over
macroeconomic policies facilitates the existence of a MPE implementing a superior
outcome because the interest rate distortions stemming from the dynamic inconsis-
tency of optimal policies are absent. However, the inferior allocation implemented
by the quasi-single agency MPE cannot be ruled out neither such that the econ-
omy is in a situation of multiple equilibria. Although the quasi-indexation MPE is
welfare-superior and even Pareto-dominant from the two authorities’ perspective, its
selection is not automatically guaranteed because the authorities’ period-by-period
incentive to coordinate their policy choices - cutting back on τ c and substituting via
an increase in M ′ - makes the time consistency problem potentially reappear and
thereby undermines the sustainability of the superior MPE.23 Indeed, one might
want to argue that communication between monetary and fiscal authorities ren-
ders the non-cooperative outcomes of Nash play implausible. Note however that, as
long as formal contracts are unavailable, the set of self-enforcing plans (in the sense
of correlated equilibria) under direct communication between the two authorities
would still be given by randomizations among the Nash equilibria of the original
non-cooperative game.24 Hence, without further arguments, the quasi-indexation
MPE cannot be dismissed.
1.6 Related literature and concluding remarks
The approach to optimal policy making presented in this paper relates to a well-
established tradition in macroeconomic research. The dynamic inconsistency of opti-
mal policy plans has been first identified by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo
(1978); subsequently, Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) have applied this framework to a
positive theory of monetary policy making. Starting with Lucas and Stokey (1983),
also fiscal policy has been the topic of further research; important papers include
Chari and Kehoe (1990), Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003) and Klein, Krusell and R´ıos-
Rull (2003). Further contributions to this branch of the literature then address the
potential benefits which can be realized by a more complete set of disposable policy
23In this respect, since it gives rise to divergent objectives between the two authorities, the
institution of a ”conservative” central bank can be interpreted as a response to the fear that the
policy making entities would have an incentive to coordinate their policy choices.
24Compare Myerson (1991), chapter 6.
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instruments25 or by delegation of authority over policy decisions. Specifically, in
the context of Barro-Gordon type models where monetary policy faces the task of
stabilizing output and inflation, the delegation to decision makers with biased in-
centives has received much attention; Rogoff’s (1985b) weight-conservative central
banker, inflation targets as proposed by Svensson (1997) and incentive contracts for
central bankers as discussed by Walsh (1995) are prominent examples. However,
a drawback with these analyses of optimal monetary policy is that fiscal policy is
typically assumed to be absent or exogenous to the model; hence, policy interactions
are neglected. Against this background, the present paper’s innovation is to consider
a setting with an inherent time consistency problem which gives rise to a dynamic
policy game where monetary and fiscal policies are decided upon by two distinct
sequentially operating authorities. Our main finding is that the properties of opti-
mal policies implemented by a single decision making unit do not readily extend to
a setting with simultaneous interaction between independent policy authorities. In
particular, we have shown that nominal debt itself does not necessarily give rise to
a time consistency problem as long as the fiscal authority is sufficiently flexible and
benevolent.
So far, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in a dynamic frame-
work with optimizing authorities seems to have been largely neglected in the liter-
ature. An exception is the recent work by Adam and Billi (2005) who investigate
a sticky price economy with a structural inefficiency due to the market power of
firms. In contrast to our problem where only monetary policy is subject to dynam-
ically inconsistent incentives, their setup gives rise to a potential time consistency
problem also for fiscal policy, which decides about the provision of public goods
to be financed by lump-sum taxation. The authors analyze the dynamic economy
under varying assumptions on the degree of the authorities’ commitment. Their
basic finding is that the monetary time inconsistency problem is more severe than
the fiscal one. As a potential solution, they then propose a conservative central
bank as an institutional arrangement that may mitigate the distortions associated
with sequential policy making. Along the same lines, Dixit and Lambertini (2003)
consider monetary-fiscal interactions with a conservative central bank and varying
degrees of commitment of the two authorities. Their analysis shows how monetary
commitment can be negated when fiscal policy is discretionary.
This finding is in stark contrast to our main result that it can be precisely the
introduction of fiscal discretion which may solve a monetary time inconsistency
problem. Specifically, we have demonstrated that the decentralization of decision
authority over policy variables may be a powerful device to overcome the time in-
consistency problem inherent in dynamic policy making. This result has been es-
25See e.g. Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987) who consider the implications of a richer
maturity structure of government debt in overcoming the time consistency problem.
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tablished within the framework of a non-cooperative dynamic game where the real
value of the government sector’s inherited liabilities takes the role of the relevant
state variable. Thus, our contribution extends the described models of policy inter-
action by considering a truly dynamic game rather than a simple repeated economy.
Our model features an endogenous state variable which has the consequence that
the policy authorities’ strategic calculus includes also their incentives to affect the
environment in which their future incarnations will interact. Our starting point
has been the non-strategic setup proposed by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006). These
authors do also consider the case of monetary-fiscal interactions, though under the
simplifying assumption of fiscal commitment either within a period or over time.
They argue that, if the fiscal authority has within-period commitment because it
moves before monetary policy is implemented, then the results (described in the In-
troduction) derived for their benchmark case of a single policy maker remain valid;
the reason would be that the monetary authority is still the residual policy maker
and faces unchanged incentives as long as a non-negativity constraint on nominal
interest rates is not binding. However, as shown in the present paper, this ineffec-
tiveness result for fiscal policy under the assumption of sequential moves within a
period fails to take into account that decentralized policy authority may allow to
sustain a continuation policy which, in turn, induces a different equilibrium play in
the current period. The second scenario considered by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006)
features an unconditional fiscal commitment extending over the entire path of fu-
ture consumption taxes and generates results in line with the quasi-indexation MPE
described here. Specifically, it is shown that a fiscal commitment to a tax policy
balancing the budget periodically induces a passive monetary policy. However, an
issue that is not explicitly addressed is the sequential optimality of fiscal policy in
a truly strategic setup. This problem has been taken care of in our analysis which
endogenizes fiscal policy choices.
Our analysis differs also from other papers which investigate non-cooperative
policy games with respect to an important assumption: The established literature
generally assumes that the objective functions of the relevant policy making au-
thorities are not aligned, with the obvious consequence that there is a strategic
conflict. An important contribution to that literature is Kehoe (1989) who shows
that coordinating the choices of policy makers who strategically interact in order
to increase their respective constituency’s welfare can be counterproductive. The
intuition for this result is that decentralized policy making gives rise to dynamic
incentive constraints which allow for implicit commitment on behalf of the policy
makers in environments where commitment with respect to future policy choices is
otherwise impossible. Conversely, the present paper has started from a situation
where decentralization proceeds under coincident objectives for the two benevolent
policy makers. In this setup, what provides scope for superior results with inter-
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acting authorities is the fact that the fiscal authority is not subject to the time
consistency problem facing the monetary authority. Indeed, if the subsequent fis-
cal authorities operate such as to guarantee a period-by-period balancing of the
consolidated government budget, there is a twofold mechanism facilitating the co-
ordination of the expectations of the third player in the economy, the continuum of
private agents: Now, the monetary announcement not to let its choice for M ′ vary
along with the future state becomes credible because (i) the fiscal reaction function
acts as a constraint on the monetary rule, thus preventing the free substitution of
one policy instrument (M ′) for another (τ c), and (ii) the current fiscal play already
imposes distortions which make resorting to the inflation tax prohibitively costly.
We have generated our results in the context of a simple dynamic general equilib-
rium economy with money and a government sector. Whereas most of the modeling
choices made are standard, two assumptions deserve closer attention. The first one
is the assumption of log-utility in consumption which has already been commented
on at various occasions in the text. The second key assumption is to have the two
interacting authorities move simultaneously in each period. Of course, the timing
of events is crucial in any dynamic game. With respect to the interaction of mone-
tary and fiscal policies, there seem to be conflicting views in the literature; compare
e.g. the discussion in Dixit and Lambertini (2003). Although some authors, e.g.
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), argue that fiscal policy is sluggish relative to mon-
etary policy, we stick to a notion of simultaneous moves rather than formalizing the
interaction in terms of a dynamic Stackelberg game, where, in each period, the fiscal
authority moves first and the monetary authority follows. This timing structure is
not uncontroversial and may be questioned with respect to its empirical relevance.
We justify our assumption as follows: First, a simultaneous moves game is concep-
tually more straightforward to work with; moreover, as illustrated in the foregoing
discussion, the insights generated on the basis of this timing protocol carry over to
the Stackelberg case with fiscal leadership. Second, it is our view of monetary policy
that considerations related to the interaction with fiscal variables play only a minor
role for ”day-to-day” operations, but are essential in shaping policy over the medium
and long run when also fiscal policy has some flexibility. In any case, we provide a
conceptual perspective on how the dynamic consistency of optimal policies changes
once we introduce interaction between policy makers.
The most important policy implication emerging from the analysis is a caveat:
Conventional wisdom holds that fiscal profligacy leading to soft budget constraints
and the accumulation of public liabilities contributes to undermining a monetary
commitment to price stability.26 Consequently, it seems that institutional reforms
26Chapter two of this dissertation explores this issue with a particular emphasis on the role of
monetary conservatism for the equilibrium dynamics of debt and the associated welfare implica-
tions.
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introducing fiscal commitment or rules in the form of debt or deficit constraints
are a good idea; in the context of the European Monetary Union, the Stability and
Growth Pact codifies this notion. Conversely, our analysis suggests (admittedly,
in a world of benevolent policy makers) that government debt is not necessarily
a source of dynamically inconsistent incentives, and that fiscal rules may be, if
anything, harmful; rather, the presence of a dynamically optimizing fiscal authority
is needed to effectively constrain the conduct of monetary policy. It is in this sense
that inflation ultimately is a fiscal phenomenon. However, the question of how the
selection between the two different MPE proceeds remains an issue.
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Figure 1.1: Paths of consumption in the quasi-indexation and quasi-single agency
equilibrium
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Monetary-Fiscal
Interactions and the Role of
Monetary Conservatism
2.1 Introduction
During the last decades, normative proposals for the conduct of monetary policy
have put increasing emphasis on inflation targets as a primary objective. Similarly,
it is now an established consensus that central bank independence is an important
institutional prerequisite for the success of monetary policy in achieving its goal
of low and stable inflation. The view behind these two developments seems to be
that a monetary authority can successfully implement a targeted path for inflation,
once its statutes equip it with an appropriate mandate for price stability and the
independence of monetary policy choices is warranted. However, it is not so clear
whether the sufficiency of an independent and properly incentivized central bank
for price stability survives in settings where the interaction between monetary and
fiscal policies plays an important role.
Indeed, as argued among others by Woodford (2001), the case for the separation
of decision authority over monetary and fiscal policies is based on two central pre-
sumptions: First, that fiscal policy is not an important determinant of inflation; and
second, that the effects of monetary policy on the government budget are neglegible.
A setting, where both of these tenets may be violated, is given by an economy with
a significant amount of outstanding government debt in nominal terms. There, the
second aspect is captured by the simple relationship that monetary policy, via its ef-
fect on the price level, affects the real value of outstanding public liabilities and thus
the tightness of the intertemporal government budget constraint. The first aspect
relies on a more controversial mechanism which has been stressed by the literature
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around what has become known as the fiscal theory of the price level.1 Specifically,
in a world where ”non-Ricardian” policy regimes, i.e. policy rules which do not
guarantee that the intertemporal government budget constraint is satisfied regard-
less of how fiscal surpluses and the price level evolve, are possible, the fiscal theory
establishes that the specification of fiscal policy matters for the (inflationary) conse-
quences of monetary policy. This view has been criticized along various dimensions.
Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) condense the discussion to a single issue, the assess-
ment of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Following these authors’
interpretation, the fiscal theory of the price level takes the intertemporal budget con-
straint as a mere equilibrium condition, requiring that imbalances between the real
value of government debt and future primary surpluses be corrected by adjustments
in the price level that lead back to equilibrium. Conversely, the traditional view
interprets the intertemporal budget constraint as a constraint on policy; according
to this position, policy rules that do not satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint
for any sequence of prices are not feasible and thus a misspecification.
While the debate on the fiscal theory remains unsettled, the present paper adopts
an alternative approach, which on the one hand is in line with the traditional view
that admits only Ricardian policies, but on the other hand generates results similar
to those proposed by the fiscal theory. To arrive there, we borrow from two dis-
tinct branches of the literature. The first one is given by the fiscalist approaches to
the question of price level determination in dynamic general equilibrium economies
already mentioned above. Starting with the seminal contribution by Sargent and
Wallace (1981), this literature has found that the behavior of fiscal policy may
impose restrictions on what monetary policy can achieve and has identified the in-
tertemporal government budget constraint as the crucial building block that makes
monetary and fiscal policies interdependent. However, models of this sort are gener-
ally tacit about how the policies considered actually come about and whether they
are sustainable. These issues are taken up by another line of macroeconomic re-
search, which considers models of monetary and fiscal policy where policy choices
are the result of explicit optimization exercises with well-defined constraints. The
drawback with these contributions is that they are generally based on the assump-
tion that there is only one entity which effectively decides about the complete set of
policy instruments. Alternatively, when the focus of their analyses is on monetary
(fiscal) policy, it is essentially assumed that fiscal (monetary) policy is absent or
exogenously given to the model. The consequence is that such models offer only
limited insights into dynamic monetary-fiscal interactions.
Against this background, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of
policy making which allows for two institutions commissioned with the conduct of
1A selection from the large variety of papers that develop this theory includes e.g. Leeper
(1991), Sims (1994) or Woodford (2001).
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policy. Specifically, we analyze a simple monetary economy with flexible prices and
formalize a policy game between two independent authorities: a fiscal authority
and a monetary authority. The starting point for our analysis is a related model
proposed by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006). These authors analyze from an optimal
taxation perspective the burden that is caused by nominal debt in a dynamic econ-
omy without capital. With a particular specification of preferences2 and with a
single policy authority controlling the complete set of available policy instruments,
their central findings are as follows: As long as there are positive amounts of nominal
government debt, the ex-post incentive under sequential policy implementation to
reduce the real value of outstanding debt through inflation creates a time consistency
problem. In the rational expectations equilibrium, these inflationary incentives are
anticipated by the public and thus increase the cost of the outstanding debt by
creating nominal interest rate distortions. Therefore, the optimal policy without
commitment is to progressively deplete the outstanding stock of debt until the extra
liability costs vanish. The authors’ general message thus is that, with nominal debt
and sequential policy making, the optimal debt management policy will differ from
the prescriptions of standard Ramsey-optimal taxation in that also the marginal
gain from manipulating the real value of the existing debt is explicitly taken into
account.
In chapter one, we have extended the framework from Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006)
to a model featuring dynamic interaction between two benevolent agencies, a mon-
etary and a fiscal authority. The key finding there is that the decentralization of
authority over the relevant policy variables, the supply of money balances and a
linear consumption tax, can potentially coordinate the public’s expectations in a
way that has important implications for the dynamic evolution of the economy. In
particular, the rational expectations equilibrium from the case of a single, mono-
lithic policy maker is no longer the only equilibrium, and the associated inflation
bias may disappear even for positive levels of outstanding government debt. The
reason for this result is that, although the two authorities share the same objective,
the presence of the autonomous fiscal policy maker who is not per se subject to the
monetary time inconsistency problem allows for a coordination failure among the
two independently operating agencies. As a consequence, the economy is in a situa-
tion of multiple (Markov-perfect) equilibria, and the equilibrium outcome reported
in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) is complemented by a welfare superior equilibrium
outcome which is not subject to the inflation bias arising in the single agency case
and which implements an entirely stationary allocation.
The present paper deviates from this benchmark in that we perturb the objec-
tive functions of the strategically interacting government authorities. In particular,
2Martin (2006) generalizes the results presented in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) and illustrates
how the particular specification affects the equilibrium outcomes.
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we consider two empirically plausible deviations from the case of purely benevolent
policy makers: On the one hand, we assume a ”conservative” central bank which
puts excessive weight on an inflationary loss term, but is also responsive to general
economic conditions as measured by consumer welfare. Indeed, the institution of
a conservative central bank can be interpreted as a response to the fear that the
two authorities would have an incentive to coordinate their policies: While interact-
ing authorities with aligned incentives would, in any given period, be tempted to
collude and as a consequence succumb to the monetary time consistency problem,
equipping the authorities with differing objectives injects a form of disagreement
to their interaction which helps to prevent an unfavorable collusion. On the other
hand, the fiscal authority’s behavior is assumed to be governed by its relative im-
patience, which we see as resulting from dynamic frictions in the political process.
This gives rise to profligate fiscal policies and introduces a strategic conflict between
the two authorities about the path of the economy. An immediate implication of
this strategic conflict is that the perturbed game, unlike the benchmark discussed in
chapter one, is characterized by a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium allocation. In
a nutshell, the reason is that the dynamic game being played by the two institutions
is no longer of a pure coordination nature such that coordination failure can no
longer be the source of equilibrium multiplicity.
The strategic game proceeds within the framework of a dynamic general equi-
librium model where government policies are implemented sequentially over time,
but, in each period, the two authorities move simultaneously. Of course, the timing
of events is crucial. In the literature, there seem to be conflicting views.3 Although
some authors, e.g. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), argue that fiscal policy is slug-
gish relative to monetary policy, we stick to a notion of simultaneous moves rather
than formalizing the interaction in terms of a dynamic Stackelberg game, where,
in each period, the fiscal authority moves first and the monetary authority follows.
The justification for this assumption is that the present model abstracts from con-
siderations related to short run stabilization and thus reduces monetary policy to its
public finance role. Then, considerations related to the monetary interaction with
fiscal variables play only a minor role for ”day-to-day” operations, but are essential
in shaping policy over the medium and long run when also fiscal policy has some
flexibility.
In settings where explicit commitment is not available, it has been investigated
whether delegation of authority over policy decisions can help to improve upon the
inferior outcomes when policy makers are subject to dynamically inconsistent in-
centives. Specifically, in the context of Barro-Gordon (1983a,b) type models where
monetary policy faces the task of stabilizing output and inflation, the issue of delega-
tion to decision makers with biased incentives has received much attention; Rogoff’s
3Compare e.g. the discussion in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a).
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(1985b) weight-conservative central banker, inflation targets as proposed by Svens-
son (1997) and incentive contracts for central bankers as proposed by Walsh (1995)
are probably the best-known examples. However, all these approaches completely
abstract from fiscal policy or take it as exogenously given. The consequence is that
these models fail to take into account the dynamic implications arising from the
interaction of monetary and fiscal policies. Most importantly, while models along
these lines provide important insights concerning the optimal design of stabilization
policies, they completely ignore the intertemporal government budget constraint. It
is this issue that we will focus on in this paper by allowing for a measure of real
government debt as an endogenous state variable that can be dynamically manipu-
lated.
This makes it necessary to consider a dynamic general equilibrium model rather
than a (static) ad hoc specification. While this comes at some cost in terms of mod-
eling effort, there are a number of important advantages. First, our model allows for
true policy interaction in the sense of a dynamic game with a non-trivial state vari-
able played between the two authorities. Second, our model automatically comprises
dynamic forward-looking behavior of all agents such that current economic outcomes
are influenced by expectations about future policy. We analyze the Markov-perfect
equilibrium (MPE) of the dynamic game played between the monetary and the fis-
cal authority. Our central result for the considered case of a conservative central
bank and an impatient fiscal authority is that the latter can strategically exploit the
monetary authority’s commitment problem, whereby the dynamic inconsistency of
monetary policy stems from its ex-post incentives to surprise the public by inflation.
This makes the inflation bias unambigously reappear even under interaction and has
important implications for the dynamics of government debt. The explanation for
why fiscal policy affects inflation even in our otherwise monetarist world is that,
although it has no direct impact on inflation, it has a crucial effect on the monetary
authority’s incentives to generate inflation. It is in this sense that inflation is to
be seen as a fiscal phenomenon. Hence, the present paper rationalizes dynamics in
line with the implications of the fiscal theory of the price level, though on the basis
of a (perturbed) optimal taxation model which does not rely on the off-equilibrium
contingencies introduced by non-Ricardian fiscal policies. Moreover, we shed light
on the role of monetary conservatism from a novel perspective, being explicit about
the costs of the partial commitment afforded by an inflation-averse central bank.
Specifically, while conservatism gives rise to a superior commitment capacity not
to engage in inflationary expansions, the implication that any given level of real
government debt can be sustained at a lower rate of monetary accommodation is
internalized by the fiscal authority. Hence, in equilibrium, it runs larger deficits
and accumulates more debt which needs to be serviced by means of distortionary
government activity and thereby crowds out private consumption.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model
and defines a competitive equilibrium for our economy. Then, the following section
briefly lays out the structure of the policy game between the monetary and the fiscal
authority. Section 4 contains a description of the equilibrium outcomes. While we
are able to characterize the MPE of the game analytically, its quantitative implica-
tions must be analyzed by numerical methods. Finally, we discuss the institutional
implications arising from our analyis before the paper concludes with a review of
the related literature and some further remarks. Technical details and an outline of
the numerical methods used are delegated to the Appendix.
2.2 The model
We consider a dynamic monetary general equilibrium economy whose basic structure
is identical to the one in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006). The economy is made up of
a government sector and a private sector, and as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) there
is no capital. The government sector consists of a monetary authority and a fiscal
authority who take their decisions independently. The policy instrument controlled
by the monetary authority is the supply of moneyM gt+1 (the superscript g is used to
distinguish an aggregate variable from an individual variable where necessary). The
fiscal authority collects consumption taxes τ ct in order to finance an exogenously
given stream of public expenditures gt. For simplicity, we let public spending be
deterministic and constant over time such that gt = g for all t ≥ 0.4 The two
authorities interact via the consolidated budget constraint of the government sector.
Seignorage revenues from money creation by the monetary authority accrue to the
consolidated government budget. Thus, we restrict attention to the public finance
role of monetary policy in order to focus on the implications of decentralized decision
power among the two independent institutions. Finally, we assume that the fiscal
authority, besides its tax policy, issues nominal one-period bonds Bgt+1, whereby the
quantity of bonds traded is determined by the following flow budget constraint for
the government sector which has to be satisfied for all t ≥ 0:
M gt+1 +B
g
t+1 + Ptτ
c
t ct ≥M gt +Bgt (1 +Rt) + Ptg (2.1)
Here, Pt is the price level prevailing at time t, while Rt is the nominal interest rate
paid on the bonds issued at date t − 1. The initial stock of money M g0 and the
4What ultimately matters for the construction of our equilibria are the fiscal deficits over time.
While the empirical evidence suggests that over short time horizons fiscal adjustments are brought
about by changes in government spending rather than in taxation, it turns out that endogenizing
taxation is conceptionally more straightforward than endogenizing spending. Therefore, we intro-
duce fiscal discretion with respect to the size of deficits as stemming from variable taxation with
government spending given exogenously.
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initial debt liabilities Bg0(1 + R0) are given. However, we impose the additional
consistency condition that, in equilibrium, there is no surprise inflation in the initial
(t = 0) period; thus, by linking the nominal interest rate R0 to the equilibrium rate
of inflation in the first period, we prevent the authorities from taking advantage of
the inelasticity of the amount of oustanding nominal balancesM0 and B0 in the first
period.5
On the private side, the economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical
infinitely-lived households whose preferences over sequences of consumption ct and
labor nt can be represented by the following expression:
∞∑
t=0
βt {u(ct)− v(nt)} , (2.2)
where the discount factor β satisfies 0 < β < 1. In what follows, we will assume
u(ct) = log(ct) and v(nt) = αnt.
6 Each consumer faces the following budget con-
straint:
Mt+1 +Bt+1 ≤Mt − Pt(1 + τ ct )ct +Bt(1 +Rt) +Wtnt, (2.3)
where Wt is the nominal wage and Bt+1 andMt+1 are nominal government debt and
nominal money balances taken over from period t to period t+ 1. We assume that
each consumer faces a no-Ponzi condition that prevents him from running explosive
consumption/debt schemes:
limT→∞βT
BT+1
PT
≥ 0 (2.4)
As a shortcut for introducing a well-defined money demand we assume that the
gross-of-tax consumption expenditure in period t must be financed using currency
carried over from period t − 1, which gives rise to the following cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint:
Mt ≥ Pt(1 + τ ct )ct (2.5)
The timing protocol underlying this CIA constraint follows Svensson (1985) and
requires that the goods market operates and closes before the asset market opens.
5The rational expectations consistency condition for the initial period is imposed because it
facilitates a meaningful welfare comparison across different monetary and fiscal institutions.
6The assumption of linear disutility of labor is made to sharpen the discussion, but implies also
that the government sector cannot affect the real interest rate. In contrast, the assumption of log
utility from consumption is essential because it allows to focus on the role of nominal debt as a
source of time inconsistency rather than on the effects due to private holdings of nominal money
balances. That is, we abstract from seignorage on base money and focus on the implications of
changing the real value of nominal debt. Importantly, this focus is consistent with the situation in
most developed economies where government debt is arguably more important than money holdings
as a source of dynamically inconsistent incentives. See also Nicolini (1998) for an instructive
exposition of the nature of the time inconsistency of monetary policy and Martin (2006) for results
with a more general specification of preferences.
56
This implies that unexpected monetary expansions, due to the inflationary pressure
they cause, are distortionary because the nominal asset portfolio cannot be reshuffled
in response to monetary innovations and only the money balances taken over from
the previous period are available to facilitate current consumption purchases.
The productive side of the model economy is very simple since there is no cap-
ital. In each period, labor nt can be transformed into private consumption ct or
public consumption g at a constant rate, which we assume to be unitary. Then,
the equilibrium real wage is wt ≡ WtPt = 1 for all t ≥ 0, and aggregate feasibility is
reflected by the following linear resource constraint:
ct + g ≤ nt (2.6)
We are now ready to define a competitive equilibrium for given government policy
choices {τ ct ,M gt+1, Bgt+1, g}∞t=0.
Definition 2.1 A competitive equilibrium for this economy is composed of the gov-
ernment sector’s policies {τ ct ,M gt+1, Bgt+1, g}∞t=0, an allocation {ct, nt, Bt+1,Mt+1}∞t=0,
and prices {Rt+1, Pt}∞t=0 such that:
1. given Bg0(1 + R0) and M
g
0 , the policies and the prices satisfy the sequence of
budget constraints of the government sector described in expression (2.1);
2. when households take B0(1+R0), M0 and prices as given, the allocation solves
the household problem of maximizing (2.2) subject to the private budget con-
straint (2.3), the CIA constraint (2.5) and the no-Ponzi condition (2.4);
3. markets clear, i.e.: Bgt = Bt, M
g
t = Mt, and g and the allocation satisfy the
economy’s resource constraint (2.6) for all t ≥ 0.
On the basis of our assumptions on household preferences, it is straightforward
to show that in the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy the household
budget constraint (2.3) and the aggregate resource constraint (2.6) are both satisfied
at equality. Moreover, the first order conditions of the Lagrangean representing
the household’s constrained optimization problem are both necessary and sufficient
conditions to characterize the solution to the household problem. Finally, when
Rt+1 > 0, the CIA constraint (2.5) is binding, and the competitive equilibrium
allocation for given government policies can be determined from the government
budget constraint (2.1), the aggregate resource constraint (2.6) and the following
conditions that must hold for all t ≥ 0:
Mt = Pt(1 + τ
c
t )ct (2.7)
u′(ct)
v′(nt)
= (1 +Rt)(1 + τ
c
t ) (2.8)
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(1 +Rt+1) =
v′(nt)
βv′(nt+1)
Pt+1
Pt
(2.9)
limT→∞βT
MT+1 +BT+1
PT
= 0 (2.10)
2.3 The policy game
The foregoing definition of a competitive equilibrium is conditional on an arbitrary
sequence of government policies. Given that our focus is on an environment where
there is no explicit commitment technology, pinning down these policies requires the
identification of a policy rule that is sequentially optimal from the two authorities’
perspectives. As hinted in the Introduction, the presence of nominal government
debt gives rise to an inflationary bias due to the ex-post incentives to deflate the
real value of outstanding liabilities. This problem is institutionally dealt with by
delegation of decision power over monetary policy to a ”conservative” monetary
authority whose objective function differs from the representative agent’s welfare in
a fashion to be detailed below. Since the authority over fiscal policy remains with the
original government entity, we are in a situation of decentralized authority. Hence,
we define a policy rule to be the combination of a fiscal and a monetary policy
rule; each of these latter rules is determined independently by the corresponding
institution i = f,m, respectively. Absent intertemporal commitment, policies are
implemented sequentially, whereby we limit the analysis to Markov-stationary policy
rules, i.e. time-invariant mappings returning policy choices as a function of the
current state of the economy.7 In order to identify the equilibrium policy rule,
we therefore need to find the optimal time-invariant strategies in the strategic game
between the two authorities. A formal description of the game-theoretic structure of
the two authorities’ interaction is given in Appendix B.3. Here, it suffices to mention
that (i) in view of their differing objectives, the two authorities choose their policies
in a non-cooperative manner, and that (ii) in doing so, they take as given not only
the public’s formation of expectations, but also the policy rules employed by their
future incarnations as well as their respective opponent’s current play. Hence, the
appropriate equilibrium concept for the simultaneous moves stage game interaction
is Nash.8 We denote the policy function by ϕ(zg) = (ϕf (z
g), ϕm(z
g)), where ϕf (z
g)
and ϕm(z
g) are the fiscal and monetary parts of the rule. They give the respective
7The implication is that history does not matter except via its influence on the current state.
It is precisely this restriction that rules out reputational mechanisms.
8One might want to argue that communication between monetary and fiscal authorities renders
the non-cooperative outcomes of Nash play implausible. Note however that, as long as formal
contracts are unavailable, the only self-enforcing plans (in the sense of correlated equilibria) that
players could implement under direct communication would be randomizations among the Nash
equilibria of the non-cooperative game; compare Myerson (1991), chapter 6.
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policy instruments τ c andM ′ as functions of the aggregate state zg ≡ Bg(1+R)
Mg
, which
is informative along two dimensions: First, with respect to the composition of the
nominal claims with which households enter period t, and secondly, with respect to
the real value of the government debt burden inherited from the past.9
The data of the economy introduced so far are sufficient to characterize a com-
petitive equilibrium for a sequence of arbitrary policy choices. What is lacking to pin
down these policy choices are (i) the preferences of the two policy making authorites
as represented by their objective functions, and (ii) an appropriate definition of a
game-theoretic equilibrium. We now turn to the former issue. Let U(z, zg;ϕ) be the
lifetime utility enjoyed by a household with individual state z when the aggregate
state is zg and the policy rule employed by the two authorities is ϕ. The fiscal
authority is impatient insofar as it tries to maximize the discounted sum of the
household’s period utilities u(ct) − v(nt), whereby its discount factor δ < β is dis-
torted downwards as compared to the one employed by the representative household.
The fiscal objective function is:
∞∑
t=0
δt {u(ct)− v(nt)}
We see this payoff function as a shortcut for introducing politico-economic frictions
into the model. Examples include electoral concerns or fiscal institutions that dis-
perse the decision power over debt and deficits.10 A divergence in the discount
9To understand why zg serves as the aggregate state variable, notice that neither nominal
variables such as money and bonds nor their real values are sufficient statistics. The reason is
that the contemporaneous price level, being endogenous, cannot be used to normalize nominal
variables. Moreover, due to the CIA constraint only money is available for current consumption
expenditure such that we need information on the composition of the nominal asset portfolio held
by private agents. Finally, to appropriately reflect the real debt burden inherited from the past,
also the interest payments on maturing bonds must be accounted for.
10In a related context, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) introduce such frictions as the result of
special-interest politics. Persson and Tabellini (2000), chapter 13, provide an extensive review of
the politico-economic literature on the accumulation of public debt. The main arguments evolve
around the notion of ”divided government” and political instability. The first issue can lead
to a dynamic common pool problem with too much spending occurring too soon or to delayed
stabilization as a consequence of a war of attrition. The second line of research stresses the strategic
calculus of governments who accumulate debt in order to increase their reelection probability or to
affect incentive constraints faced by their successors or political opponents. While most of these
models are formulated in terms of variable government spending, the obvious result with exogenous
spending is that political incentives map into myopic policy choices which attach too much weight
to the present as opposed to the future. A possible way of modelling such fiscal behavior would be
to let the fiscal authority be engaged in quasi-geometric discounting. However, such a specification
on its own gives rise to a dynamic game between the subsequent incarnations of the fiscal authority,
which is sufficiently difficult to analyze already in isolation; compare e.g. Krusell, Kuruscu and
Smith (2000, 2002). Therefore, we choose to model the bias towards the present as simply emerging
from a lower discount factor.
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factors of the form δ < β then reflects the systematic tendency towards myopic
policy choices. We let V (zg;ϕ) denote the fiscal value function associated with a
given aggregate state zg and policy rule ϕ.
As regards the monetary authority, our starting point are the statutes of many
independent central banks which ascribe importance to the task of curbing inflation
or alternatively stabilizing the price level, but at the same time also refer to fur-
ther indicators for general economic performance. For example, the ”Protocol on
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central
Bank”11 prescribes the following objectives for the European monetary authority
(Article 2): ”... the primary objective of the E[uropean] S[ystem] [of ] C[entral]
B[anks] shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of
price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the [European] Com-
munity with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Com-
munity... The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market
economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources ...”. We
parameterize this by defining the monetary authority’s objective function as follows:
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−γ
(
Pt
P¯t
)2
+ (1− γ)[u(ct)− v(nt)]
}
Here, γ ∈ (0, 1) is a weight which balances the relative impacts on the monetary
authority’s payoff of general welfare (as measured by the representative household’s
lifetime utility) and a loss term resulting from unanticipated deviations of the real-
ized price level P from the level P¯ that was expected by the public. This specification
is a particular interpretation of a weight-conservative central banker (Rogoff, 1985b),
according to which the monetary aversion against surprise inflation implies a reluc-
tance to use the inflation tax as a lump-sum instrument. This monetary objective
captures two important points in line with real world evidence: First, the monetary
authority has an explicit interest in price level stability; and secondly, despite its
specific mission, the monetary authority cares also about general economic condi-
tions.12 On the basis of this specification for period payoffs, we define the value
function for the monetary authority as W (zg;ϕ).
Finally, our relevant concept to pin down policy choices is Markov-perfect equi-
librium (MPE). Accordingly, the main goal is to identify a policy rule ϕ(zg) that
is time consistent. This means that the authorities must not have an incentive to
deviate from this rule when they choose their policy instruments simultaneously and
11Protocol annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community. See European Central
Bank (2000).
12While the monetary objective function is stipulated in an ad hoc way, it seems natural in the
present environment featuring a monetary time consistency problem. Compare also the literature
on central bank contracts, e.g. Walsh (1995).
60
sequentially over time. Finding such a policy rule involves three steps:13
1. Define the economic equilibrium for arbitrary policy rules ϕ. This allows to de-
termine the representative household’s welfare level as well as the authorities’
value functions for arbitrary policy rules ϕ.
2. Define the optimal equilibrium policy pi in the current period when future
policies are determined by some arbitrary policy rule ϕ. Since the optimal
current policy depends on the current states, this step determines the optimal
current policy rule pi(ϕ), given a future rule ϕ.
3. Define the conditions under which the authorities will not deviate from the
rule assumed for the future, i.e. impose time consistency on the policy rule.
Time consistency will obtain if the policy rule assumed for the future is equal
to the rule that is optimal in the current period (policy fixed point): ϕ = pi(ϕ).
With this structure the policy equilibrium can be represented recursively. Recall
that in our deterministic model with constant government expenditure, the aggre-
gate state is simply zgt ; the individual state is given by zt. We now operationalize the
three steps described above; details of the procedure are specified in the Appendix.14
2.3.1 Equilibrium for arbitrary policy rule
Conditional on a policy rule ϕ employed by the two authorities, a competitive equi-
librium is defined in the usual way. In the rational expectations equilibrium, a fixed
point between a perceived law of motion Ge(zg;ϕ) for the endogenous aggregate
state variable zg and the induced actual law of motion G(zg;ϕ) has to obtain. This
allows us to recast the definition of a competitive equilibrium in a recursive manner.
Definition 2.2 A recursive competitive equilibrium for given policies ϕ con-
sists of a household value function U(z, zg;ϕ), (individual) decision rules
{c(z, zg;ϕ), n(z, zg;ϕ), B′(z, zg;ϕ),M ′(z, zg;ϕ)} and an aggregate function Ge(zg;ϕ)
such that:
1. households optimize, i.e. given the states (z, zg), policies ϕ and a perceived
law of motion Ge(zg;ϕ), the value function U(z, zg;ϕ) and the decision rules
{c(·), n(·), B′(·),M ′(·)} solve the household problem;
13The procedure has been developed by Klein, Quadrini and R´ıos-Rull (2005) who apply it to
analyze a model of international tax competition.
14The equations presented in the following are derived from a primal approach to the authorities’
problems; the respective problems are conditional on the other authority’s policy rule as well as on
private expectations as represented by the barred variables in the constraints. The primal approach
reformulation of the relevant decision problems is done in Appendix B.2.
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2. the perceived law of motion is the actual law of motion, i.e. households are
representative and form rational expectations:
z′ = z′g = Ge(zg;ϕ)
3. the pursued policies are feasible, i.e. the consolidated budget constraint of the
government sector is satisfied in every period:
M ′g +B′g + Pτ cc =M g +Bg(1 +R) + Pg.
The optimal household decisions in view of a policy rule ϕ determine the house-
hold value function U(z, zg;ϕ). By the same token, once the actual law of motion
G(zg;ϕ) consistent with policy rule ϕ is determined, we can infer the fiscal value
function, conditional on the policy rule ϕ:
V (zg;ϕ) = {[log(c(zg;ϕ))− α(c(zg;ϕ) + g)] + δV (z′g;ϕ)}
s.t.
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′g
(1 + µ(z′g;ϕ))
− c(zg;ϕ)− β
α
zg
(1 + µ(zg;ϕ))
= 0,
where µ ≡ M ′g
Mg
− 1 is the rate of money expansion determined by the monetary
authority. Similarly, for the monetary authority, we have:
W (zg;ϕ) =
{
−γ
(
c¯(zg)(1 + τ¯ c(zg))
c(zg;ϕ)(1 + τ c(zg;ϕ))
)2
+ (1− γ)[log(c(zg;ϕ))− α(c(zg;ϕ) + g)] + βW (z′g;ϕ)
}
s.t.
β
α
− g + βz′gc(z′g;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′g;ϕ))− c(zg;ϕ)− zgc(zg;ϕ)(1 + τ c(zg;ϕ)) = 0,
where barred variables denote predetermined private expectations.
2.3.2 Optimal current policy rule for given future policy
rule
We look for a MPE where both authorities correctly anticipate their current oppo-
nent’s as well as their successors’ policy choices and take them as given. Clearly, the
optimal control laws depend on each other, but in the MPE with simultaneous moves
each authority ignores the influence that its choice exerts on the other authority’s
current choice. Then each authority faces a situation where its own current policy
choice affects both its current payoff and its continuation value from the next period
onwards. The contemporaneous effect reflects the impact of this period’s allocation
and prices on the period payoff. The effect on the continuation value works through
two channels both of which hinge on the real value of liabilities z′g that result at
the beginning of the subsequent period as a consequence of the current policies im-
plemented by the two authorities: First, z′g is a measure of the government sector’s
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indebtedness with the private sector and therefore determines the amount of future
distortionary activity necessary to balance the intertemporal government budget;
this channel reflects a distortion smoothing motive. Second, the future authorities’
incentives to implement a particular policy are a function of the future state z′g.
Hence, by manipulating the future state z′g, the current policy makers can affect
the continuation play; this channel reflects a strategic manipulation motive.15
Let pi = (pif , pim) denote the current policy rule, and let ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm) denote the
future policy rule. Individual households take these rules as given. With the appro-
priate notational changes, a recursive competitive equilibrium for arbitrary current
policy actions pi followed by a future policy rule ϕ is then defined analogously to
above recursive competitive equilibrium for given policies ϕ. Faced with a continu-
ation policy rule ϕ, the authorities’ problem consists of optimally determining their
contemporaneous policies pi. Specifically, for the fiscal authority, we have the fol-
lowing (in order to distinguish it from the continuation value V (z′g;ϕ), the current
value Vˆ (z′g; pi, ϕ) is denoted with a hat):
Vˆ (zg; pi, ϕ) = maxpif {[log(c(zg; pi))− α(c(zg; pi) + g)] + δV (z′g;ϕ)} ,
where the maximization is subject to the fiscal implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′g
(1 + µ(z′g;ϕ))
− c(zg; pi)− β
α
zg
(1 + µ(zg; pim))
= 0
For the monetary authority, we have:
Wˆ (zg;pi, ϕ) =
maxpim
{
−γ
(
c¯(zg)(1 + τ¯ c(zg))
c(zg;pi)(1 + τ c(zg;pif ))
)2
+ (1− γ)[log(c(zg;pi))− α(c(zg;pi) + g)] + βW (z′g;ϕ)
}
,
where the maximization is subject to the monetary implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + βz′gc(z′g;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′g;ϕ))− c(zg; pi)− zgc(zg; pi)(1 + τ c(zg; pif )) = 0
Note that the authorities maximize directly over their current policies (pif and
pim, respectively), whereby the authorities understand their policies’ impact on the
ensuing private allocation. This effect is captured by deriving the authorities’ value
functions from the private allocation which, in turn, is conditional on policies. The
15However, it is important to realize that each current authority i = f,m and its respective
subsequent incarnation agree along the following dimension: Given current expectations about
the continuation play as reflected by the nominal interest rate R which households demand as a
compensation for buying government debt, there is no conflict about how to set the next period’s
policies. The disagreement between current and future policy makers stems only from the fact that
the former can manage the public’s expectations with respect to the continuation play ϕ, while
the latter cannot.
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authorities make their current policy choices simultaneously, taking the other one’s
policy rule as well as the future continuation play as given. The fiscal authority,
given pim and ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm), chooses pif to maximize Vˆ (z
g; pi, ϕ), and the monetary
authority, given pif and ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm), chooses pim to maximize Wˆ (z
g; pi, ϕ). This
leads to the following definition:
Definition 2.3 Given the functions ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm), a Nash equilibrium of the
policy game is a pair of functions {pi∗i (zg;ϕ)}i=f,m such that (i) pi∗f (zg;ϕ) maxi-
mizes Vˆ (zg; pi, ϕ), given pi∗m(z
g;ϕ), and (ii) pi∗m(z
g;ϕ) maximizes Wˆ (zg; pi, ϕ), given
pi∗f (z
g;ϕ).
By construction, the Nash equilibrium will consist of feasible policies. However,
out of equilibrium, the payoffs may not be well-defined. This will be the case for
policy choices which are jointly incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. Then,
the question is what will happen out of equilibrium. Noting that the described
environment and the rules according to which the two authorities interact in this
environment fall short of the formal description of a game, we will nevertheless
proceed to analyze the MPE outcomes.16
2.3.3 Policy fixed point
Now, we can define the equilibrium time consistent policies:
Definition 2.4 The policy functions ϕ = (ϕf , ϕm) define time consistent policies if
they are the Nash solution of the policy game when the two authorities expect ϕ to
determine future policies. Formally: ϕi(z
g) = pii(z
g;ϕ), i = f,m.
A MPE of the policy game described above is a profile of time consistent Markov
strategies for the two authorities that yields a Nash equilibrium in every proper sub-
game. It is these time consistent policies ϕ and the associated equilibrium outcomes
that we are interested in.
16Formally, the structure presented is a quasi-game. The problem is that the outcome and the
associated payoffs are not well-defined if there is no feasible allocation satisfying a consistency
condition defined by equation (2.11) below. In such situations, the authorities’ policy choices τ c
and M ′ are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. In a related context, but with only
one authority, a possible solution to this lack of formal structure has been suggested by Bassetto
(2002, 2005) who proposes the introduction of an explicit market microstructure and the adoption
of a modified notion of government policy within a period as contingent strategy rather than as
uncontingent plan.
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2.4 Markov-perfect equilibrium outcomes
2.4.1 Necessary conditions
Before characterizing the MPE outcomes associated with the dynamic policy game,
at a more fundamental level existence and uniqueness of such a MPE should be
verified. As regards the former issue, we can build on an existence result in chapter
one which establishes that a differentiable MPE in stationary strategies exists for
the infinite-horizon game at hand. However, in contrast to the benchmark case
discussed in chapter one, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes will not be a concern
here, if we restrict the analysis to differentiable policy rules. The reason is that,
in the present context, the two policy authorities’ objectives are conflicting. In
particular, as will become obvious in a moment, the fiscal authority’s impatience
forces monetary policy to be accommodative in the sense of (partially) monetizing
fiscal deficits. This results in anticipated inflationary distortions, whose degree is
marginally responsive to variations in zg, and implies that there is no scope for
the favorable coordination of the public’s expectations that was the condition for
sustaining a stationary non-inflationary MPE in the benchmark case of chapter one.
Concentrating on differentiable Markov strategies, it is useful to present the two
authorities’ first order conditions with respect to their primal choice variables c
and z′ for a given continuation policy ϕ (step 2 above). These first order condi-
tions, together with the respective implementability constraints, are necessary con-
ditions characterizing any MPE.17 Moreover, in any MPE, the following consistency
condition, which guarantees that the two authorities’ dynamic programs and their
respective solutions are mutually consistent and decentralizable as a competitive
equilibrium, must hold:
c(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))(1 + µ(z;ϕ)) =
β
α
(2.11)
The fiscal authority’s optimality conditions with respect to c and z′ can be com-
bined to yield the following expression:
1
c
− α = −
δ
β
V ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 , (2.12)
where εµ(z;ϕ) ≡ ∂(1+µ(z;ϕ))/∂z(1+µ(z;ϕ))/z is defined to be the elasticity of (gross) monetary ex-
pansions in response to changes in the aggregate state z. According to this condition,
the marginal gain from increased current consumption is equated to the marginal
cost of entering the next period with a higher stock of real debt z′, which is (i) scaled
17The relevant equations are derived in Appendix B.5. In what follows, we will drop the super-
script g because in any rational expectations equilibrium, the individual state z and the aggregate
state zg must coincide.
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down by the factor δ
β
< 1 due to the fiscal authority’s relative impatience and (ii)
scaled up by the factor [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 ≥ 1.18 This latter amplification results from
the adverse expectational effects of increased outstanding liabilities: A higher debt
burden increases the future monetary authority’s incentives to resort to the inflation
tax, which is anticipated by the public and leads to an upward distortion in nominal
interest rates; this, in turn, constitutes an opportunity cost of consumption due to
the CIA constraint. That the fiscal authority will not only behave impatiently, but
will also take into account future incentive problems in formulating its distortion
smoothing policy becomes even more apparent if an envelope condition is applied
in order to substitute for the value function term in (2.12), which yields:
1
c
− α = δ
β
(
1
c(z′;ϕ)
− α
)
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (2.13)
Equation (2.13) reveals that, even though the current fiscal authority is not per se
subject to a time consistency problem, it will not act like a conventional Ramsey
planner. Rather, in trying to smooth distortions over time, it will also take into
account the incentive problems of future policy makers. However, since the fiscal
authority attaches a lower relative weight to the time when the commitment problem
is relevant, this strategic rationale is discounted.
As for the fiscal authority, the monetary authority’s first order conditions for c
and z′ can be combined to yield a single expression:
2γ 1
c
+ (1− γ) (1
c
− α)
[1 + z(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))]
= − W
′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (2.14)
Again, this condition has the interpretation that, in each period, the monetary au-
thority tries to equate the marginal gain from higher current consumption to the
marginal cost associated with higher debt in the next period. The marginal benefit
from current consumption as perceived by the monetary authority (LHS) consists
of three components: First, there is the direct effect via current household utility as
reflected by the expression (1−γ) (1
c
− α). Second, for given private sector expecta-
tions, higher consumption implies lower surprise inflation and hence impacts on the
inflationary loss term. Finally, the expression in the denominator (which exceeds
one for z > 0) reflects a discounting of the benefits from increased consumption
due to the following mechanism: By virtue of the CIA constraint, higher consump-
tion requires that the current monetary policy maker has to forego the inflation tax,
18The equilibrium property [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 ≥ 1 follows from the fact that 1 > εµ(z′;ϕ) ≥ 0. In
particular, since any competitive equilibrium must be decentralized via distortionary policies, we
have [u′(c(z))−v′(c(z)+g)] =
(
1
c(z) − α
)
> 0 for all z ≥ 0; then, as seen from (2.13), compatibility
with fiscal optimality requires 1 > εµ(z′;ϕ). Finally, εµ(z;ϕ) ≥ 0 is a consequence of the monetary
authority’s incentives to monetize outstanding government liabilities via the inflation tax being a
non-decreasing function of the inherited debt burden z. In Proposition 1 below, we will verify that
εµ(z;ϕ) > 0.
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which would operate in a lump-sum fashion on the outstanding liabilities; rather, the
policy maker leaves its successors with the task to satisfy the intertemporal budget
constraint by means of future distortionary activity. The evaluation of the marginal
cost of higher debt in the next period again takes into account the commitment prob-
lems of future policy makers such that the RHS comprises the amplification term
[1 − εµ(z;ϕ)]−1 ≥ 1. Substitution of the value function derivative via an envelope
condition leads to the following intertemporal expression:
2γ 1
c
+ (1− γ) (1
c
− α)
(1 + z(1 + τ c(z;ϕ)))
(2.15)
=
2γ 1c(z′;ϕ) + (1− γ)
(
1
c(z′;ϕ) − α
)
[1 + z′(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))]
− 2γ
εµ(z′;ϕ)
z′
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
 [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 ,
which dictates distortion smoothing subject to the twofold incentive constraint stem-
ming from debt being nominal and policy implementation being sequential. The
former distortion, reflecting the discretionary incentive to reduce the real value of
government debt, enters (2.15) via the term [1+z(1+τ c(z;ϕ))], as explained above.
The latter distortion arises as a consequence of future policies being responsive to
the inherited stock of liabilities z′ and the fact that a non-myopic policy maker takes
into account that this will be rationally anticipated by the public.
Explicitly solving for the allocation implemented as the outcome of the dynamic
interaction among the sequence of monetary and fiscal policy makers necessitates
numerical methods the details of which are specified in Appendix B.7. In order to
illustrate the dynamic evolution of the economy in the presence of nominal govern-
ment debt, we will invoke a simple numerical example. For that purpose, we choose
the following values for the parameters of our model economy: α = 0.45, β = 0.98,
γ = 0.5, b0 ≡ z0(1+R0) = 1.28, g = 0.5. These parameter values largely draw on
Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) in order to make our results comparable to their ones.
However, we choose the values for initial government debt and public spending more
in line with recent OECD data.19 Finally, the fiscal discount factor δ is set equal
to 0.95 (< β), reflecting the assumed impatience underlying the conduct of fiscal
policy.
2.4.2 Economic outcomes and institutional implications
To understand the MPE outcomes of the policy game considered here, the insights
from the benchmark case, where the fiscal discount factor is not perturbed (δ = β)
and the monetary authority is not inflation-averse per se (γ = 0), are helpful. In this
19In 2003, the average of general government gross financial liabilities across the OECD countries
was 76.0% of GDP, while the ratio of general government total outlays to GDP was at 40.7%;
compare OECD (2004).
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situation, both authorities share the representative household’s preferences, but the
monetary authority has access to a policy instrument which gives rise to dynami-
cally inconsistent incentives. However, as shown in chapter one, the decentralization
of decision power among the two interacting authorities is an institutional arrange-
ment that may help to overcome the time inconsistency problem plaguing monetary
policy and the associated inflation bias. The key mechanism sustaining this favor-
able equilibrium outcome is the fact that the reaction function, which pins down
optimal fiscal policy, acts as an additional constraint on monetary policy choices.
Consequently, since the optimal fiscal policy is not dynamically inconsistent, there
is scope for a favorable coordination of the public’s expectations. Given such ex-
pectations and a fiscal policy that keeps the stock of real government liabilities z
constant, a benevolent monetary policy maker refrains from using the inflation tax.
Loosely speaking, the point is that the decentralized decision power among the two
authorities does not allow the monetary authority to substitute the distortionary
consumption tax by the lump-sum inflation tax. The result is that the standard
single-agency MPE outcome, where the stock of debt is driven to zero20 in order
to economize on the extra expectational costs of outstanding nominal liabilities, is
complemented by another MPE outcome characterized by (i) a stationary allocation
even in the presence of positive amounts of oustanding government debt and (ii) the
absence of a systematic inflation bias.
Nevertheless, even in a non-inflationary equilibrium, government debt crowds out
private consumption because it has to be serviced via distortionary taxation. Given
the adverse welfare implications of government debt in the benchmark model, the
following question emerges: Why is there nominal debt at all, if there are no benefits
from it,21 but an outstanding amount of debt only depresses consumption and may
additionally give rise to adverse expectational effects? A potential answer to this
question can be given if we acknowledge that the fiscal authority’s preferences are
slightly perturbed. Indeed, if the fiscal authority discounts the future at a higher
rate than the private households and the monetary authority do (δ < β), then
its preferred policy consistently shifts policy distortions into the future at the cost
of accumulating public debt. Hence, there emerges a strategic conflict between
the two authorities about when to incur the distortions necessary to satisfy the
intertemporal government budget constraint. This conflict can be summarized by
the two authorities’ differing preferences with respect to the path of the endogenous
20The convergence to a zero debt level is an implication of the particular logarithmic specification
of preferences; see Martin (2006) for a generalization.
21Of course, the model is a simplification in this respect. A role for government debt can arise
from its tax smoothing potential (Barro, 1979), its interaction with the accumulation of physical
capital (Diamond, 1965) as well as from liquidity or insurance services of government bonds in
stochastic or incomplete market environments (Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998; Shin, 2006).
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state variable z.22
Given that c(z) is strictly decreasing,23 optimality condition (2.13) reveals that
the fiscal authority favors an increasing path of z whenever δ
β
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 < 1
and vice versa. This stems from the relative impatience inherent in fiscal policy
making which is traded off against the welfare losses due to the crowding out of
consumption via debt. In the long run, the model predicts a stationary level of debt
z∗ implicitly characterized by δ
β
[1− εµ(z∗;ϕ)]−1 = 1. For z < z∗, the fiscal authority
is not willing to balance the budget but prefers to accumulate debt. This means
that the selection of a non-inflationary equilibrium necessarily breaks down because
of the monetary authority’s motive to contain the accumulation of debt, which is
achieved by engineering some inflation in order to devaluate the stock of outstanding
liabilities. Hence, the monetary ex-post incentives to generate surprise inflation are
always present during the transition to z∗. In a rational expectations equilibrium
the public anticipates such inflation, and - abstracting from the interference by
fiscal polcies - the path of real debt preferred by the monetary authority would be
decreasing, a scenario similar to the one described in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006).
The policies preferred by the two authorities can be qualitatively characterized
by inspection of their relevant optimality conditions. However, it is not as straight-
forward to anticipate the details of how the economy will evolve in equilibrium as
an outcome of the dynamic policy interaction. Therefore, we resort to a numerical
example which is parameterized as described above. The key results of this exer-
cise are displayed in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 shows the dynamic evolution
of the end-of-period stock of real government debt b′ = z
′
(1+R′) . The stock of real
debt grows at a decreasing rate, converging to a debt ceiling at b∗ = z
∗
(1+R∗) . The
increasing distortions associated with the accumulation of debt affect the pattern
of consumption displayed in Figure 2.2. As hinted above, the debt ceiling is deter-
mined by the fiscal optimality condition (2.13); however, it is important to realize
that this condition is contingent on the equilibrium policy rule ϕ and thus depends
also on monetary policy.24 In particular, it must be the case that, at z∗, the losses
incurred due to inflation and the benefits from stabilizing the level of debt by mon-
etizing fiscal deficits via the inflation tax are equal from the monetary authority’s
22The following analyis throughout assumes that the initial state z0 takes a small positive value
such that convergence to the steady state z∗ proceeds from below. Convergence from z0 > z∗
involves a gradual decumulation of public debt, whereby the monetary inflation tax is operative in
the sense of (1 + µ(z)) > 1.
23This property is equivalent to a strictly concave value function V (·). The intuition for the
concavity is that a higher level of z calls for higher future distortionary activity to balance the
intertemporal government budget, which implies a lower continuation path of c, and that increases
of z are increasingly costly due to the concavity in c of the representative household’s period payoff.
24The same argument applies for the monetary optimality condition (2.15), which is contingent
on the fiscal behavior stipulated by the equilibrium rule ϕ.
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perspective. A closer analysis of the situation for the monetary authority reveals
the following: On the one hand, monetary policy needs to inflate the economy in
order to contain the accumulation of debt preferred by the fiscal authority; indeed,
the monetary incentives to inflate the economy are a non-decreasing function of the
stock of debt. On the other hand, the responsiveness of monetary policy to the
level of debt makes the accumulation of debt increasingly unattractive because the
dynamically inconsistent incentives are anticipated by the public. Given that also
the fiscal authority suffers from the extra distortions caused by these expectational
effects, the fiscal authority will have an incentive not to let debt go out of hands.
The mechanism behind these dynamics is that the fiscal impatience undermines
the monetary authority’s ability to credibly sustain the zero-inflation competitive
equilibrium that was available with purely benevolent interacting authorities. Nom-
inal debt now bears liability costs beyond the costs arising from the need to balance
the intertemporal government budget by distortionary activity. Consequently, the
optimal policy would be to gradually decumulate debt until these extra liability costs
vanish. However, the fiscal authority’s bias towards the present implies a tendency
to accumulate debt. These two effects balance each other at the steady state z∗.
Hence, to a certain extent - namely up to the point where the gains from reduc-
ing the liability costs of debt via the inflation tax equal the costs to the monetary
authority due to actual inflation - fiscal policy indeed dominates monetary policy.
Importantly, it can be shown that there cannot be a MPE involving zero inflation
during the transition (from below) to the steady state. This is seen by inspection
of the monetary authority’s first order condition (2.15) which can be rewritten as
follows:
W ′(z;ϕ)
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
− W
′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1
=
2γ εµ(z;ϕ)
z
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
(2.16)
Here, εµ(z
′;ϕ) ≥ 0 such that a rising path of real liabilities z implies that the LHS of
equation (2.16) is positive,25 while the RHS is positive only for εµ(z;ϕ) > 0. Thus,
for z < z∗, at a candidate stage game equilibrium with εµ(z;ϕ) = 0, the monetary
authority has an incentive to deviate by increasing the money supply in order to
prevent an excessive accumulation of debt. At the steady state z∗, this incentive
persists as can most easily be seen from the fiscal optimality condition (2.13) which
prescribes εµ(z
∗;ϕ) = (1− δ
β
) > 0.
In our economy, the Friedman rule implementing zero nominal interest rates
corresponds to a gross rate of money growth of (1 + µ(z;ϕFR)) = β; due to the
25This follows from the strict concavity of the monetary value function W (·) and the fact that
0 > εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ) = −εµ(z;ϕ), whereby the last equality is established via total differentiation of
the consistency condition (2.11).
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non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates, we have µ(z;ϕ) ≥ µ(z;ϕFR)
for any feasible time consistent policy rule ϕ. As shown above, εµ(z;ϕ) > 0 for
all 0 < z ≤ z∗; hence, generically we have µ(z;ϕ) > µ(z;ϕFR), implying distorted
nominal interest rates. Therefore, since the nominal interest rate is an opportunity
cost on holding money balances, and since carrying nonnegative amounts of currency
is inevitable due to the CIA constraint, the adverse impact on welfare is immediate.26
For this reason, we call any policy rule ϕ characterized by εµ(z;ϕ) > 0 a rule subject
to an inflation bias. We summarize our results in:
Proposition 2.1 For δ < β and γ ∈ (0, 1) any (differentiable) Markov-perfect
equilibrium involves εµ(z;ϕ) > 0 for all 0 < z ≤ z∗. In other words, there is no non-
responsive (differentiable) Markov-perfect equilibrium, and for any time consistent
policy rule ϕ, there is an inflation bias.
Against the background of this result, it is interesting to investigate how changes
in the two authorities’ preference parameters impinge on the properties of the equi-
librium outcomes. First, consider the effect of a lower fiscal discount factor δ, hold-
ing β fixed. The induced decrease in the ratio δ
β
implies throughout the state
space that εµ(z
′;ϕ) must increase, as can be inferred from the fiscal optimality
condition (2.13). This means that a more impatient fiscal authority triggers a mon-
etary policy which must be more responsive to variations in the stock of debt.
The consequence of this is that W ′(z;ϕ) becomes more negative since the associ-
ated money expansions are antipicated and accentuate the indirect liability costs
of any given amount z of outstanding debt. Revisiting the monetary optimality
condition (2.16) at the steady state implemented by the equilibrium policy reveals(
2γ
z∗ +W
′(z∗;ϕ)[1− εµ(z∗;ϕ)]−1
)
= 0. With W ′(z;ϕ) being globally more negative,
the only way this can be achieved is via a lower z∗. This establishes the following
result:
Proposition 2.2 Given β, a more impatient fiscal authority, characterized by a
lower δ, triggers a more responsive monetary policy as measured by a higher εµ(z;ϕ)
for all z > 0, but the steady state level of debt z∗ implemented as the Markov-perfect
equilibrium outcome is lower.
The intuition for this proposition is as follows: A more impatient fiscal policy
maker incurs higher deficits which - if an excessive accumulation of debt is to be
prevented - must be partially monetized by money expansions. Since the increased
fiscal impatience accentuates the monetary margin already for lower levels of debt
26To be precise, the welfare losses do not stem from strictly positive nominal interest rates per se;
as seen from (2.8), what ultimately matters is the overall distortion (1 +R)(1 + τ c). Rather, they
stem from the fact that εµ(z;ϕ) > 0 such that expectational effects imply that nominal interest
rates are systematically affected by the amount of real liabilities z.
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and since the monetary authority is reluctant to use its instrument, the equilibrium
features a more aggressive monetary policy which implements a lower long run level
level of debt z∗ in order to economize on the extra liability costs of outstanding
debt.
Next, consider what happens if γ, the monetary authority’s aversion against sur-
prise inflation is increased. Again, εµ(z
∗;ϕ), the degree of monetary responsiveness
at the steady state z∗, is pinned down by δ
β
; since the latter is unchanged, the equi-
librium value for εµ(z
∗;ϕ) must be influenced by two effects which neutralize each
other: On the one hand, the improved - but still incomplete - commitment implied
by a higher γ leads to lower absolute values for both εµ(z;ϕ) and W
′(z;ϕ) for any
given value z. On the other hand, there is the effect via the steady state value z∗
at which the relevant expressions are evaluated. Again, the steady state condition(
2γ
z∗ +W
′(z∗;ϕ)[1− εµ(z∗;ϕ)]−1
)
= 0 is helpful: Here, a higher γ is compensated for
by a higher z∗; however, since an increase in z simultaneously works to make the
expressionW ′(z;ϕ)[1−εµ(z;ϕ)]−1 more negative, a less than proportionate increase
in z∗ is sufficient. While the intuition underlying this result is very similar to the one
for the first parameter change discussed, the second part of the following proposition
suggests an interesting institutional interpretation:
Proposition 2.3 With a more inflation-averse monetary authority, characterized
by a higher γ ∈ (0, 1), an impatient fiscal policy triggers a less responsive mone-
tary policy as measured by a lower εµ(z;ϕ), but the steady state level of debt z
∗
implemented as the Markov-perfect equilibrium outcome is higher.
This proposition has the remarkable implication that a more ”conservative” cen-
tral bank, identified as a monetary authority which is more averse against the sur-
prise use of its inflation tax instrument, will generally not be more successful in con-
taining the accumulation of public debt. This theoretical finding is also confirmed
numerically as evidenced by Figure 2.3 which compares the dynamic evolution of
real debt for three alternative economies; the basic parameterization is the same
as in the initial numerical example, but the monetary authority’s inflation aversion
parameter γ varies in the set {0.5; 0.7; 0.9}. Importantly, the following trade-off
arises: Monetary conservatism is a successful commitment device to constrain the
monetary accommodation of fiscal profligacy, but at the same time a higher stock
of debt is accumulated in equilibrium. What happens is that at any given level
of debt z, the recourse to the inflation tax is lower; but since this advantageous
commitment effect is (i) incomplete and (ii) understood by the fiscal authority, the
latter has an incentive to accumulate more debt. The reason is that the crowding
out of consumption via debt will be less pronounced because monetary conservatism
helps to economize on the extra liability costs of public debt.
For economic environments where a monetary time consistency problem has bite,
the conventional presumption is that monetary conservatism has a positive value. In
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contrast, the present analysis establishes that the welfare gains during the transition
to the steady state must be weighted against the costs of inducing a steady state with
higher accumulation of real liabilities. Numerically, it turns out that the transitory
gains from monetary conservatism are overcompensated by the long run costs:
Result 2.1 With an impatient fiscal authority (δ < β), the higher the degree γ ∈
(0, 1) of the monetary authority’s inflation aversion, the lower the lifetime utility
U(z, z;ϕ) enjoyed by the representative household.
This assessment of the welfare implications of monetary conservatism is graphi-
cally illustrated in Figure 2.4, which plots the representative household’s value func-
tions U(z, z;ϕ) for the same variation of the monetary authority’s inflation aversion
parameter γ as in the experiment underlying Figure 2.3. Increased monetary con-
servatism is found to induce negative welfare effects. The welfare effects of a given
variation in γ depend on the amount of outstanding liabilities; in particular, for low
levels of debt, the relative welfare costs of increased conservatism are larger than
for high levels of debt. This is understood from the fact that public liabilities are
the source of the monetary ex-post incentive to inflate the economy: A lower degree
of inflation aversion goes along with stronger incentives to monetize part of the in-
herited liabilities. From the rational expectations consistency condition, which links
the initial nominal interest rate R0 to the equilibrium rate of inflation in the first pe-
riod, this gives rise to higher interest rate distortions. The importance of this effect
relative to the long run effects due to convergence to a steady state characterized
by lower public indebtedness is increasing in the amount of initial (t = 0) liabilities.
Hence, as seen in Figure 2.4, the relative disadvantage of monetary conservatism
declines when the amount of initial liabilities increases. Nevertheless, the absolute
level of welfare attained under increased monetary conservatism is still lower than
the one available with a lower degree of inflation aversion. This result underpins the
notion that the positive effect of a higher γ, which contains the monetization of any
given amout of outstanding liabilities z, is dominated by the negative effect that a
higher amout of debt is accumulated in equilibrium.27
27The fact that the monetary time consistency problem can be strategically exploited by the
fiscal authority even in case of an explicitly inflation-averse monetary policy maker raises the ques-
tion of whether there are institutional arrangements that may help to mitigate the adverse welfare
consequences. Obviously, in the present context fiscal constraints can play a role as an institu-
tional complement to an otherwise ineffective conservative central bank. Within the framework
considered, such constraints should be designed to provide a ceiling to the maximum admissible
amount of real debt. Alternatively, establishing a limit on fiscal deficits can help as an auxiliary
device to constrain the accumulation of debt resulting from the fiscal authority’s impatience. With
a binding constraint on deficits, the long run level of real debt would be lower, and the transition
to the long run steady state would proceed along a path featuring lower rates of inflation.
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2.5 Related literature and concluding remarks
Fiscal discipline is often seen as a requirement for price stability, both in indepen-
dent economies and monetary unions. In this paper, we have adopted the view that
policy makers are unable to commit to future policies. Hence, due to its power to se-
quentially inflate away the nominal debt of the government sector against the private
sector, the monetary authority suffers from a time consistency problem. Against this
background, we have analyzed the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in
a deterministic dynamic general equilibrium model. The contributions of this paper
are of both conceptual and applied nature. On conceptual grounds, the paper has
provided a method to characterize and compute the MPE outcomes in a dynamic
general equilibrium economy with large interacting players who cannot commit to
future policies but are bound by the requirement that their combined actions must
be compatible with a competitive equilibrium of the economy. The paper has then
applied this idea to the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in the presence
of nominal government debt. The central insight to be gained from the analytical
and numerical results is that an impatient fiscal authority can strategically exploit
the time consistency problem inherent in monetary policy making. This finding is
reminiscent of what Chari and Kehoe (2004) establish in the context of a monetary
union. However, the mechanism involved is different in our context. Whereas Chari
and Kehoe build their analysis on a free-rider problem between the fiscal constituen-
cies in a monetary union,28 our starting point is a politico-economic friction that
results in diverging preferences about the accumulation or decumulation of govern-
ment debt. On the basis of this setup, our analysis proposes a positive theory of
government indebtedness and inflation.
In this respect, the paper relates to a number of fiscalist approaches to the de-
termination of the price level. As laid out in the Introduction, the key difference
between such fiscal theories of the price level and the traditional monetarist view
lies in the role of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, which links the
real value of debt to the present value of primary surpluses the fiscal authority will
run in the future. In two recent studies, Bassetto (2002, 2005) examines the fiscal
theory of the price level from a game-theoretic perspective and addresses the issue of
government commitment. Specifically, he pays close attention to the behavior of the
economy out of equilibrium. With this approach, he is able to shed light on the na-
ture of the restrictions on fiscal policy due to the intertemporal budget constraint.
Taking as given some target policy, Bassetto asks two main questions: (i) Is the
fiscal authority actually able to adhere to this targeted policy in all contingencies,
i.e. also off the equilibrium path? (ii) If not, can the fiscal authority implement
28Other papers that address the rationale for fiscal rules on the basis of fiscal externalities in
monetary unions include Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997, 1998, 1999), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999)
or Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003b).
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the targeted policy as a unique equilibrium outcome? His answer basically is that
unconditional rules involving spending levels that exceed the tax revenue in some
period are misspecifications, while the fiscal authority can implement any compet-
itive equilibrium as a unique equilibrium. Essentially, this means that the fiscal
authority must comply with a budget constraint both on and off the equilibrium
path, but has the power to select specific equilibria. Similarly, the present paper
establishes that an impatient fiscal authority can reject a non-inflationary candidate
equilibrium by refusing to balance the primary budget.
In this paper, we have restricted attention to what happens on the equilibrium
path. In contrast to Bassetto, we specify objective functions for two separate gov-
ernment authorities and demand that these authorities must be willing to adhere
to their policy rule in any subgame. While our approach suffers from the drawback
that we are not able to completely characterize what happens off the equilibrium
path,29 we are nevertheless able to provide some important insights. We identify the
incentives involved and develop a notion of dominance between the two authorities
which is not exogenously assumed, but rather derived as an endogenous result of
the primitives of the dynamic game. Specifically, it is shown under which conditions
and to what extent fiscal policy can gain leverage over monetary outcomes. So, our
approach generates results similar to those of the fiscal theory, but without relying
on a reinterpretation of the intertemporal government budget constraint as a mere
equilibrium condition, a view that has been subject to much criticism on theoretical
grounds.30
Having discussed the relationship between the fiscal theory and our approach,
it should be stressed that the methodology we use is more in the tradition of the
optimal taxation literature. The time inconsistency of optimal plans has first been
identified by Kydland and Prescott (1977); subsequently, Barro and Gordon (1983b)
have applied this framework to a positive theory of monetary policy making. In a
paper closely related to ours, Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2006) explore the implications
of nominal government debt on optimal monetary policy. Since the contribution by
Lucas and Stokey (1983) also fiscal policy has been the topic of further research; im-
portant contributions include Chari and Kehoe (1990), Klein and R´ıos-Rull (2003) or
Klein, Krusell and R´ıos-Rull (2003). However, in spite of the institutional arrange-
ments that we observe in most developed economies, when the focus of their analyses
is monetary (fiscal) policy, all these papers essentially assume that fiscal (monetary)
policy is absent or exogenously given to the model. Against this background, our
innovation has been to consider a setting with an inherent time consistency problem
29The point is that our model is tacit about what happens if a pair of policy choices is incom-
patible with a competitive equilibrium. In such situations the crucial question is: How does the
adjustment process work to restore equilibrium?
30Compare e.g. Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Buiter (2002) or Niepelt (2004).
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which gives rise to a dynamic policy game where monetary and fiscal policies are
decided upon by two separate authorities.
So far, the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in a dynamic frame-
work with optimizing authorities seems to have been neglected in the literature. An
exception is the work by Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) who consider monetary-fiscal
interactions with a conservative central bank and varying degrees of commitment
of the two authorities. Their analysis is cast within a linear-quadratic framework
and shows that monetary commitment is negated when fiscal policy is discretionary.
This result is similar to our finding that, despite its inflation aversion, the monetary
authority is unable to implement a zero-inflation equilibrium when the fiscal author-
ity is impatient. Similar in spirit, Adam and Billi (2005) investigate a sticky price
economy where output is inefficiently low due to the market power of firms. Their
paper is complementary to the present paper since the setup the authors consider
is one where monetary policy controls the nominal interest rate, while fiscal policy
decides about the provision of public goods and taxation is lump-sum; moreover,
their setup gives rise to a problem of dynamic inconsistency also for fiscal policy,
while only monetary policy is subject to a time inconsistency problem in our econ-
omy. Adam and Billi analyze the dynamic economy under varying assumptions on
the degree of the authorities’ commitment capability. Specifically, they propose a
conservative central bank as an institutional arrangement that may mitigate the
distortions associated with sequential policy making. Importantly, not only does
the discipline afforded via monetary conservatism eliminate the distortions due to
sequential monetary policy making, but at the same time it also does away with
those due to sequential implementation of fiscal policy. In contrast, the present pa-
per establishes that monetary conservatism may fail to achieve these objectives. In
detail, it complements the conventional view by illustrating the costs of monetary
conservatism resulting from the superior commitment capacity being exploited by
a sequential fiscal policy maker who accumulates more public debt. Our approach
has facilitated this novel insight because it features a measure of real government
liabilities as an endogenous state variable which is strategically manipulated over
time.
A number of questions remain open and should be addressed in future research.
First, we have already mentioned that our model falls short of a complete game-
theoretic specification of the economy. Particularly, not all outcomes off the equi-
librium path nor the adjustments from there are well-defined. A relevant scenario
of this kind is a debt crisis where households simply refuse to buy government debt
at any intertemporal price. Incorporating such a crisis in our model as a zero-
probability event or explicitly along the lines of Cole and Kehoe (2000) would be a
very interesting, if difficult, extension. Second, our model takes government spend-
ing to be exogenous. In the baseline model presented here, we assume a constant
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path of public spending. However, most projections for advanced economies31 pre-
dict rising levels of government expenditure due to the pressures associated with
ageing societies. Hence, it would be a worthwhile exercise to investigate how a
deterministic trend in government spending would affect the dynamic game played
between monetary and fiscal policy. Finally, by considering only one-period bonds
our paper abstracts from the maturity structure of government debt. Indeed, it has
been demonstrated how a richer maturity structure can help to overcome the time
consistency problem faced by policy makers.32 In the context of the dynamics of
the fiscal theory of the price level, Cochrane (1999) has demonstrated that in an
environment, where the inflation tax would otherwise operate as a lump-sum instru-
ment, the introduction of long-term debt has the effect of converting the inflation
tax from a lump-sum into a distortionary source of revenue by pushing the inflation
generated by tax cuts into the future. The question then is how this result carries
over to our setup where there is strategic interaction between a monetary and a
fiscal authority.
31Compare e.g. OECD (2002).
32Compare Lucas and Stokey (1983), Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987) as well as Calvo and
Obstfeld (1990).
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Figure 2.1: Path of real debt in benchmark example
Figure 2.2: Path of consumption in benchmark example
78
Figure 2.3: Debt dynamics for different degrees of monetary conservatism
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Figure 2.4: Representative household’s welfare for different degrees of monetary
conservatism
Chapter 3
Inflation, Investment Composition
and Total Factor Productivity
3.1 Introduction
The starting point for this paper1 is the empirical finding of a negative relation
between inflation and total factor productivity (TFP), both at business cycle fre-
quency and over longer horizons. Economic interpretations of this correlation can
pursue two ways, depending on the direction of causality that is stressed. Indeed,
in standard (complete markets) monetary business cycle models featuring an ex-
ogenous productivity process and a quantity relation between money, output and
prices, it is the case that - ceteris paribus - a negative productivity shock is asso-
ciated with a higher rate of inflation. Hence, the premise in this class of models is
a causal negative effect of TFP on inflation. However, given that TFP is taken to
be an exogenous residual, this is an unsatisfactory situation; the reason is that we
are left with a ”measure of our ignorance” (Abramovitz, 1956) in order to explain
economic processes of first priority. This paper takes a different route. While we
do not question the merits of the aforementioned class of models for the purpose
of studying macroeconomic dynamics, we reverse the underlying notion of causal-
ity between inflation and TFP by proposing that the latter variable can be seen
as a function of the former one. This implies that TFP is no longer an exogenous
residual, but becomes an endogenous variable which is determined in the general
equilibrium of the economy. Empirically, the findings emerging from US aggregate
time series data at quarterly and yearly frequency provide robust evidence in favor
of this hypothesis. In particular, higher inflation is significantly found to negatively
affect TFP(-growth), whereby the exogeneity of inflation cannot be rejected; thus,
there is evidence that the negative relation between inflation and TFP is indeed due
to a causal effect from inflation to TFP.
1This chapter draws on joint work with Michael Evers and Marc Schiffbauer.
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Against this background, the present paper concentrates on the supply-side effect
of monetary policy on TFP. Specifically, we argue that it is not appropriate to treat
shocks to monetary policy and aggregate technology as orthogonal. The transmis-
sion mechanism that we put forward in order to rationalize the negative relationship
between inflation and TFP is tied to the composition and effectiveness (in a sense to
be defined below) of aggregate investment. To formalize our argument, we develop
a model economy whose underlying structure is based on the common point of de-
parture of both business cycle and growth theory: the neoclassical growth model.
This basic model is modified along three dimensions. First, it features a cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint and incorporates the assumption of limited asset market
participation; this allows for liquidity effects and hence for non-neutrality of mon-
etary policy even in an environment with flexible prices. Second, the model does
not involve a comprehensive aggregate production function, but starts from the pre-
sumption that investment can be channelled into two distinct technologies: a safe,
but return-dominated (”basic”) technology and a superior (”advanced”) technology
which yields higher expected returns, but is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
Agents operating the latter technology can insure themselves against such idiosyn-
cratic risk by means of holding a precautionary stock of readily marketable assets.
However, due to an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, which is the third key
building block of the model, the scope for insurance is limited. The consequence of
this friction is that financial markets are incomplete in that scarce liquidity cannot
be optimally provided to the productive sector. In particular, given that insurance
against liquidity shocks is costly, variations in the costs of insurance trigger shifts
in the composition of aggregate investment which are associated with changes in
TFP. In the model we put forward, these costs coincide with the nominal interest
rate. Specifically, in addition to its role with respect to the opportunity costs of
consumption in a simple monetary cash-in-advance model, the nominal interest rate
works as a liquidity premium and thus constitutes an additional cost of production
by means of the advanced technology relative to the basic one. Hence, the model
postulates a novel aspect of monetary transmission in that movements in the nom-
inal interest rate are associated with changes in the composition of investment in
the two available technologies.
In view of above arguments, it is evident that the present paper borrows from
both business cycle and growth theory: It considers monetary and technological
shocks as well as their interaction with a specific financial markets friction, but
at the same time endogenizes the aggregate productivity process via an endoge-
nous technology choice which is catalyzed by this friction.2 Here, we focus on the
2For a similar approach, compare the recent paper by Aghion et al. (2006) who paraphrase the
situation as follows: ”The modern theory of business cycles gives a central position to productivity
shocks and the role of financial markets in the propagation of these shocks; but it takes the entire
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corresponding cyclical and steady state implications, but abstract from the perti-
nent endogenous growth effects.3 Instead, we elaborate on the source of market
incompleteness which limits financial markets’ capability to provide liquidity to the
corporate sector. In particular, we detail a set of predictions regarding the interac-
tion of variations in the liquidity premium with certain supply-side characteristics
at the industry level; moreover, following Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), we pro-
vide an explicit framework which illustrates how these interaction effects can be
endogenously derived from a particular entrepreneurial agency problem. Hence,
constrained-efficient contracting in the face of incomplete insurance against idiosyn-
cratic liquidity shocks delivers a number of implications concerning the reaction of
the productive sector to monetary policy shocks and the way in which industry-level
characteristics affect specific industries’ sensitivity to such shocks. Specifically, fol-
lowing movements in the nominal interest rate, the response of industries which are
more profitable and more exposed to advanced technologies is predicted to be more
pronounced.
In order to assess the quantitative and empirical relevance of the proposed trans-
mission mechanism, we adopt a twofold strategy: One the one hand, we interpret our
model as a literal business cycle model and calibrate it to US data. The calibrated
benchmark economy is then compared to alternative economies whose basic struc-
ture is identical, but where either monetary shocks are absent or the steady state
rate of inflation is varied. Comparing the respective model-generated moments, we
conclude (i) that, by generating an investment-composition driven variation in TFP,
monetary policy shocks can account for a significant proportion of macroeconomic
fluctuations, and (ii) that systematic changes in the level of inflation induce size-
able changes in the level of TFP. On the other hand, in order to substantiate the
empirical relevance of our basic hypothesis that nominal fluctuations affect the com-
position of aggregate investment, we complement our empirical findings pertaining
to aggregate US data by an analysis of disaggregate industry-level and firm-level
panel data. In doing so, we provide evidence consistent with (i) the implications of
constrained-efficient contracting with respect to the postulated agency problem, as
well as (ii) the notion that corporate liquidity holdings are used as a precautionary
buffer stock to hedge investment into advanced technologies and that the scope of
such insurance is negatively affected by the level of inflation. We view these findings
as strongly supportive of our theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly synthesizes
the established empirical findings on the effects of inflation on economic performance
productivity process as exogenous. The modern theory of growth, on the other hand, gives a central
position to endogenous productivity growth and the role of financial markets in the growth process;
but it focuses on trends, largely ignoring shocks and cycles.”
3An endogenous growth perspective is adopted in Evers, Niemann and Schiffbauer (2007).
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and reviews the related literature. Then, Section 3.3 provides detailed evidence on
the relationship between inflation and TFP in the US economy. Against this back-
ground, Section 3.4 proposes a business cycle model as the theoretical framework
for formulating our main hypotheses. Section 3.5 examines the quantitative prop-
erties of the calibrated benchmark economy as well as those of alternative model
economies. In Section 3.6, we undertake an empirical analysis of (panel) data at
different levels of aggregation in order to underpin our proposition that the compo-
sition of aggregate investment is crucially affected by the firm-level conditions for
insurance against liquidity risk. A final section concludes, while some auxiliary infor-
mation, including the explicit derivation of the solution to the financial contracting
problem, is relegated to the Appendix.
3.2 Related literature
Empirical literature: In line with the present paper’s focus, we organize our read-
ing of the relevant empirical work in two steps: First, we draw on the literature to
provide evidence on the relationship between inflation and economic performance,
also shedding light on the respective effects on factor accumulation and aggregate
productivity. Second, we resort to evidence from disaggregate firm-level data which
provides valuable background information with respect to the transmission mecha-
nism proposed in this paper.
Applying cross-sectional and panel growth regressions for yearly data, Fischer
(1993) finds a negative correlation between inflation and economic growth.4 The
author investigates the causal mechanism behind this correlation in several ways.
First, by considering sample variations across periods predominated by demand
(1960-1972) or supply (1973-1988) shocks, he examines the potential endogeneity of
inflation. He starts from the presumption that adverse supply shocks are the main
source of the potential endogeneity of inflation (while an adverse supply shock is in-
flationary, an adverse demand shock would be deflationary). However, he finds that
the correlation between inflation and economic growth remains unchanged across the
relevant subsamples and is therefore led to the conclusion that inflation is exogenous
with respect to growth. Second, by means of a growth accounting exercise, Fischer
decomposes GDP-growth into its components and detects a robust negative relation
between inflation on the one hand and the growth rate of capital, but also of TFP
4Other contributions include De Gregorio (1992, 1993), Barro (1996), Bruno and Easterly (1998)
and Easterly (2005). Generally, three potential mechanisms are put forward to rationalize the nega-
tive relationship: (i) the adverse effects on economic performance of distortions in the informational
content of the price level due to aggregate uncertainty; (ii) the reduction in capital accumulation
stemming from a temporary hold up of investment decisions in the presence of aggregate uncer-
tainty; (iii) the inflation tax on returns from capital and R&D investment if investors must hold
cash-in-advance.
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on the other hand. These two results have striking implications: They indicate that
the negative correlation between inflation and GDP-growth cannot be (exclusively)
due to adverse technology shocks. And they demonstrate that, even after controlling
for factor accumulation and employment, the negative effect of inflation on growth
persists; that is, there must be some inflation-driven mechanism which records in
terms of decreased aggregate productivity.
The model we develop in Section 3.4 proposes that inflation, by making the pro-
vision of liquidity more costly, affects investment in a way that shifts activity from
superior to return-dominated, but safer technologies. A natural way to operational-
ize arguments concerning the composition of aggregate investment is to use data on
R&D expenditures to proxy investment in superior technologies. Wa¨lde and Woitek
(2004) report the overall level of R&D expenditure to be procyclical. Conversely,
Aghion et al. (2006) focus on the cyclical variation of R&D as a share of total
investment. On the basis of dynamic panel estimations, they find that the R&D
share and aggregate investment have markedly different business cycle properties,
which hints at the potential importance of a decomposition of aggregate investment
in order to account for business cycle phenomena.
At the disaggregate level, our study seeks to empirically assess how nominal
fluctuations impact on firms’ investment decisions when financial markets are
incomplete.5 The basic take of our theory is that the availability of corporate
liquidity is a crucial determinant for firm-level investment. To get some guidance
on the potential power of this mechanism, we resort to the findings in Opler et
al. (1999) who examine the determinants and implications of holdings of cash
and marketable securities by publicly traded non-financial US firms.6 The authors
establish that firms with better outside financing opportunities tend to hold a lower
fraction of their total assets in the form liquid assets, and that firms with strong
growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold relatively high ratios of cash to
total non-cash assets.7 Therefore, there is evidence that firms retain a relatively
high fraction of their earnings as liquid reserves and that these reserves are generally
not used for capital investment, but rather tend to be depleted by operating losses,
i.e. corporate liquidity is held as a hedge against production risk. As to the
quantitative importance of corporate cash holdings, the authors report the mean
over the firms in their sample of the ratio of cash to net assets at 18%, while the
median amounts to 6%. Thus, corporate liquidity holdings are likely to constitute
5For a review of the literature on corporate investment see Hubbard (1999).
6Most theoretical and empirical studies of corporate cash holdings start from the presumption
that external finance is costly and that firms hold liquid assets in order to survive bad times and to
have funds readily available if an investment opportunity arises. The benefits of corporate liquidity
must then be balanced against its costs which arises as a consequence of a liquidity premium.
7We interpret these latter features - high growth potential and risky cash flows - as the identi-
fying characteristics of what we label ”advanced” technology.
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a quantitatively relevant category for the transmission of macroeconomic shocks
and in particular of fluctuations in nominal variables like the rate of inflation or the
nominal interest rate. In the present paper we will elaborate on this hypothesis.
Theoretical literature: Characterizing a theoretical framework for an empir-
ically plausible monetary transmission mechanism is the subject of a large set of
macroeconomic models set up either in flexible or sticky price environments.8 Our
own model presents a flexible price economy generating monetary non-neutrality
via a CIA constraint and the additional assumption of limited asset market par-
ticipation;9 an important empirical phenomenon replicated in models characterized
by limited asset market participation is the liquidity effect, i.e. a fall in nominal
interest rates following an (unexpected) monetary expansion. We augment a simple
monetary model along these lines by a financial market friction which is motivated
by an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem and gives rise to a well-defined corpo-
rate demand for liquidity. Starting from the contribution by Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), there is an extensive literature dealing with the interaction of financial mar-
ket frictions and the monetary transmission process. In this context, the dynamics
of corporate investment and the heterogeneity of firms’ responses to monetary policy
shocks have received particular attention.10 Here, we make no attempt to system-
atically review this literature; instead, we concentrate on contributions developing
some of the aspects which feature prominently in our own model.
The key propagation mechanism we invoke to explain the negative relation be-
tween inflation and TFP is an investment composition effect in the presence of
incomplete financial markets. In a real economy, Aghion et al. (2006) use a similar
decomposition of aggregate investment in order to examine how credit constraints
affect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing investment. To that end, the
authors develop a growth model where investment can be sunk into either a short-
term project or a long-term project which enhances future productivity. Importantly
then, aggregate productivity has both an exogenous and an endogenous component.
The exogenous component is specified as in a conventional real business cycle model,
whereas the endogenous component is driven by the mass of long-term projects that
have been successfully completed in the past. Similar to our ”advanced” technology,
survival of long-term projects is uncertain because they are subject to idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks which - for reasons left unspecified - can only be imperfectly insured.
8Compare e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997, 2005) and the references therein.
9See Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1998) for monetary business cycle studies based on CIA con-
straints and Lucas (1990), Fuerst (1992) or Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992, 1995) for develop-
ments of the limited participation framework.
10A selection of general contributions includes Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1996, 1999) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Cooley and Quadrini (2006), Fisher
(1999) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) are concerned with heterogenous firm dynamics.
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In this setup, the assumed stochastic structure of aggregate shocks alters the amount
of scarce resources available to insure idiosyncratic liquidity risk in a procyclical fash-
ion. As a consequence, the survival probability of any given productivity-enhancing
project is procyclical which generates an investment composition effect giving rise
to further procyclical momentum in the process for productivity growth and the
business cycle. Another paper concerned with the composition of aggregate invest-
ment when financial markets are incomplete is Angeletos (2007). He studies the
effects of idiosyncratic investment risk on the aggregate level and the allocation of
savings within the framework of a non-monetary neoclassical growth model. One
particular model variant considers the general equilibrium properties of an economy
where there is the choice of investing into either privately-held risky projects or pub-
lic equity, wherby the latter allows to pool idiosyncratic risks. One of the model’s
implications then is that, quite similar to what will happen in the model economy
developed in section 3.4, incomplete markets reduce TFP by shifting resources away
from the more risky, but also more productive private equity investment.
Both Aghion et al. (2006) and Angeletos (2007) are concerned with real general
equilibrium economies; hence, nominal aspects do not play any role. Moreover, in
contrast to our own model, the implications for the economy’s cyclical dynamics crit-
ically hinge on the assumption that uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk evolves
in a countercyclical fashion. The present paper addresses both these issues at the
same time. We set up a monetary business cycle model to show how the effects
of financial market frictions on the composition of physical investment are shaped
by the relative price for insuring superior investment activities, the nominal inter-
est rate. This nominal rate is affected by monetary fluctuations and is determined
in the model’s general equilibrium such as to equilibriate the supply of short-term
credit by the household sector with the demand for short-term credit from in the
productive sector. Finally, in order to better understand the determinants of the in-
teraction between the nominal interest rate and the scope for liquidity provision, we
explicitly specify the source of market incompleteness which gives rise to uninsured
idiosyncratic risk.11 This allows us to derive a number of theoretical predictions
which can be empirically examined.
11Specifically, we embed the contracting problem discussed in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) into
our business cycle model. Kato (2006) adopts a similar approach, but in a real model. Meh
and Quadrini (2006) consider a model with endogenous market incompleteness with respect to
individual investment risk.
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3.3 Empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween inflation and aggregate productivity
In this section, we use US time series data and adopt an instrumental variable
approach to (i) document how inflation and aggregate productivity are related at
business cycle frequency and to (ii) establish that the causal effect of inflation on
TFP-growth is transmitted via corporate portfolio choices. That is, we complement
the work of Fischer (1993) by employing alternative econometric methods and by
examining the transmission channel in more detail. We exploit both quarterly and
yearly data since it is not a priori clear whether the effect of nominal fluctuations
on TFP fully materializes within a quarter.
As a starting point, we examine the interactions between TFP-growth and in-
flation at the aggregate level. We employ the first difference of TFP rather than
its level since our methodology requires the inclusion of stationary variables.12 The
TFP series is constructed as the residual from the aggregate production function
implied by the calibrated one-sector neoclassical growth model to be set out in Sec-
tion 3.4.13 Inflation is derived as the first difference of the consumer price index.14
Moreover, we include GDP-growth and the private investment share relative to GDP
as additional endogenous variables. The rationale behind this is that in standard
monetary business cycle theories, the effect of inflation on real economic activity
(GDP-growth) is due to the adverse impact on aggregate investment of the inflation
tax or increased aggregate uncertainty associated with higher rates of inflation.15
Table 3.1 reports the results of an unrestricted VAR for quarterly and yearly
frequencies as well as the corresponding Granger causality tests. The information
criteria suggest the inclusion of a lag length of one in both cases;16 hence, the Granger
causality test reduces to a simple exclusion test of the first lag of the corresponding
variable. The information contained in Table 3.1 reveals that inflation reduces TFP-
growth in the subsequent period at a quarterly as well as a yearly frequency. This
effect is significant on a 5% and 1% level, respectively, and works independently
12Indeed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (p-value of 0.623) if we apply
an augmented Dickey-Fuller test including a trend and two lags for US quarterly TFP data (167
observations).
13At yearly frequency, the correlation between the growth rates of our calibrated TFP-series and
of the relevant series published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is 0.89; quarterly series
are not available from the BLS. For further details, see Appendix C.3.
14The base year is 1995. We also employ the GDP deflator; however, we exclusively report the
estimates based on consumer prices since the results are very similar in both cases.
15See Cooley and Hansen (1989), Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1995), Jones and Manuelli (1990),
Ramey and Ramey (1995) or Stockman (1981) for a discussion of such theories.
16We stress that the negative (joint) effect of the lags of inflation on TFP-growth is robust to the
inclusion of additional lags of the endogenous variables (1-4) at both frequencies. The additional
tables are available from the authors upon request.
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from the adjustment of the private investment share and GDP-growth. In addition,
we find that inflation Granger causes private investment at neither frequency. We
infer that, in our sample, the transmission channel of inflation does not rest on
private factor accumulation. This result underpins our hypothesis that inflation
affects the composition rather than the overall level of private investment.17 Finally,
inspection of reverse causality from TFP-growth towards inflation shows that TFP-
growth reduces inflation in the subsequent period at a yearly (significant at a 5%
level), but not at quarterly frequency.
These results confirm a negative relation between inflation and TFP-growth at
business cycle frequencies. The specific mechanism we put forward in this paper
implies that an increase in inflation reduces corporate liquidity holdings which are
used as insurance against the risk associated with physical investment relying on
advanced technologies. The reduced liquidity holdings, in turn, induce a shift in the
composition of investment and hence aggregate changes in TFP. A (non-structural)
representation of this mechanism is given by the following system of equations:
∆Tt = αT + βT Ct +X ′iγT + Tt (3.1a)
Ct = α
C + βCDt +X
′
iγ
C + Ct (3.1b)
Dt = α
D + βDpit +X
′
iγ
D + Dt , (3.1c)
where ∆T is TFP-growth, C is investment composition, D are aggregate corporate
liquidity holdings, pi is inflation and X is a vector of covariates which affect all
variables. In the following, we want to test the macroeconomic mechanism under-
lying system (3.1). Therefore, we exploit firm-level US data from the Compustat
database and average across firms to obtain the relevant aggregate measures. Fol-
lowing Opler et al. (1999), we approximate investment composition by corporate
investments in R&D and corporate liquidity holdings by the amount of cash and
marketable securities, both relative to total assets. Moreover, we include average
operating income, total assets and the amount of long term debt as additional control
variables. To deal with an endogeneity problem of average R&D ratios and corpo-
rate liquidity holdings with respect to TFP-growth in the sense of E(Ct | Tt ) 6= 0,
E(Dt | Ct ) 6= 0, we apply an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, in view
of potential contemporaneous feedback effects from TFP-growth to inflation, we as-
sume E(pit−1 | Tt ) = 0 and employ lagged inflation as an instrument. In fact, the
pattern of estimated coefficients from the unrestricted VAR suggests that the first lag
of inflation is exogenous to TFP-growth since it Granger causes TFP-growth, while
the lagged dependent variable of TFP-growth itself is not significant. If, in addition,
the lag of inflation is correlated with average R&D ratios and corporate liquidity
holdings (which we illustrate below), it is a valid instrument for these endogenous
17Similarly, Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion et al. (2006) call the effect of macroeconomic
uncertainty on aggregate investment into question.
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measures in equations (3.1a) and (3.1b). Furthermore, we consider the nominal in-
terest rate (R˜) as an alternative measure of nominal fluctuations and apply its first
lag as an additional instrument for the endogenous measures in these equations.18
This allows us to test for the validity of our instruments by employing a Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions. Consequently, we use the first lags of inflation and
the nominal interest rate as exogenous instrumental variables to estimate via the
general method of moments (GMM) the causal effect of investment composition and
average corporate liquidity holdings on TFP-growth. The Hansen test statistic in-
dicates a well-specified econometric model in all reported estimations; furthermore,
we always include a lagged dependent variable and incorporate heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors in all estimations. Summing up, we separately estimate the
equations:
∆Tt = αTC + βTCCt +X
′
iγ
T
C + 
T
C,t (3.2a)
∆Tt = αTD + βTDDt +X
′
iγ
T
D + 
T
D,t, (3.2b)
whereby we treat C and D as endogenous and model them respectively as:
Ct = α
C
C + β
C
1 pit−1 + β
C
2 R˜t−1 +X
′
iγ
C
C + 
C
C,t (3.3a)
Dt = α
D
D + β
D
1 pit−1 + β
D
2 R˜t−1 +X
′
iγ
D
D + 
D
D,t (3.3b)
The results for US yearly data are reported in Table 3.2. Columns one to four
are concerned with equations (3.2a) and (3.3a). The first column displays a posi-
tive correlation between the average R&D investment ratio and TFP-growth. The
corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level. This positive correlation is
independent of changes in average firm size, average operating income across firms,
average value of corporate long-term debt and aggregate private and government
investment shares. Moreover, the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in-
dicates the absence of first and second order serial correlation in the error terms. In
the next two columns, we instrument advanced (R&D) investments by the first lags
of inflation and the nominal interest rate, whereby column two does not employ the
set of exogenous controls. In both cases, the results reveal a positive causal effect of
advanced investment on TFP-growth which is significant on a 1% level. In addition,
the Hansen test shows that the first lags of inflation and the nominal interest rate are
valid instruments. Finally, we display the (modified) first stage regression in column
four, whereby we excluded the nominal interest rate.19 The first stage regression
indicates a negative impact of the first lag of inflation on advanced investments.
The corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level. In columns five to eight,
18The nominal interest rate is represented by the yield on corporate bonds (Moody’s Seasoned
Aaa Corporate Bond Yield) because the latter is the closest proxy for firms’ cost of external finance.
19For unfiltered data, the correlation coefficient between CPI inflation and the nominal interest
rate (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield) is 0.42 (0.55) at yearly (quarterly) frequency.
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we repeat the same exercise for equations (3.2b) and (3.3b), now instrumenting for
our second endogenous transmission variable. First, we detect a positive significant
contemporaneous correlation between the average corporate liquidity holdings and
TFP-growth. The subsequent IV-estimations reveal that causation is indeed run-
ning from average corporate liquidity holdings to TFP-growth. The Hansen test
indicates the validity of our instruments in both specifications. Finally, the (mod-
ified) first stage regression reports a strong negative impact of lagged inflation on
average corporate liquidity holdings which is significant on a 1% level. Summing
up, on the basis of annual US time series we find support for our model hypothesis
which proposes that inflation and nominal interest rates reduce TFP-growth in the
short-run by affecting average corporate liquidity holdings and the composition of
firm-level physical investment portfolios.
Table 3.3 is concerned with the same questions, but for quarterly frequency. Due
to the higher frequency, we now use the first two lags of inflation and the nominal
interest rate as instrumental variables. We find a positive correlation between quar-
terly average R&D ratios and TFP-growth; as evidenced by columns two and three,
applying an IV-approach reveals that causation is running from advanced (R&D)
investments to TFP-growth. The first lag of inflation features a negative correlation
with the average R&D ratio, which is significant on a 1% level. The results for
firms’ average quarterly liquidity holdings are less clear-cut. We do not detect a
significant positive correlation between this endogenous measure and TFP-growth
at a quarterly frequency. Accordingly, at quarterly frequency the IV-approach does
not confirm a significant impact of average corporate liquidity on TFP-growth even
though the former is negatively influenced by lagged inflation. Overall, the results
based on quarterly data appear less robust than the previous ones, which suggests
that firms’ adjustment in terms of their liquidity holdings or investment portfolios
to changes in the level of inflation might not be swift enough to record at quarterly
frequency.
To sum up, for US data we find a robust negative empirical relation between
inflation and TFP-growth which is independent of changes in the private invest-
ment share or GDP-growth. A Granger causality test indicates that causality is
running from inflation to TFP-growth. These two empirical observations challenge
the presumption of conventional monetary business cycle theories which take the
aggregate productivity process as exogenous or stipulate that real effects of inflation
are transmitted via changes in the aggregate quantity of investments. The results
of the IV-approach suggest that, on average, the aggregate negative effect of in-
flation on TFP is due to firm-level variations in liquidity holdings and investment
composition.
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3.4 The model
In view of above empirical findings, we now propose a one-sector model of a monetary
economy as a tractable structure formalizing the economic intuition underlying our
proposed transmission mechanism. As hinted in the Introduction, the model’s key
ingredients are (i) limited asset market participation, (ii) endogenous technology
choice, and (iii) incomplete financial markets. The economy is populated by two
sets of agents, households and entrepreneurs, each of unit mass. The production
sector is characterized by two distinct intermediate input goods, labelled ”basic”
and ”advanced” corresponding to the characteristics of the two constant-returns-to-
scale technologies which are used to produce them,20 and by a simple aggregation
technology that combines the two intermediate goods to the final market good.
Each entrepreneur runs an individual firm producing both intermediate input goods,
though in distinct projects utilizing the respective technology. The final market good
is produced by anonymous firms in a perfectly competitive market environment. In
addition, there is a market for financial intermediation which is also assumed to
be perfectly competitive. Finally, there is a government (”monetary authority”)
which implements macroeconomic policies. These policies, together with a set of
exogenous shocks, expose the economy to aggregate uncertainty.
The timing structure underlying our model is as follows. Time is discrete, and
within each period t, there are three points in time: one at the beginning of the
period, denoted t−, one at an interim stage when the vector st of aggregate shocks
materializes and information about them is revealed, and finally one at the end of
the period, denoted t+. The aggregate shocks in our model are productivity shocks
At, Vt to the two intermediate technologies as well as a shock Jt to government
policy (to be specified later); hence, we have st = {At,Vt,Jt}. Apart from these
aggregate shocks, there are purely idiosyncratic liquidity shocks ξit to the single
advanced technology project run by an individual entrepreneur. We now turn to
a detailed description of the environment in which the economy’s agents interact
and define their decision problems. The exposition of the solution to the agents’
problems as well as of the competitive equilibrium are relegated to the Appendix
C.1; the most important equilibrium implications are discussed in in Section 3.4.6.
3.4.1 Households
Households enter a given period t with claims to two distinct capital stocks (kt, zt)
accumulated from the past together with a nominal wealth positionMt. At time t
−,
households divide their nominal wealth into resources Qt disposable for consumption
later in the period and deposits Mt − Qt with a financial intermediary which earn
20As a general rule, variables pertaining to the basic input good are indicated by the vari-
able/superscript k, while z is the relevant indicator for the advanced input good.
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a net interest rate (R˜t− 1).21 After aggregate shocks have materialized, households
rent out their technology-specific physical capital to the entrepreneurs who run the
projects producing the basic and advanced input good, respectively. Similarly, they
supply labor hk,Ht to basic and h
z,H
t to advanced projects, resulting in an aggregate
labor supply of hHt = h
k,H
t +h
z,H
t , whereby households are indifferent as to where their
labor is employed.22 As an equilibrium consequence, households will receive the same
nominal wageW k,Ht = W
z,H
t = W
H
t in both projects. At time t
+, households receive
the returns from labor and capital and make consumption and investment decisions.
However, there is a cash constraint on the goods market with the consequence that
a household’s current expenditure for consumption cHt and physical investment xt
must be covered by the resources Qt earmarked for consumption plus a fraction
θ of its current wage earnings. The household has preferences over sequences of
consumption and labor supply; hence, the household problem is to maximize lifetime
utility:
E0−
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cHt , h
H
t ) (3.4a)
subject to the cash constraint:
Qt + θW
H
t h
H
t ≥ Pt[cHt + xt], (3.4b)
an equation describing the evolution of nominal assets:
Mt+1 = Qt + θW
H
t h
H
t − Pt[cHt + xt] + R˜t[Mt −Qt + Jt]
+ Rkt kt +R
z
t zt + (1− θ)WHt hHt +Υt, (3.4c)
where Jt are cash injections into the financial market on behalf of the government
and Υt are nominal resources redistributed in a lump-sum fashion among the con-
sumers at the end of the period; moreover, there is a law of motion for aggregate
capital Kt = kt+ zt, which accounts for depreciation and technology-specific adjust-
ment costs Φ(·):
xt = (kt+1 + zt+1)− (1− δ)(kt + zt) + Φ(kt, kt+1) + Φ(zt, zt+1) (3.4d)
3.4.2 Entrepreneurs
Apart from households, there is a unit mass of risk neutral entrepreneurs, each one
capable of running a single firm which produces the two distinct intermediary input
goods. Any such entrepreneurial firm has access to a neoclassical production plan
21This timing convention is standard in monetary models which feature a limited participation
assumption on the household side; compare e.g. Lucas (1990).
22Where necessary, variables pertaining to the household sector will be denoted with a superscript
H; similarly, the superscript E is used to indicate variables pertaining to entrepreneurs.
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utilizing the basic technology as well as to a single advanced technology project.
At the beginning of each period, a mass (1 − η) of new-born entrepreneurs enters
the economy without any initial wealth and replaces an equal measure of retiring
entrepreneurs. The remaining measure η of incumbent entrepreneurs stays active.
An individual entrepreneur arrives in period t with an amount Ait of nominal wealth.
Then, if she receives a random exit signal, she waits until the end of the period to
simply consume her accumulated wealth such that Ait = Ptc
E,i
t . In contrast, new
entrants and entrepreneurs who have not received the exit signal have no consump-
tion motive; rather, each active entrepreneur inelastically supplies her (unit) labor
endowment hEt = h
k,E
t + h
z,E
t = 1 and thus augments her nominal wealth A
i
t by
her current wage earnings WEt . As for households, only a fraction θ of these wage
earnings is immediately disposable such that an individual entrepreneur’s effective
wealth position is Eit = A
i
t + θW
E
t ; E
i
t constitutes the entrepreneur’s necessary
private equity stake when she applies for funding of her advanced project with a
financial intermediary.
3.4.2.1 Intermediate input goods
Each of the two intermediate input goods is produced in an environment of perfect
competition. Both input goods require capital as well as labor for production, but
they are characterized by different technologies. On the one hand, there is a safe,
but return-dominated (”basic”) technology; the other (”advanced”) technology
yields a higher potential return, but is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The
scope for insuring an individual advanced project against this idiosyncratic liquidity
risk is endogenously determined via a (constrained-efficient) financial contract. The
need for this insurance arises as a consequence of an entrepreneurial moral hazard
problem which prevents the efficient refinancing of projects and calls for the com-
mitment of liquidity at the ex ante, rather than the ex post stage. A key distinction
between the two technologies is the relevance of entrepreneurial moral hazard for
the successful completion of production processes: In particular, we assume the
basic technology to be free from the moral hazard problem such that the standard
theory of corporate finance applies here; conversely, production by means of the
advanced technology is subject to ex post entrepreneurial moral hazard. Another
friction that is relevant for both tehnologies is an advance payment requirement,
which necessitates borrowing working capital in order to pay wages; specifically, the
parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of the wage bill to be financed in advance.
Basic technology: Employment of labor and capital inputs (lkt , kt) for the basic
technology is chosen such as to maximize time t+ profits, whereby the vector of prices
(P kt ,W
k
t , R
k
t , R˜t) is taken as given. The basic technology producing intermediate
goods is assumed to be homogenous of degree one and features labor augmenting
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technological progress at the exogenous rate γ. For simplicity, we employ the Cobb-
Douglas form:
ϕ(kt, l
k
t ) = (kt)
αk ((1 + γ)tlkt )1−αk
Similarly, a Cobb-Douglas aggregator converts household and entrepreneurial la-
bor inputs into their effective composite, and agent-specific wages aggregate to a
composite wage rate:
lkt =
(hk,Ht )
Ω(hk,Et )
(1−Ω)
(Ω)Ω(1− Ω)(1−Ω) and W
k
t = (W
k,H
t )
Ω(W k,Et )
(1−Ω)
Hence, the problem when employing the basic technology is:
max
{kt,lkt }
Πkt = P
k
t
(Atϕ(kt, lkt ))−W kt lkt −Rkt kt−1 − θ(R˜t − 1)W kt lkt
= P kt y
k
t − C(W kt , Rkt , R˜t; ykt ). (3.5)
Advanced technology: Apart from controlling the basic production plan, each
entrepreneur also runs a single advanced technology project. For any such project,
the production plan is complicated by the risk that it is hit by a liquidity shock23
which may trigger project termination before it yields any return. We assume that
liquidity risk ξ˜it is proportional to planned revenue P
z
t y˜
z
t and that the normalized liq-
uidity shock ξit ≡ ξ˜
i
t
P zt y˜
z
t
is distributed according to a continuous distribution function
G(ξit) with associated (strictly positive) density g(ξ
i
t). As for the basic intermedi-
ate goods, there is a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of the respective labor inputs by
households and entrepreneurs, and the technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function under constant returns to scale which allows for exogenous labor
augmenting technological progress:
f(zt, l
z
t ) = (zt)
αz ((1 + γ)tlzt )1−αz
An individual entrepreneur brings the amount Eit as private equity into her interme-
diary firm. The advanced production plan and the hedge against liquidity shocks are
then determined as part of a constrained-efficient contract between the entrepreneur
and the financial intermediary.
3.4.3 Financial intermediation
The financial intermediary (or equivalently, a perfectly competitive financial sec-
tor) receives the time t− financial deposits Mt −Qt from the households as well as
23The liquidity shock admits a variety of interpretations. It can be thought of as a simple cost
overrun, as a shortfall of revenue at an interim stage which could have been used as an internal
source of refinancing or as adverse information relating to the project’s end-of-period profitability.
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lump-sum cash injections Jt from the monetary authority. These funds are supplied
to the loans market at a gross nominal interest rate R˜t. At the loans market, this
supply meets the demand for financial assets which comes from two sources: First,
entrepreneurial firms demand short term credit in order to meet the advance financ-
ing requirement for a fraction θ of their respective wage bills. Second, entrepreneurs
demand liquidity Dt to be held as a buffer stock insuring their respective advanced
technology projects. Hence, financial market clearing requires:
Mt −Qt + Jt = θWtLt +Dt, (3.6)
where Wt and Lt are the aggregate wage rate and labor input across households
and entrepreneurs and across the two intermediary technologies. Above condition
simply stipulates that the equilibrium interest rate R˜t balances the supply of loans
with the corporate demand for funds due to its advance financing requirement
and its need for precautionary liquidity. The financial intermediary operates
after aggregate uncertainty is resolved. While lending to projects employing the
basic technology proceeds in a frictionless market, lending to advanced technology
projects is complicated by an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem which is dealt
with by a financial contract. Two key implications of this contracting scheme are
that firm bankruptcy is an equilibrium phenomenon and that the intermediary must
commit funds to individual advanced technology projects before these projects’
idiosyncratic liquidity needs are known. Therefore, it is important to recognize
that the financial intermediary is able to pool idiosyncratic risks across individual
projects because, as a consequence, it is sufficient for the financial intermediary to
break even on an individual credit relationship in expectation.24 At the end of the
period, the intermediary receives the returns on its lending and financial investment
activity and pays the amount R˜t[Mt−Qt+Jt] to the households in return for their
deposits. We next turn to a detailed description of the specific contracting problem
in our model.
Financial contracting: Following Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), the sequenc-
ing of events underlying an individual advanced project’s within-period25 contracting
24Moreover, the intermediary’s risk pooling capability also facilitates insurance of households’
claims against individual advanced projects; the financial intermediary can therefore be thought
of not only as matching supply of and demand for short-term credit, but also as a mutual fund
pooling all household claims against advanced projects. The consequence is that, from an individual
household’s perspective, idiosyncratic risk ξit is hedged, while aggregate risk from st = {At,Vt,Jt}
remains relevant.
25Although the advanced production plan is conditional on the predetermined entrepreneurial
equity position Eit , the factor demand problem itself is not dynamic because entrepreneurial asset
accumulation proceeds mechanically and there is no intertemporal incentive provision. Moreover,
since the financial contract turns out to be linear in Eit , the distribution of equity across entrepre-
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problem can be decomposed into three stages. At stage one, after aggregate uncer-
tainty with respect to st = {At,Vt,Jt} is unveiled, the entrepreneur running an in-
dividual advanced project and holding an equity position Et in it contracts with the
financial intermediary to pin down its production plan and refinancing provisions.
In particular, the refinancing provisions determine the degree of insurance against
idiosyncratic liquidity risk.26 Given st, a contract between the financial intermediary
(outside investor) and the entrepreneur holding equity Et prescribes (i) the scale of
production as determined by factor employment (zt, l
z
t ), (ii) a state contingent con-
tinuation rule Γt(ξt), and (iii) a state contingent transfer τt(ξt) from the entrepreneur
to the investor. Hence, a generic contract takes the form Ct = {zt, lzt ,Γt(ξt), τt(ξt)}.
A constraint on the contract is that it is written under limited liability, i.e. in case of
project termination factors must be remunerated by the outside investor. At a sub-
sequent interim stage (stage two) after the factor employment decisions have been
made, the project is hit by an idiosyncratic liquidity shock ξt. If the shock is met
by appropriate refinancing, the project can continue; otherwise it is liquidated. We
assume that the liquidity shock is verifiable, but it is shown in Holmstro¨m and Ti-
role (1998) that nothing changes if only the entrepreneur observes the shock as long
as she does not benefit from diverting resources. After the continuation decision,
there is scope for moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur in that she can exert
effort to affect the distribution of production outcomes. Specifically, we make the
extreme assumption that, conditional on continuation, exerting effort guarantees a
gross return of P zt y˜
z
t = P
z
t Vtf(zt, lzt ) to production activity, while shirking leads to
zero output, but generates a private (non-monetary) benefit Bt. We assume that
the private benefit is proportional to project revenue conditional on survival; in par-
ticular, we have: Bt = bP
z
t Vtf(zt, lzt ) = bP zt y˜zt with 0 < b < 1.27 Finally, at stage
three, the revenue from production accrues and payoffs are realized according to the
rules stipulated in the financial contract. The financial intermediary engages in a
continuum of contracts with all entrepreneurs operating the advanced technology;
since liquidity risk is idiosyncratic, the intermediary is therefore able to pool the risk
inherent in the investments across individual projects. As an implication, we can
completely abstract from the effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty on the investor’s
evaluation of payoffs. Similarly, the entrepreneur who is exposed to her uninsured
neurs does not matter and exact aggregation is possible. From now on, we will therefore drop the
superscript i.
26It is important to realize that the financial contract is negotiated after fresh cash Jt has been
injected into the economy. Consequently, our concept of corporate liquidity is real in the sense
that there is no nominal rigidity which, upon an increase in the price level, would discount the
effective insurance capacity of any given nominal amount of liquid assets; what is affected by
nominal fluctuations, though, is its relative price, the liquidity premium (R˜t − 1).
27Note, however, that the specific value of b > 0 will not matter as long as the constrained-
efficient contract to be derived in Appendix C.1.3 delivers an interior solution.
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private equity risk is risk neutral and cares only about expected profits as long as
she is active.
Hypothetically abstracting from both the entrepreneurial incentive constraint
and the cost of obtaining liquidity at the interim stage, it is easy to see that there
exists a unique cutoff value corresponding to a continuation policy which prescribes
project continuation if and only if the liquidity shock is such that ξt ≤ 1. The reason
is that the stage one investment is sunk; hence, at the interim stage, it is optimal to
refinance up to the full value of what can be generated in terms of revenue at the
final stage. However, the need to take into account the incentive constraint and the
costs of liquidity provision implies that the continuation policy will take the form:
Γt(ξt) =
{
1, if ξt ≤ ξˆt
0, if ξt > ξˆt
for some cutoff value ξˆt < 1. Hence, Γt(ξt) is a simple indicator function with
Γt(ξt) = 1 in case of continuation and Γt(ξt) = 0 in case of termination.
A constrained-efficient contract Ct = {zt, lzt ,Γt(ξt), τt(ξt)} with (zt, lzt ) determin-
ing the scale of production, and Γt(ξt) and τt(ξt) pinning down the state contin-
gent policies for project continuation and transfers per unit of production costs
C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
, respectively, then solves the following second best program of
maximizing the entrepreneur’s net return:
max
Ct
∫ {
Γt(ξt)P
z
t y˜
z
t − τt(ξt)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)}
dG(ξt)− Et (3.7a)
subject to a participation constraint for the investor that requires him to break even
in expectation:∫ {
τt(ξt)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
− Γt(ξt)ξtR˜tP zt y˜zt
}
dG(ξt) ≥ C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
− Et(3.7b)
and a state-by-state incentive compatibility constraint for the entrepreneur:
Γt(ξt)P
z
t y˜
z
t − τt(ξt)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
≥ Γt(ξt)bP zt y˜zt ∀ ξt, (3.7c)
where y˜zt = Vt (zt)α
z
((1 + γ)tlzt )
1−αz
is the project’s output conditional on survival
and:
C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
= MCzt
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t
)
y˜zt =
1
Vt
(
Rt
αz
)αz ( [1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(1− αz)
)(1−αz)
y˜zt
= [1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt lzt +Rzt zt (3.8)
are the associated total costs which accrue when a output level of y˜zt is targeted in
case of survival; by constant returns to scale, the marginal costMCzt (·) of increasing
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planned output y˜zt is constant. Note how the specification of this problem, by means
of the participation constraint (3.7b), incorporates the requirement that the investor
who bears the risk of project failure be willing to finance the project, whereby the
outside investor commits both the factor remuneration and the interim resources
needed to meet the liquidity shock. Appendix C.1.3 shows that the solution to
program (3.7) in terms of the optimal cutoff ξˆ∗t is determined via the following first
order condition:
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt =
MCzt (·)
P zt
1
R˜t
(3.9)
This condition illustrates that the cost of providing liquidity at the interim stage,
which has to be obtained in the financial market at the financial rate R˜t, as well
as the gap between prices and marginal costs
P zt
MCzt (·) play a key role in shaping the
optimal contract.
Implementation and aggregate liquidity demand: The key element of the
solution to program (3.7) is the second best cutoff value ξˆ∗t up to which refinancing
needs will be covered such that production can proceed. In order to hedge against
such liquidity shocks, it is necessary that outside investors commit funds at the ini-
tial contracting stage (stage one). The reason is that, by issuing corporate claims
at the interim stage (stage two), it is not possible to raise enough funds because the
entrepreneurial commitment problem limits the maximum return pledgeable to out-
side investors at ξˆ0t =
(1−b)
R˜t
< ξˆ∗t . It is then a natural question to ask how the second
best policy can actually be implemented at the initial contracting stage; moreover, in
view of our modelling hypothesis that an economy’s physical investment portfolio is
affected by the degree to which risky production activities can be insured by means
of corporate liquidity holdings, there arises the related question of whether there
is a second best policy that features firms (rather than the intermediary) holding
liquidity. These questions are dealt with in Appendix C.1.4. Here, suffice it to stress
(i) that second best contracting can indeed be implemented via liquidity holdings
at the firm level and (ii) that under financial intermediation, which efficiently econ-
omizes on the use of scarce liquidity by pooling liquidity risk across projects, the
aggregate demand for liquidity is:
Dt =
[∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt
]
P zt y˜
z
t (3.10)
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3.4.4 Market good
The market good is simply aggregated over the two technology-specific intermediate
input goods supplied by the entrepreneurs:
yt =
(
ζ
1
ρykt
ρ−1
ρ + (1− ζ) 1ρyzt
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
, (3.11)
where yt is the final output good and y
z
t and y
k
t are the two distinct intermediate
input goods. The two parameters 0 < ζ < 1 and ρ > 0 determine the weight of
each intermediate good in producing the aggregate market good and the elasticity of
substitution of the two intermediates. Productive efficiency pins down the minimum
cost combination of the final good firms’ demands for intermediate input goods to
be functions of the relative prices for the relevant intermediate input P jt , j = k, z
and for the final output Pt:
ykt = ζ
(
P kt
Pt
)−ρ
yt and y
z
t = (1− ζ)
(
P zt
Pt
)−ρ
yt (3.12)
We assume perfect competition on the final goods market; therefore, the aggregate
price level is determined by the marginal input cost, i.e. the intermediate good
prices, which are constant from the final good firm’s perspective. Consequently,
zero profits imply:
Pt =
(
ζP kt
1−ρ
+ (1− ζ)P zt 1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
(3.13)
For future reference, we also define the respective aggregates of the two factors of
production, capital Kt = kt + zt and labor Lt = l
k
t + l
z
t , as well as the elasticities of
aggregate output with respect to the intermediate input levels:
ωyyk,t ≡
dyt/yt
dykt /y
k
t
= ζ
1
ρ
(
ykt
yt
) ρ−1
ρ
and ωyyz,t ≡
dyt/yt
dyzt /y
z
t
= (1− ζ) 1ρ
(
yzt
yt
) ρ−1
ρ
(3.14)
3.4.5 Government policy
In order to close the model, a specification for government policy is needed. The
focus of our analysis is not a normative one; therefore, to keep things simple,
we will consider an exogenous process for monetary policy which consists of pe-
riodic injections Jt of money in the financial market. Jt is implicitly defined as
Jt = (emgt − 1) (Mt + At), where mgt is the gross rate of money growth. Hence,
the aggregate of nominal wealth held by households and entrepreneurs is updated
according to:
(Mt+1 + At+1) = e
mgt (Mt + At)
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The gross rate of money growth mgt is assumed to evolve according to an autore-
gressive mean-reverting process:
mgt = ρjmgt−1 + (1− ρj)mg∗ + j,t, j ∼ N (0, σ2j ),
where mg∗ is the steady state level of money growth, which together with the econ-
omy’s exogenous (balanced) growth rate γ determines the rate of inflation prevailing
in steady state.
3.4.6 Equilibrium implications
The solution to the agents’ optimization problems, the details on the implementa-
tion of financial contracting subject to entrepreneurial moral hazard as well as the
definition of a competitive equilibrium are all contained in Appendix C.1. In the
following, we put on record a set of important equilibrium implications which are
informative with respect to the effects of monetary fluctuations on corporate liquid-
ity demand and the composition of firms’ physical investment. They are derived on
the basis of the financial contracting scheme outlined in Section 3.4.3, which pins
down the optimal amount of liquidity provision ξˆ∗t , and will be the object of our
empirical analysis below.
• H1: Ceteris paribus,28 an increase in R˜t leads to a lower cutoff ξˆ∗t :
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
= −
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt
R˜tG(ξˆ∗t )
< 0 (3.15)
Thus, quite intuitively, higher nominal interest rates R˜t imply less hedging against
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks because the financial intermediary’s participation con-
straint gets tighter in line with the increased costs of providing liquidity. In order to
examine the effects of other changes in the economic environment on firms’ liquidity
demand, we establish two auxiliary results. First, increased volatility of the liquid-
ity shock distribution G(·) in the sense of a mean-preserving spread implies a lower
cutoff value ξˆ∗t ; formally
dξˆ∗t
dσξ
< 0.29 The intuition behind this result is that increased
risk makes the option to terminate any given advanced project more valuable. The
empirical prediction therefore is that firms operating in a more volatile environment
28The claimed result obtains if, to a first approximation, P
z
t
MCzt (·) remains constant. The result
then follows from total differentiation of condition (3.9). That is, the results derived in the following
are valid from a partial equilibrium perspective; taking into account general equilibrium effects does
not change the qualitative (sign) properties of the relevant derivatives.
29Variations in the standard deviation σξ need to be restricted to mean-preserving spreads.
The result then obtains by partial integration; compare Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995),
chapter 6.
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are insured less comprehensively. Second, situations where production by means of
the advanced technology is more profitable, i.e. situations characterized by higher
markups of prices over marginal costs
P zt
MCzt (·) are predicted to feature a lower ξˆ
∗
t ;
formally
dξˆ∗t
d(P zt /MC
z
t )
< 0.30 The reason for the poorer insurance of more profitable
projects is the contracting trade-off between ex ante and ex post rationing under-
lying the efficient choice of ξˆ∗t : While a more generous provision with liquidity has
the advantage of withstanding larger shocks, the higher associated costs necessarily
imply a lower stage one investment volume. Thus, for highly profitable projects,
both contracting parties prefer to cut ξˆ∗t in order to expand the project size. Based
on these results, we can derive two additional hypotheses relating to the sensitivity
of specific firms to fluctuations in the nominal interest rate.
• H2: Increased production risk (in the form of a mean-preserving spread of the
distribution G(·)) accentuates the negative effect of R˜t on the cutoff ξˆ∗t :
d
dσξ
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
=
dξˆ∗t
dσξ
d
dξˆ∗t
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
< 0, (3.16)
where the inequality follows from the fact that ξˆ∗t is decreasing in the volatility
of the shock distribution and differentiation of expression (3.15) with respect
to ξˆ∗t .
• H3: Increased profitability accentuates the negative effect of R˜t on the cutoff
ξˆ∗t :
d
d(P zt /MC
z
t )
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
=
dξˆ∗t
d(P zt /MC
z
t )
d
dξˆ∗t
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
< 0, (3.17)
where the inequality follows from the fact that ξˆ∗t is decreasing in the price-
to-marginal-cost ratio and differentiation of expression (3.15) with respect to
ξˆ∗t .
Moreover, starting from the supposition that the economy’s productive activity is
organized based on a set of distinct technologies available to a continuum of entre-
preneurial firms, we can infer a measure Tt of aggregate productivity. The argument
put forward within the framework of our model is that Tt is not simply determined
as an exogenous residual process, but also affected by endogenous shifts in the com-
position of economic activity. In detail, as shown in Appendix C.2, we derive our
aggregate measure of TFP such that changes in Tt can be decomposed as follows:
T̂t = ωyyk,tÂt + ωyyz,t
(
V̂t + ωGξˆ∗,t
̂ˆ
ξ∗t
)
, (3.18)
30This follows from total differentiation of condition (3.9), for given R˜t.
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where x̂ ≡ dx
x
and where ωG
ξˆ∗
= g(ξˆ
∗)ξˆ∗
G(ξˆ∗)
denotes the elasticity of the survival prob-
ability with respect to the cutoff value for liquidity shocks ξˆ∗. Expression (3.18)
illustrates how changes in Tt can be expressed as a weighted sum of changes in
the technology-specific productivity levels At and Vt. The endogenous weights at-
tached to Ât and V̂t are given by the elasticity terms ωyyk,t and ωyyz,t defined in (3.14),
which underpins the importance of the sectoral composition of production activities;
moreover, since the elasticity terms are formulated in terms of realized intermediate
output levels, the effect of V̂t is amended by the term ωGξˆ∗,t
̂ˆ
ξ∗t which reflects how the
level of realized advanced sector output yzt (as opposed to y˜
z
t , the relevant quantity
conditional on survival) responds to changes in the degree of insurance against liq-
uidity risk provided to advanced projects. Thus, besides the exogenous processes At
and Vt, there are two endogenous sources of fluctuations in measured TFP: First,
shifts in the allocation of physical investments (kt, zt) - an investment composition
effect; and second, for a given composition of aggregate investment, changes in the
effectiveness of converting hired factor inputs (zt, l
z
t ) into realized output y
z
t - an
insurance effect in response to changes in the liquidity premium. Now, building on
equations (3.15) and (3.18), the model’s key implication with respect to aggregate
fluctuations is obtained.
• H4: For given realizations of At and Vt, an increase in R˜t leads to a drop in
TFP:
dTt
dR˜t
= ωyyz,tω
G
ξˆ∗
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
< 0, (3.19)
where the inequality follows from ωyyz,t, ω
G
ξˆ∗
> 0 and (3.15).
Finally, differentiation of equation (3.19) facilitates a prediction concerning the dif-
ferential impact of nominal fluctuations across economies characterized by different
production structures:
• H5: Higher exposure to the advanced technology, as measured by a higher
ωyyz,t, implies a higher responsiveness of TFP to movements in R˜t:
d
dωyyz,t
(
dTt
dR˜t
)
= ωG
ξˆ∗
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
< 0, (3.20)
which follows from ωG
ξˆ∗
> 0 and (3.15).
3.5 Quantitative model analysis
The model is calibrated to US time series at quarterly frequency, whereby we
employ macroeconomic aggregates and amend them by industry-level data in order
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to calibrate the parameters that pin down the relative employment of ”basic”
versus ”advanced” technologies. A description of the data as well as the details of
our calibration exercise such as the specification of functional forms are contained
in Appendix C.3. The calibrated benchmark set of parameters is summarized in
Table 3.4. In order to assess the quantitative role of nominal shocks for aggregate
fluctuations and in particular for the endogenous evolution of TFP, we now analyze
the statistical properties of the model economy, employing the routines proposed
by Sims (2001). As far as the monetary transmission mechanism is concerned,
the effects of an unanticipated monetary expansion are twofold: First, there is a
liquidity effect, recording as a drop in nominal interest rates on impact, and second,
there is an inflationary effect which may take time to materialize. The induced
dynamic pattern of nominal interest rates is key in shaping firms’ investment with
respect to its overall amount, but also with respect to its composition. Importantly,
the compositional effects are associated with changes in aggregate productivity.
Against this background, the main purpose of the following analysis is to examine
within the framework of our model economy whether monetary shocks can indeed
account for a sizeable fraction of fluctuations in TFP.31 We approach this question
based on a series of numerical experiments. First, we simulate the model for
our benchmark calibration and confront the generated moments with empirical
US business cycle statistics. Second, we consider the same model economy, but
shut down money shocks as a source of nominal fluctuations; this exercise allows
us to decompose the volatility of key macroeconomic aggregates - particularly of
TFP - into the fractions that are attributable to money and technology shocks,
respectively. Finally, we are interested in the steady state effects of increased
nominal distortions, an issue that we approach by comparing the equilibrium
allocations of alternative economies which are indexed by different rates of inflation
along their balanced growth paths.
Empirical and simulated business cycle statistics: Table 3.5 documents
empirical and simulated business cycle statistics. Of particular interest are stan-
dard deviations as well as contemporaneous correlations of several macroeconomic
aggregates with real GDP. We point out that, empirically, aggregate productivity
is procyclical with respect to real GDP, whereas both the level and the growth
rate of TFP are negatively correlated with the rate of inflation (in terms of both
the GDP deflator and CPI inflation) and different nominal interest rate measures,
the own rate on M2 and the yield on corporate bonds.32 Our benchmark model
31In contrast, it is not our principal objective to replicate salient features of the US monetary
business cycle.
32The contemporaneous correlations for the growth rate of TFP, which are not reported in
Table 3.5, are ρ(∆T , pi (dGDPdef)) = −0.23, ρ(∆T , pi (dCPI)) = −0.22, ρ(∆T , R˜ (M2)) = −0.15
and ρ(∆T , R˜corp) = −0.06.
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economy is characterized by a steady state quarterly rate of inflation of 1.31% and
a remaining parametrization as summarized in Table 3.4. The linearized model
is simulated, and the columns labelled ”benchmark economy” in Table 3.5 report
standard deviations as well as cross-correlations with aggregate output; for TFP,
we also present cross-correlations with nominal interest rates and inflation. A
comparison with the empirical statistics reveals that the model-generated standard
deviations are consistent with the empirical pattern as far as relative magnitudes
are concerned, but that the implied volatility of output falls short of its empirical
counterpart, while the model statistics for hours worked and aggregate productivity
reflect the increased (as compared to the data) volatility of the monetary variables.
Turning to the contemporaneous correlations, we find that hours and aggregate
investment display less procyclicality with aggregate output than observed in the
data and that, counterfactually, a negative comovement of inflation and real GDP
is predicted. On the other hand, the benchmark model generates interest rate
correlations (0.07) which strike a balance with respect to the diverging sign pattern
of the two analyzed nominal interest rate measures’ correlations (0.24 and −0.17).
Notably, also the comovement of TFP with real GDP is accurately replicated at
0.55 (versus 0.58 in the data). Turning to the correlations with nominal interest
rates, the key statistic for our purpose is the negative contemporaneous correlation
of TFP which the benchmark model predicts at −0.53 versus, depending on the
interest rate measure, −0.29 or −0.44 in the data. The empirical correlation of TFP
with the two different inflation measures is −0.35 or −0.22, whereas the benchmark
model predicts that inflation and aggregate productivity do hardly comove over
the cycle.33 While not reported, we also note that inflation plays the role of a
leading indicator for nominal interest rates; similarly, past money growth is found
to be associated with higher nominal interest rates, whereas the contemporaneous
correlation is negative due to the liquidity effect of monetary expansions. Taken
together, these facts suggest a systematic effect of monetary policy on TFP, which
is transmitted via fluctuations in the nominal interest rate and - according to our
model - the associated changes in the composition of aggregate investment.
Variance decomposition and key correlations: To further assess the
relevance of this mechanism, we resimulate the model, employing the same para-
metrization, but shutting down monetary shocks by setting σj = 0. This exercise
facilitates a variance decomposition and is also informative with respect to the
33The explanation for this somewhat puzzling finding is related to the liquidity effect: Not only
does an expansionary monetary innovation lead to inflation, but it also induces a decrease in
nominal interest rates, thereby increasing aggregate productivity. Our rudimentary benchmark
model features an excessively strong liquidity effect; therefore, the strongly positive comovement
between inflation and measured TFP upon impact nets out the otherwise negative correlation
between the two variables.
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cyclical effects of monetary policy. The relevant statistics are also reported in Table
3.5 under the heading ”σj = 0”. Importantly, our quantitative analysis implies
that 17.16% = (1.34 − 1.11)/1.34 of the fluctuations in aggregate productivity
can be attributed to monetary policy shocks (see column four). Obviously, the
quantitative importance of these shifts in aggregate productivity due to changes
in the composition of aggregate investement critically depends on the relative
importance of corporate liquidity demand in overall short-term credit, d
d+θwL
; the
latter ratio, in turn, is affected by the advance financing parameter θ. Specifically,
pushing θ from its calibrated benchmark value of 0.25 towards zero implies that
the relative importance of the demand for corporate liquidity to insure advanced
technology investments increases. As a consequence, the sensitivity of aggregate
productivity to fluctuations in the liquidity premium (the bulk of which can be
attributed to monetary disturbances) is magnified. This is illustrated in column
six which, for the alternative economy with θ = 0.05, reports the fraction of TFP
fluctuations to be traced to monetary shocks at 34.88%. In contrast, the standard
deviation of aggregate investment is hardly affected across the alternative model
economies. The same parameter variations have also important implications for the
correlation pattern between macroeconomic aggregates as illustrated by the columns
at the right end of Table 3.5. In particular, we point out that the contemporaneous
correlation between TFP and nominal interest rates undergoes a sign switch from
−0.53 to 0.15 when shutting down monetary shocks, while a decrease in θ is
seen to intensify the negative comovement between the two variables. Similar
conclusions can also be drawn with respect to the comovement of inflation and TFP.
Steady states: At a more fundamental level, distortions via increased rates of
inflation and nominal interest rates affect the economy’s real allocation also along
a balanced growth path. Some important indicators for the induced distortions are
summarized in Table 3.6, which compares steady state allocations across economies
indexed by different rates of inflation. Moving from left to right, it can be seen
that increased rates of inflation one-to-one feed into higher nominal interest rates
and thus into a higher liquidity premium for insuring advanced sector production.
The reason for this is that the liquidity premium faced by firms is effectively
determined by the households who, due to their CIA constraint, require a higher
compensation for carrying money from one period to the next one. Higher nominal
rates then change the allocation in that (i) the composition of aggregate investment
as measured by the ratio z
k
is shifted towards the basic technology, and (ii) the
amount of corporate liquidity used to hedge advanced sector production decreases.
The latter holds true both for the absolute real amount d = D
P
of corporate
liquidity and two relevant measures of liquidity in relation to aggregate output, d
y
,
or the overall demand for short-term credit, d
d+θwL
. The implication is that the
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survival probability G(·) of advanced projects successively decreases, which further
aggravates the effect of the distorted composition of aggregate investment; this is
evidenced by the ratio of realized sectoral outputs y
z
yk
which declines by more than
the relative allocation of physical capital. In line with the prediction of H4, the
relocation of resources induces a fall in aggregate productivity T ; as hinted above,
this drop in TFP is the consequence of two things: (i) the shift in the composition of
aggregate investment towards the basic technology, and (ii) the decreased insurance
against liquidity risk in the advanced sector. Indeed, moving from an economy
which is governed by a Friedman rule (first column) to an economy characterized
by a money growth rate of 10% (column five) leads to a drop in TFP of 2.1%;
similarly, moving from a non-inflationary steady state (column two) to the latter
economy goes along with a drop in TFP of 1.7%. Finally, we mention that also
some cyclical aspects of the alternative economies (indexed by their respective
steady state rates of inflation) change as is evidenced by the correlation pattern
of nominal interest rates presented in the last line of Table 3.6. Specifically, the
adverse effects of interest rate shocks on TFP become more pronounced the higher
the level of steady state inflation.
The results established on the basis of above experiments underpin that our pro-
posed model may be a useful tool to understand how (inflation-driven) fluctuations
in the nominal interest rate impinge on the cyclical behavior of macroeconomic ag-
gregates and in particular on TFP. As far as the main phenomenon of interest, the
negative causal effect of inflation and nominal interest rates on aggregate produc-
tivity, is concerned, the quantitative model analysis has demonstrated that not only
cyclical fluctuations, but also level effects do play a quantitatively important role.
Thus, at this stage, the model is consistent with the empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship and the inherent causality between macroeconomic aggregates documented
in Section 3.3. The model has proposed a particular monetary transmission mecha-
nism based on the qualitative composition of private investment portfolios and the
importance of corporate liquidity holdings to hedge superior investment projects.
Since this channel is identified neither via aggregate data nor the analysis of model-
generated moments, we now investigate whether our specific predictions regarding
firm behavior find empirical support in disaggregate data.
3.6 Empirical analysis of disaggregate data
In this section, we employ disaggregate US data to examine the specific microeco-
nomic mechanism underlying our model. We do so in two steps, first exploiting
industry-level data and then firm-level data.
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3.6.1 Sectoral level
Data and methodology: Our model provides us with a set of firm-level predic-
tions (H1 - H3) as well as aggregate implications (H4 - H5). It is straightforward
to extend our one-sector model to a multi-sector setup, whereby each individual
industrial sector is a replica of the representative production structure described
in Section 3.4. The economywide TFP measures discussed in the context of H4
and H5 can then readibly interpreted as industry-specific productivity measures,
and the contracting implications H1 - H3 do apply not only for individual firms,
but also for industrial sectors. Hence, we can empirically test our hypotheses by
means of industry-level data. In particular, as an implication of H2, we are led to
hypothesize that the response in terms of the cutoff ξˆ∗ to movements in the nominal
interest rate is stronger for firms operating in more volatile industries. A positive
correlation between the rate of inflation and nominal interest rates34 and the fact -
compare equation (3.18) - that a lower ξˆ∗ ceteris paribus leads to lower TFP-growth
then together imply that the negative relation between TFP-growth and inflation is
expected to be stronger in more volatile industrial sectors. In addition, we presume
that firms operating in more productive sectors in terms of their historically realized
TFP-growth have had access and are more exposed to superior investment oppor-
tunities and therefore depend more heavily on corporate asset holdings to insure
against liquidity risk. Indeed, for given R˜, equation (3.8) delivers a link between the
technology component V available to a firm on the one hand and its marginal cost
MCz and therefore its profitability P
z
MCz
in case of survival on the other hand; the
intuitive implication is that high productivity growth goes along with high poten-
tial profitability. Hence, from H3, profitable firms operating in industries with high
realized productivity growth are expected to react more sensitively to nominal fluc-
tuations, and, from H5, such fluctuations should affect sectoral TFP-growth more
severely in industries with a better historical productivity performance.
We apply 3-digit industry-level data for the US to investigate these hypotheses.
The productivity of US industrial sectors is measured by the yearly growth rate of
real value added per industry from the UNIDO (2002) industrial statistics database.
The yearly data are available for 28 industries from 1963-2000.35 The classifica-
tion of 3-digit US industries with respect to average volatility (standard deviation)
and average growth of productivity in our sample are reported in Table 3.7. The
correlation coefficient between these two rankings is positive 0.23 (s.e.=0.03) and sig-
34As already mentioned above, for unfiltered data, the correlation coefficient between CPI infla-
tion and the nominal interest rate (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield) is 0.42 (0.55)
at yearly (quarterly) frequency.
35We have to confine ourselves with yearly data since, to our knowledge, quarterly data on value
added at industry level are not available. Moreover, note that we deflate the value added series in
each sector with the economywide GDP-deflator.
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nificantly different from zero at a 1% level according to Spearman’s rank correlation
test. Hence, independence of both rankings is rejected, confirming that more volatile
sectors tend to be characterized by higher average productivity growth.36 Therefore,
identifying industries that are highly exposed to the advanced technology (in the
sense of a high ωyyz) with volatile and strongly growing sectors, we operationalize our
empirical analysis by means of H5: We divide the sample according to the median,
the first and the fourth quartile of both measures. According to our theoretical
model, the differential impact of inflation on TFP-growth across the relevant sub-
samples should result from the different sensitivity of corporate liquidity holdings in
response to nominal fluctuations and is expected to be more pronounced in the 14
(7) industries whose volatility/average productivity growth is above the median (in
the first quartile). We control for industry-specific fixed effects in all estimations.
Since the first lag of the growth rate (or level) of value added is not significant at
conventional levels in any specification, we employ a static panel estimation. That
is, we estimate the following model:
yi,t = α+ β1pit−1+ β2(pit−1 ∗DVi) + β3Xt+ ηi+ i,t, i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 1, 2, ..., T,
(3.21)
where yi,t is the growth rate of real value added per industry, pit−1 the first lag
of inflation, DVi a dummy which amounts to one for industries with an above
median (first quartile) volatility/mean, Xt a vector of aggregate control variables,
N = 28 the number of cross-sections, T = 38 the number of time-periods, ηi
industry-specific fixed effects, i,t the error term and α and β parameters to be
estimated.37 We cluster the error terms at the industry level so that the standard
errors are robust to within-group (serial) correlation.38 Inflation is measured
as the change in the economywide consumer price index; we include the first
lag of inflation due to the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous measures.
Furthermore, we include the contemporaneous level and the first lag of the growth
rate of GDP (GDP − growth), the private investment share (inv − share) and
the amount of overall credit (credit) as control variables. The latter variable is
often used as a proxy for the degree of financial market development in the literature.
Results: The first column in Table 3.8 reports the correlation between the first
lag of inflation and the growth rate of real value added for the full sample. We find
that a 1% increase in the economywide rate of inflation triggers, on average, a drop in
36Among the ten most volatile sectors, we find industries such as professional & scientific equip-
ment, petroleum refineries, plastic products, industrial chemicals, iron and steel or non-ferrous
metals. In contrast, the four least volatile sectors are food products, other chemicals, beverages
and printing and publishing.
37We also included a linear time trend, but it is not significant at conventional levels. Moreover,
allowing for year fixed effects would have considerably reduced the degrees of freedom.
38Consequently, our results are not subject to the caveat raised by Moulton (1990).
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the sectoral growth rate of real value added by 0.96% after controlling for changes in
(lagged) GDP-growth, the private investment share and the overall supply of credit.
The next two columns contrast the sensitivity of value added growth with respect to
inflation in high and low volatility sectors (above/below median). Consistent with
H2, we detect that the negative impact of inflation is significant in both subsamples,
but on average 61% higher in the 14 highly volatile sectors. In order to test for a
statistical significance of the difference between both coefficients, we interact the
lag of inflation with a dummy variable which amounts to one for high volatility
industries (according to the median) and zero otherwise. Column four reveals that
the interaction is negative and significant on a 10% level. That is, the distorting
impact of an 1% increase in inflation aggravates, on average, by 0.32% if we focus
on high volatility as opposed to low volatility sectors. This effect is even more
pronounced if we compare the sensitivity in the seven most volatile sectors with the
one in the residual 21 sectors (column five). In particular, the sensitivity of value
added growth per industry with respect to inflation is, on average, 76% higher in
the seven most volatile sectors. The difference is significant on a 5% level. Thus, as
predicted by H2, we are able to link the inflation-sensitivity of sectoral TFP-growth
to the average sectoral volatility of productivity growth per industry. Columns
six to seven of Table 3.8 classify the impact of inflation on productivity growth
according to the median and first quartile of the observed average productivity
growth of a given industry in the sample. In accordance withH3 andH5, column six
reports that the negative impact of inflation is more pronounced in industries whose
average productivity growth is above the sample median. Yet, the difference is not
significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the coefficient is neither significant nor
even positive if we focus on the seven sectors that experienced the highest average
productivity increase in the sample.
Overall, the results emerging from the analysis of industry-level data corroborate
our theoretical predictions that the negative effect of inflation on TFP-growth varies
systematically with the riskiness of physical investment portfolios across industrial
sectors as measured by the sectoral volatility of value added growth. In particular,
we interpret these findings as supportive for our theoretical model’s distinction be-
tween the basic technology, which is normalized to be free of liquidity risk, and the
advanced technology, where there is a superior growth potential, but where idio-
syncratic liquidity shocks give rise to a corporate demand for (partial) insurance
against such risk. In the next subsection, we will revisit the specific implications
arising from this setup on the basis of firm-level data.
3.6.2 Firm level
Data and methodology: Firm-level data allow for the most direct test of the
specific transmission mechanism proposed by our model. Specifically, our theory
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predicts that firms react to nominal distortions which increase the liquidity premium
by reducing their liquidity holdings used to hedge advanced investment projects
(H1) and by shifting their investment portfolios towards more secure, but also less
productive projects. Thus, we expect that increased corporate liquidity holdings
augment the investment in superior projects, while increased nominal interest rates,
notably as a consequence of higher (expected) rates of inflation, reduce corporate
liquidity holdings and trigger an adverse investment composition effect.
In order to test these hypotheses, we match the relevant variables employed in
Section 3.3 with US firm-level data at quarterly as well as yearly frequency from
the Compustat database. The latter data relate to the balance sheets of US non-
financial firms and cover the effective time periods 1989:1-2000:4 and 1970-2000,
respectively. In detail, we include the following firm-level data: R&D expenses,
the amount of corporate liquidity measured as the sum of cash and marketable
securities (corp. liquidity) and the amount of total assets (assets).39 Here, R&D
is used as a proxy for investment in superior technologies.40 The assets variable,
in turn, reflects overall corporate assets and thus controls for firm size. As hinted
above, we use the US CPI-based rate of inflation and the yield on corporate bonds
to investigate the effect of these macroeconomic variables on firm-level liquidity and
investment portfolios.41 In addition, where available, we exploit information on
individual firms’ S&P credit rating (spdrc)42 as an additional control variable to
isolate the effect of firm-specific credit conditions relative to the aggregate measure
for the lending rate faced by non-financial firms.
In this context, we again point out the empirical evidence provided by Opler et
al. (1999) based on yearly US firm-level data for 1970-1993. The authors proxy a
firm’s investment opportunities by its market-to-book value and/or its expenses for
R&D, respectively; the risk associated with a firm’s cash flow is measured by the
standard deviation of its cash flows. The study finds that the value of liquid assets
(cash and marketable securities) relative to total net assets averages at 18% for US
non-financial firms. Furthermore, it establishes that firms with higher growth op-
portunities and riskier cash flows hold on average more liquid assets.43 We see these
39The qualitative results are robust to the inclusion of additional firm-level control variables such
as operating income before taxes and interest payments, the amount of long-run outstanding debt
or interest payments.
40If we interpret investment in superior technologies as investment in new technologies, while
investment in less productive projects reflects production with established technologies, R&D ex-
penses are the most appropriate candidate for an approximation of advanced investments projects.
41We stress that our standard errors are robust to serial correlation and hence are not subject
to the caveat raised by Moulton (1990).
42The variable is an index number, ranging from 1 to 30 in our sample, whereby a higher value
corresponds to a poorer credit rating.
43Notice that these latter findings relate to a sample comprising firms irrespective of the industrial
sector they belong to. In contrast, our own empirical prediction (H2) was empirically tested by
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empirical findings as strongly supportive of the relevance of corporate liquidity hold-
ings for the purpose of insuring superior, but risky production activities. Against
this background, we extend the analysis in Opler et al. (1999) by investigating the
impact of inflation and nominal interest rates on corporate liquidity holdings and
firm-level R&D expenses.
We have a balanced panel of over 150000 (97000) observations at quarterly
(yearly) frequency.44 We employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference
(GMM − dif) as well as the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM system estimator
(GMM − sys) because of the significance of the lagged dependent variable (e.g.
lagged R&D levels).45 These estimation procedures are based on the general
method of moments (GMM) and are constructed to yield consistent estimates in
dynamic panels. In particular, Arellano and Bond (1991) estimate a dynamic panel
data model in first differences and apply appropriate lagged levels as instruments
for the first differences of the endogenous variables. These are valid instruments
if (i) the time-varying disturbance i,t is not serially correlated, and (ii) the
explanatory variables Xi,t are weakly exogenous.
46 In all estimations, we employ
heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust standards errors. Finally, note
that the mix of macroeconomic and microeconomic data allows for an inspection
means of industrial subaggregates. Hence, there is no inconsistency between the results in Opler
et al. (1999) and our own findings reported in Section 3.6.1.
44Unfortunately, the S&P credit rating index is only available for roughly 12000 time observa-
tions.
45Similarly, Aghion et al. (2006) apply a (country-) panel estimation based on yearly data to
test for business cycle effects of volatility.
46In other words, considering the following dynamic panel data model in first differences:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (i,t − i,t−1), i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 3, 4, ..., T,
the basic assumptions of Arellano and Bond (1991) are E[yi,t−s(i,t − i,t−1)] = 0, E[Xi,t−s(i,t −
i,t−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ...T , where yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t a vector of endogenous
and exogenous explanatory variables, N the number of cross-sections, T the number of time-
periods, i,t the error term and α and β parameters to be estimated. In addition, Blundell and Bond
(1998) apply supplementary moment restrictions on the original model in levels, whereby lagged
differences are used as additional instruments for the endogenous and predetermined variables
in levels. [For practical purposes, we impose one instrument for each variable and lag distance
(collapse option), rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance in the case of
the GMM system estimator. This restriction on the IV-matrix reduces efficiency, but increases the
number of overidentifying restrictions which are used to test for the validity of the instruments
(Hansen test). Moreover, we limit the number of lags to six in the case of the Arellano-Bond
estimator.] Given that E[yi,t, µi] is mean stationary, the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator
incorporates the additional moment restrictions E[(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0, E[(Xi,t−1 −
Xi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0, which requires the additional assumption of no correlation between the
differences of these variables and the country-specific effect. The authors show that this procedure
is more efficient if explanatory variables are persistent; however, the estimator requires mean
stationarity.
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of causality. More specifically, the coefficient of inflation reflects the causal impact
on an individual firm’s (marginal) R&D expenses since the latter have no feedback
effect on the aggregate level of inflation.
Results: In all estimations, we reject the presence of second-order autocorre-
lation. Furthermore, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions never rejects
the validity of the instruments. Hence, all estimation specifications appear to be
well-specified.47 Table 3.9 summarizes our main results for the dynamic panel esti-
mations at quarterly frequency.48 In the first two columns, we use the amount of
corporate liquidity as the dependent variable. The first column reports a negative
coefficient of inflation, which is not significant at conventional levels, however. The
second column displays a negative impact of the nominal interest rate on corporate
liquidity holdings, which is significant on a 5% level. This coefficient suggests that,
averaging across firms, a 1% increase in the nominal interest rate reduces liquidity
holdings per firm by almost 1.4 million US$ in the same quarter. In particular,
our estimation results are consistent with proposition H1 derived in the context of
the agency problem underlying our theoretical model. In both cases, we control for
firm size (total assets), which - not surprisingly - has a positive effect on liquidity
holdings.
The remaining columns of Table 3.9 have R&D expenses per firm as the de-
pendent variable. The third column illustrates that inflation has a negative causal
impact on firm-level investments in R&D; the coefficient is significant on a 5% level.
Keeping the amount of total assets fixed, a 1% increase in inflation reduces R&D
expenses per firm on average by 0.9 million US$. Moreover, as evidenced by the
positive coefficient on total assets, larger firms invest more in R&D. In view of the
comprehensive empirical evidence49 that larger firms have better outside financing
opportunities, this suggests that R&D investments are constrained by a firm’s financ-
ing opportunities. Importantly, the fourth column demonstrates that the distorting
effect of inflation declines if we control for the amount of corporate liquidity hold-
ings. We find that the coefficient of inflation is cut by one half and not significant
any more at conventional levels. At the same time, an increase in liquid assets per
firm enhances investments in superior technologies; the corresponding coefficient is
significant on a 1% level.50
47As explained above, inflation and the nominal interest rate are considered as exogenous vari-
ables. The microeconomic variables are considered as (potentially) endogenous.
48The same qualitative results obtain also for OLS or static fixed effects estimations. However,
both estimators are inconsistent in our setting due to the presence of aggregate variables in a
dynamic disaggregate panel framework.
49Compare e.g. Hubbard (1998) and the references therein.
50Note that all qualitative results are also robust to the inclusion of industry rather than firm
fixed effects; results are available from the authors upon request.
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In the next two columns of Table 3.9, we repeat the same exercise, using the
yield on corporate bonds rather than inflation as the measure of nominal distortions.
The nominal interest rate has a negative impact on firm-level R&D expenses; the
corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level. Again, the effect is smaller in
absolute terms and loses significance at conventional levels if firm-level liquid assets
are controlled for. Finally, in the last column of Table 3.9, again resorting to the
rate of inflation as the key explanatory variable, we include the S&P credit rating
index as an additional control variable. This reduces the effective sample to 7482
observations since the rating is only available for a subset of firms. The coefficient of
the index reveals that a downgrading in the credit rating reduces R&D expenditures,
though not significantly. We point out that the adverse effect of inflation on R&D
expenses increases and is even significant at a 1% level for the relevant subset of firms.
Overall, the quarterly firm-level results are consistent with the specific transmission
mechanism proposed in our theoretical model in that increases in inflation or interest
rates reduce investment in advanced projects (R&D). Moreover, as demonstrated by
the differential coefficient pattern depending on whether corporate liquidity holdings
are switched on or off as a control variable, such liquidity buffer stocks are indeed
a quantitatively relevant transmission channel for the effect of nominal fluctuations
on the composition of firms’ investment portfolios.
In Table 3.10, we report the firm-level evidence for data recorded at yearly fre-
quency. The outline of the results follows the same logic as for Table 3.9. The
first two columns reveal that an increase in either inflation or nominal interest rates
substantially reduces corporate liquidity holdings. The two relevant coefficients are
both significant on a 5% level. Moreover, inflation reduces R&D investment per firm.
At a yearly frequency, the corresponding coefficient suggests that a 1% increase in
inflation reduces a firm’s R&D expenses on average by 0.47 million US$.51 The dis-
tortionary effect of inflation declines by 20% if we additionally control for liquidity
holdings per firm.52 The direct effect of corporate liquidity holdings on R&D is close
to the one at quarterly frequency and significant at a 1% level. In contrast to the
quarterly findings, the coefficient of the nominal interest rate in the R&D regres-
sion, though still negative, is not significant at conventional levels; there is even a
sign switch if liquid assets are controlled for. In the last two columns of Table 3.10,
we systematically exploit the information of the S&P credit rating. Specifically, we
split the sample into two subsets: (i) firms with a ”sound” credit ranking (below
12) and (ii) firms with a ”poor” one (above 12). Following the logic of our model,
one would expect that the negative impact of inflation on R&D is more pronounced
51We employ the Arellano-Bond estimator since the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable
is close to one, indicating problems with the stationarity of R&D at yearly frequency which would
contaminate the Blundell-Bond estimator.
52Yet, the decline in the inflation-coefficient is not statistically significant.
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for firms with worse access to external finance since the precautionary holding of
marketable assets for the purpose of hedging liquidity risk becomes more important.
Indeed, columns seven and eight display that the distortionary impact of inflation
is six times higher for firms with a poor credit rating. Furthermore, a deterioration
in the credit rating has a negative direct effect on R&D investments for the subset
of firms with a relatively bad credit rating, while the effect is not significant for the
subset of better-rated firms.
Summing up, the firm-level results show that inflation has a negative impact
on firm-level investment in superior technologies. However, this effect disappears if
corporate holdings of cash and marketable securities and individual firms’ outside
financing opportunities are controlled for. Thus, the impact of inflation on composi-
tional investment decisions at the firm-level is actually due to variations in a firm’s
liquidity holdings and outside financing opportunities. Together with the results
from the previous industry-level analysis, the empirical firm-level findings provide
strong evidence in favor of the microeconomic mechanism underlying our theoreti-
cal propositions regarding the aggregate relation between inflation and investment
composition-driven TFP-growth at business cycle frequency.
3.7 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to document a negative causal effect of in-
flation on TFP at business cycle frequency and to propose a model to structurally
rationalize this effect. On the basis of US quarterly and yearly time series data, we
provide detailed empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that nominal distor-
tions have a negative effect on TFP-growth. We then propose a monetary business
cycle model allowing for endogenous technology choice between a safe, but return-
dominated technology and a superior technology which yields higher expected re-
turns, but is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Insurance against such liquid-
ity risk is possible by holding a buffer stock of liquid assets, but an agency problem
prevents complete insurance, whereby the scope for insurance is endogenously deter-
mined via the relative price for liquidity. In this environment, we demonstrate how
nominal fluctuations affect not only the overall amount, but also the composition
of aggregate investment and the degree to which advanced investments are hedged
against liquidity risk. The direct consequence is an effect on aggregate productivity.
Next, we show that the proposed monetary transmission mechanism as well as the
model’s equilibrium implications for corporate liquidity holdings and the composi-
tion of physical investment are consistent with US industry-level and firm-level panel
data. Using industry-level data, we find that sectoral TFP-growth responds more
sensitively to nominal fluctuations (i) in more volatile sectors and (ii) in sectors
that are characterized by a relatively high historical TFP-growth. From firm-level
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data, we infer that investments in superior technologies, proxied by firm-level R&D
expenses, (i) decline if the level of inflation or nominal interest rates increases and
(ii) are positively related to corporate liquidity holdings. We regard these empirical
findings as strongly supportive of our proposed transmission mechanism.
On the basis of numerical exercises we infer that monetary policy shocks can
account for a significant proportion of the variations in TFP. In fact, the benchmark
calibration of our model implies that some 17% of the variability in aggregate pro-
ductivity can be attributed to monetary shocks. Consequently, our findings suggest
that the role of monetary policy shocks for macroeconomic fluctuations has been un-
derestimated. While the present paper’s focus is on the business cycle implications
of the investment-composition driven effects of monetary shocks, both the empirical
analysis of US aggregate data and the analysis of our model indicate that also higher
steady state rates of inflation have adverse implications on the evolution of TFP. In
a companion paper, Evers, Niemann and Schiffbauer (2007), we therefore elaborate
on the endogenous growth implications of our proposed transmission mechanism
and, using country-level panel data, identify a robust negative causal effect of in-
flation on long-run TFP-growth. Our explanation is that inflation acts as a tax on
the provision of liquidity to the corporate sector and thereby affects not only the
capital accumulation decision, but also the technology choice decision which shapes
the evolution of aggregate productivity.53
On more general grounds, the striking empirical evidence of a negative causal in-
fluence of monetary variables (inflation and nominal interest rates, respectively) on
both short-run fluctuations and long-run growth rates of TFP fundamentally ques-
tions the orthodox modelling strategy of treating money supply shocks and shocks to
aggregate technology, identified as a residual category labelled TFP, as orthogonal.54
Against this background, there is a need for more theoretical and empirical work
in order to better understand the implications of compositional variations in the
utilization of production factors and their dependence on nominal macroeconomic
conditions. In the present paper, we have stressed one relevant margin; complemen-
tary issues relating to government policies other than monetary policy as well as to
the market environment in which (heterogenous) firms dynamically interact deserve
particular attention.
53Compare Erosa (2001) for a similar argument.
54Implicitly, this insight already underlies the work by Fischer (1993).
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Table 3.1: US aggregate quarterly and yearly data: Inflation & TFP-growth
unrestricted VAR
quarterly yearly quarterly yearly
dependent variable: TFP-growth dependent variable: inflation
L.TFP-growth -.0656 .0806 L.TFP-growth -.0572 -1.20∗∗
(-.56) (.22) (-.93) (-2.22)
L.inflation -.1761∗∗ -.2399∗∗∗ L.inflation .8486∗∗∗ .8760∗∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.76) (20.68) (6.81)
L.GDP-growth -.0727 -.2582 L.GDP-growth .0382 1.24∗∗∗
(-.81) (-1.12) (.82) (3.64)
L.inv-share -.1000∗∗∗ -.0231 L.inv-share .0289 -.1244
(-2.61) (-.13) (1.45) (-.46)
dependent variable: GDP-growth dependent variable: inv-share
L.TFP-growth -.6108∗∗∗ .6148 L.TFP-growth -.5447∗∗∗ .5393
(-4.00) (0.92) (-5.37) (1.30)
L.inflation -.2238∗∗ -.2596 L.inflation .0543 .0473
(-2.19) (-1.62) (.80) (.48)
L.GDP-growth .6053∗∗∗ -.3055 L.GDP-growth .5528∗∗∗ -.0866
(5.23) (-.72) (7.19) (-.33)
L.inv-share -.1335∗∗∗ -.0479 L.inv-share .8149∗∗∗ .5862∗∗∗
(-2.69) (-.14) (24.72) (2.83)
Granger causality test
quarterly yearly quarterly yearly
dependent variable: TFP-growth dependent variable: inflation
inflation 0.025∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ TFP-growth 0.351 0.026∗∗
GDP-growth 0.415 0.262 GDP-growth 0.412 0.000∗∗∗
inv-share 0.009∗∗∗ 0.899 inv-share 0.147 0.643
dependent variable: GDP-growth dependent variable: inv-share
TFP-growth 0.000∗∗∗ 0.360 TFP-growth 0.000∗∗∗ 0.195
inflation 0.028∗∗ 0.105 inflation 0.423 0.634
inv-share 0.007∗∗∗ 0.886 GDP-growth 0.000∗∗∗ 0.742
Lag length selection criteria
quarterly 167 Observations AIC: 4. lag HQIC: 1. lag SBIC: 1. lag
yearly 30 Observations AIC: 1. lag HQIC: 1. lag SBIC: 1. lag
We exclusively report the effects on TFP-growth. Always include a constant. 1960:1 - 2001:4 quarterly
and 1970-2000 yearly data. Endogenous variables: inflation, GDP-growth, private investment share.
Heteroscedasticity-robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Test statistics are reported in p-values.
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Table 3.2: US aggregate yearly data: Inflation, corporate interest rates,
investment composition, corporate liquidity & TFP-growth
first stage1) first stage1)
TFP-growth R&D/assets TFP-growth liquidity/assets
OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS
R&D/assets 2.04∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗
(2.76) (2.92) (2.99)
liquidity/assets .7279∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.27∗
(2.53) (2.74) (1.94)
L.inflation -.0604∗∗∗ -.1643∗∗∗
(-3.20) (-3.07)
assets -.0045 -.0030 .0022∗∗∗ -.0040 -.0053 .0048∗∗
(-.96) (-.83) (2.71) (-.77) (-.98) (2.09)
oper. income -.0145 -.0023 .0050 -.0074 -.0005 .0015
(-.63) (-.16) (1.33) (-.73) (-.05) (.16)
long-debt .0273 .0108 -.0128∗∗∗ .0257 .0281 -.0277∗∗∗
(1.45) (.80) (-3.12) (1.19) (1.61) (-3.30)
inv-share .1792 .1083
(.89) (.61)
gov-share -1.61∗ -1.39
(-1.91) (-1.36)
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
1. serial-cor. .466 .464 .875 .219 .985 .495 .565 .065
2. serial-cor. .464 .503 .346 .328 .826 .318 .447 .620
Hansen-test - .694 .315 - - .742 .573 -
1) We exclusively show the results of the first stage regression for the first lag of inflation; the correlation coefficient
between inflation and corporate interest rates is 0.42.
Exog. variables (IVs): first and second lags of inflation and interest rates (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield).
Additional exogenous control variables in the 1. and 2. stage for robustness check:
corporate assets, corporate operating income, corporate long-run debt, corporate interest expenditures.
Heteroscedasticity-robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Null-hypothesis of well-specified model. Test statistics are reported in p-values.
Always include a constant. 1970 - 2000 yearly data.
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Table 3.3: US aggregate quarterly data: Inflation, corporate interest rates,
investment composition, corporate liquidity & TFP-growth
first stage1) first stage1)
TFP-growth R&D/assets TFP-growth liquidity/assets
OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS OLS GMM-IV GMM-IV OLS
R&D/assets .5308∗∗ .8768∗ 1.01∗
(2.22) (1.73) (1.81)
liquidity/assets -.0025 .0365 .0481
(-.04) (1.05) (1.26)
L.inflation -.1861∗∗∗ -2.95∗∗∗
(-2.87) (-4.08)
assets .0001 .0006 -.0002 .0001 -.0002 .0120∗∗∗
(.08) (.44) (-.51) (.04) (-.11) (2.87)
oper. income -.0096 -.0207∗ .0151∗∗∗ -.0034 -.0045 -.0223
(-.86) (-1.94) (3.71) (-.29) (-.47) (-.64)
long-debt .0010 .0006 -.0006 .0009 .0029 -.0692∗∗∗
(.18) (.10) (-.34) (.16) (.46) (-3.57)
inv-share -.0004 -.0001
(-.56) (-.13)
gov-share .0052 .0028
(.70) (.39)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
1. serial-cor. .303 .358 .331 .174 .551 .318 .325 .405
2. serial-cor. .869 .407 .369 .069 .930 .333 .646 .011
Hansen-test - .482 .555 - - .485 .490 -
1) We exclusively show the results of the first stage regression for the first lag of inflation; the correlation coefficient
between inflation and corporate interest rates is 0.55.
Exog. variables (IVs): first and second lags of inflation and interest rates (Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield).
Additional exogenous control variables in the 1. and 2. stage for robustness check:
corporate assets, corporate operating income, corporate long-run debt, corporate interest expenditures.
Heteroscedasticity-robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
Null-hypothesis of well-specified model. Test statistics are reported in p-values.
Always include a constant. 1960:1 - 2001:4 quarterly data.
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Table 3.4: Calibrated parameter values
β σ µ γ αk αz δ θ φ Ω χ η
0.98 2 0.167 0.0037 0.31 0.31 0.0112 0.25 12.5 0.95 1.26 0.97
ζ ρ ρa σa ρv σv ρav ρj σj b µξ σξ
0.73 1.66 0.79 0.0075 0.66 0.0111 0.67 0.35 0.0069 0.15 -0.75 0.75
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Table 3.6: Steady state values and selected contemporaneous correlations
Friedman rule mg∗ = (1 + γ) mg∗ = 1.0167 mg∗ = 1.05 mg∗ = 1.1 mg∗ = 1.2
Variable pi∗ = −2.42 pi∗ = 0.00 pi∗ = 1.31 pi∗ = 4.74 pi∗ = 10.11 pi∗ = 21.69
R˜− 1 0.0000 0.0248 0.0383 0.0734 0.1284 0.2471
z/k 0.1450 0.1413 0.1393 0.1344 0.1271 0.1132
d 0.0359 0.0336 0.0325 0.0297 0.0260 0.0197
d/y 0.0921 0.0897 0.0887 0.0857 0.0815 0.0730
d/(d+ θwL) 0.3700 0.3658 0.3637 0.3578 0.3497 0.3314
G 0.8414 0.8330 0.8285 0.8165 0.7975 0.7563
yz/yk 0.1537 0.1483 0.1455 0.1381 0.1276 0.1077
T 0.9712 0.9672 0.9650 0.9593 0.9506 0.9321
ρ(R˜, T ) -0.49 -0.52 -0.53 -0.55 -0.57 -0.61
Statistics generated from simulated and Hodrick-Prescott filtered (smoothing parameter 1600) series
for the benchmark economy.
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Table 3.7: USA: Sectoral volatility and mean of growth in value added
Industries volatility ranking average growth ranking
Petroleum refineries 22.41135418 1 8.718858009 4
Non-ferrous metals 14.82056985 2 6.70920077 14
Iron and Steel 13.20761732 3 4.28101271 26
Wood products, except furniture 12.33161156 4 7.080945619 13
Professional & scientific equipment 11.82739193 5 9.520253349 3
Leather products 10.80728372 6 3.355740195 28
Industrial chemicals 9.80919931 7 6.565964224 17
Tobacco 9.466520079 8 9.765847611 2
Plastic products 9.047342577 9 11.40471846 1
Misc. petroleum and coal products 8.966026705 10 7.523389904 8
Transport equipment 8.93003486 11 6.708187212 15
Pottery, china, earthenware 8.753001453 12 6.344808742 18
Machinery, except electrical 8.447901686 13 7.217618028 11
Footwear, except rubber or plastic 7.94506906 14 0.592402327 29
Machinery, electric 7.771043776 15 7.865959786 6
Furniture, except metal 7.139279992 16 7.311662001 10
Paper and products 7.022639071 17 7.458034007 9
Other non-metallic mineral products 6.880040345 18 5.97226836 23
Textiles 6.602291836 19 5.229363677 25
Rubber products 6.212744352 20 5.399295643 24
Other manufacturing products 5.895932472 21 6.204043301 20
Glass and products 5.803579219 22 6.009918041 22
Wearing apparel, except footwear 5.515015898 23 3.865111854 27
Fabricated metal products 5.513984278 24 6.108224644 21
Total manufacturing 5.035217269 25 7.183158099 12
Printing and publishing 4.634205085 26 8.18032749 5
Beverages 4.122690753 27 6.238331092 19
Other chemicals 3.660652642 28 7.535671621 7
Food products 2.840748937 29 6.661717672 16
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Table 3.8: US sectoral yearly data:
Inflation-sensitivity with respect to volatility and mean of growth rate of value added
Growth rate of value added
full sample vol>med vol<med full sample full sample full sample full sample
inflation -.9632∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗ -.7390∗∗∗ -.8014∗∗∗ -.8107∗∗∗ -.8700∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(-4.20) (-2.69) (-5.83) (-3.84) (-3.73) (-3.51) (-4.25)
infl∗dvol -.3235∗ -.6167∗∗
(-1.65) (-2.58)
infl∗dmean -.1981 .2379
(-.97) (1.14)
GDP-growth 1.20∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(4.36) (2.67) (3.92) (4.36) (4.34) (4.36) (4.35)
L.GDP-growth -.7851∗∗∗ -.8938∗ -.6764∗∗∗ -.7851∗∗∗ -.7869∗∗∗ -.7839∗∗∗ -.7858∗∗∗
(-2.92) (-1.71) (-4.11) (-2.92) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.92)
credit -11.46∗∗∗ -15.01∗∗ -7.91∗∗∗ -11.46∗∗∗ -11.52∗∗∗ -11.42∗∗∗ -11.49∗∗∗
(-3.26) (-2.23) (3.86) (-3.26) (3.27) (3.52) (-3.27)
inv-share .5734∗∗ .8181 .3287 -.6305 .5734∗∗ .5720∗∗ .5741∗∗
(2.04) (1.55) (1.64) (2.04) (2.05) (2.03) (2.04)
Ind./Obs. 28/946 14/473 14/473 28/946 28/946 28/946 28/946
The correlation coefficient between the volatility- and mean rankings amounts to 0.23 (s.e. 0.03) according to
Spearman’s rank correlation test.
1963-2000 yearly data. Always include a constant. Heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust s.e.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 3.9: US firm-level quarterly data: Inflation, liquidity-holdings & R&D expenses
Corporate liquidity R&D expenses per firm
GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys1) GMM-sys GMM-sys1) GMM-sys
inflation -1.06 -.8556∗∗ -.4257 -11.74∗∗∗
(-1.10) (-2.08) (-1.01) (-2.81)
yield-corp-bonds -1.38∗∗ -.5967∗∗∗ -.3137
(-2.20) (-2.77) (-1.51)
corp. liquidity .0383∗∗∗ .0382∗∗∗
(2.73) (2.73)
assets .0138∗∗∗ .0138∗∗∗ .0129∗∗∗ .0091∗∗∗ .0129∗∗∗ .0091∗∗∗ .0015∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.62) (8.89) (5.01) (8.90) (5.01) (6.06)
spdrc -1.65
(-.79)
lag-dep.-var. .9013∗∗∗ .9012∗∗∗ -.0576 -.0783 -.0578 -.0785 -.0728∗∗
(14.77) (14.75) (-1.39) (-1.02) (-1.39) (-1.02) (-1.94)
Firms 5892 5892 6052 6052 6052 6052 425
Observations 115811 115811 121106 120730 121106 120730 7482
1. auto-cor. .998 .008 .012 .018 .012 .018 .007
2. auto-cor. .110 .110 .211 .140 .111 .140 .162
Hansen-test .464 .480 .125 .246 .113 .239 .697
1) The IV-matrix starts at the 4. lag since Hansen-test indicates that 2. and 3. lag endogenous.
Firm-level data on R&D expenses, corporate liquidity and total assets all measured in millions of US$.
1989:1-2000:4 quarterly data. Heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis.
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Table 3.10: US firm-level yearly data: Inflation, liquidity holdings and R&D expenses
Corporate liquidity R&D expenses per firm spdrc < 12 spdrc ≥ 12
GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-dif GMM-dif GMM-sys GMM-sys1) GMM-sys GMM-sys
inflation -1.38∗∗ -.4707∗ -.3764∗ -3.721∗ -22.514∗∗
(-2.32) (-1.73) (-1.68) (-1.72) (-2.16)
yield-corp-bonds -1.61∗∗ -.0366 .0889
(-2.34) (-.34) (.88)
corp. liquidity .0353∗∗∗ .0486∗∗∗
(4.15) (4.20)
assets .0230∗∗ .0231∗∗ .0035∗∗ .0021 .0007 -.0010 -.0014 -.0008
(2.23) (2.25) (2.18) (1.48) (-1.19) (-1.57) (-.74) (-.24)
spdrc -99.1 -439.3∗∗
(-1.24) (-2.09)
lag-dep.-var. .7361∗∗∗ .7357∗∗∗ .8504 .8237 1.01 .9462 .1.00 .9289
(7.73) (7.77) (19.08) (17.73) (29.43) (21.00) (14.69) (7.52)
Firms 10903 10923 9705 9703 9742 10925 378 492
Observations 83468 84277 72009 71981 84355 84314 6217 5194
1. auto-cor. .002 .002 .001 .002 .001 .001 .017 .182
2. auto-cor. .468 .488 .604 .554 .616 .533 .519 .474
Hansen-test .238 .260 - - .075 .267 221 .274
1) The IV-matrix starts at the 4. lag since Hansen-test indicates that 2. and 3. lag endogenous.
Firm-level data on R&D expenses, corporate liquidity and total assets all measured in millions of US$.
1970-2000 yearly data. Heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis.
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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Concluding Remarks
This dissertation contains three essays on monetary policy interactions with fiscal
policy and financial markets. The main theoretical and empirical results of this
endeavor have been summarized within the individual chapters. To conclude, it is
therefore useful to put the thesis as a whole into perspective. For that purpose,
it seems appropriate to briefly point out a number of limitations of the present
dissertation and, starting from there, to indicate directions for future research.
Importantly, the preceeding three chapters have been exclusively concerned with
closed economies, leaving aside many interesting open economy considerations.
These, in turn, are crucial in the context of the problem of international macro-
economic policy coordination. The policy interaction framework laid out in the first
two chapters of this thesis is a natural one to investigate such questions, particu-
larly when domestic and international frictions or incentive problems interact in a
non-trivial way.55 Against this background, a limitation of the bulk of the existing
literature on international policy coordination is that it abstracts from dynamics
in endogenous state variables such as capital stocks and net foreign asset portfo-
lios. Chapters one and two have illustrated the role of one such endogenous state
variable, the real value of outstanding government debt, in shaping the incentives
faced by sequential policy makers, but due to the focus on a closed economy, the
composition of the asset portfolios in terms of domestic versus foreign bonds held
by private agents was not an issue. In an international setup, however, agents
can endogenously choose their portfolios in view of the relevant assets’ payoffs and
their covariance characteristics with national policies and shocks. This adds an-
other dimension to both the determination of a competitive equilibrium for given
government policies and to the problem of implementing optimal policies taking into
account this endogenous portfolio choice.56 In terms of both normative results and
55Rogoff (1985a) shows that the international coordination of monetary policy may be counter-
productive because it aggravates domestic credibility problems; Kehoe (1989) establishes the same
result for fiscal policies; conversely, in highlighting policy makers’ incentives to manipulate the
terms of trade, Cooley and Quadrini (2003) argue that giving up monetary independence may be
welfare improving despite the loss of country-specific stabilization instruments.
56Compare Smith (1995) for some empirical evidence as well as Cooper, Kempf and Peled (2004)
and Devereux and Sutherland (2007) for partial analyses along these lines.
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positive predictions, it would therefore be interesting to learn what an optimal tax-
ation approach implies for international risk sharing, asset portfolio dynamics and
other issues in international finance.
Returning to a closed economy framework, given that the analysis in chapters one
and two has been confined to a relatively rudimentary deterministic environment,
it is desirable to study the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal policy
makers in empirically more plausible setups. These would allow for capital accumu-
lation, imperfect competition on goods and factor markets, nominal rigidities as well
as uncertainty deriving from a set of stochastic shocks. In such a framework, little is
known about optimal time consistent (as opposed to Ramsey) policies in general and
about the implications of decentralizing decision authority to interacting authorities
in particular. Thus, the analysis of the cyclical properties of key macroeconomic
variables like government debt and inflation induced via the sequential choice of
monetary and fiscal policy instruments is an open task.
On different grounds, we notice that chapter three addresses a particular fi-
nancial market imperfection, but does neither attempt to provide a comprehensive
account along this dimension nor touch upon frictions prevailing in other impor-
tant markets such as the labor market. Certainly, labor market frictions are an
important determinant of an economy’s aggregate productivity. Hence, a better
understanding of the joint implications of these frictions and the conduct of macro-
economic policies for economic performance is critical, particularly if imperfections
catalyze spillovers between financial and labor markets.57 Another simplification in
the modelling approach taken in chapter three has been to boil down the implications
of heterogeneity across entrepreneurial firms. In the presence of financial frictions,
firm characteristics such as net worth are an important determinant of corporate
activity. In considering a sequence of period-by-period financial contracts rather
than a dynamic specification of the contracting problem, chapter three has largely
abstracted from the effects of monetary policy on the dynamics among heteroge-
nous, financially constrained firms. Cooley and Quadrini (2006) present a model
featuring such dynamic interactions between monetary policy, financial contract-
ing and firm dynamics, which could provide a valuable starting point for thinking
about the effects of monetary policy on firms’ financial structure, their accumulation
decisions with respect to technology-specific capital and their capacity utilization.
In this context, the empirical part of this thesis has offered only a very superficial
analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism and of other salient business cycle
phenomena and thus made only a marginal contribution to this branch of the lit-
erature; elaborating along this dimension, e.g. by means of vector autoregressions,
would therefore be desirable.
There is no doubt that these ignored issues constitute important and interesting
57This latter aspect has been stressed e.g. in Wasmer and Weil (2004).
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avenues for future research. Nevertheless, at this stage, rather than enumerating
further potential extensions, it seems more fruitful to hint at a set of connections
which link the seemingly disjoint questions underlying the first two versus the third
chapter of this dissertation. Chapters one and two emphasize a time consistency
problem for monetary policy in the presence of nominal government debt. In this
environment, the mechanics are such that the incentives faced by the policy maker
to improve upon the second best allocation render the Ramsey equilibrium unattain-
able and lead to a third best outcome. It turns out that the model in chapter three
allows for very similar effects as soon as monetary policy is endogenized. Indeed,
given the result established there that monetary policy is non-neutral with respect
to aggregate productivity, it is natural to ask the following question: Can a cycli-
cally responsive policy, which provides additional liquidity when production via the
advanced technology is particularly valuable, successfully stabilize the economy? In
other words, what are the implications of the monetary authority adopting an ac-
tive liquidity management policy? The results (not reported here) emerging from
the model simulation under an exogenously stipulated active liquidity management
policy indicate that there are hazards attached to such a policy in that (i) the com-
position of aggregate activity is inferior than absent active liquidity management,
and that (ii) the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates is increased. These findings
are most straightforwardly understood as resulting from the following mechanism
which propagates a shock to the relative attractiveness of producing by means of
the advanced technology, say a positive one: Under an active liquidity manage-
ment regime, monetary policy should react by a money injection. On impact, this
expansion generates a liquidity effect which indeed facilitates better insurance of
production via the advanced technology. However, due to the systematic reaction of
monetary policy, the autocorrelation in the technology-specific shocks induces a cor-
responding autocorrelation also in money growth rates; hence, rational expectations
dictate an increase in the following periods’ nominal interest rates. This, in turn,
triggers an adverse investment composition effect and also a poorer insurance of
advanced production projects. As hinted above, the overall effect is an inferior com-
position of aggregate activity, combined with an increase in the realized volatility of
macroeconomic aggregates.
Taking this idea one step further requires making monetary policy truly endoge-
nous in the sense of deriving monetary policy actions as resulting from an explicit
dynamic optimization problem. Against the background of the findings for the
exogenous active liquidity management regime, we conjecture that, under optimal
monetary policy without commitment, there is scope for expectation traps: The pol-
icy maker’s incentive to improve the allocation by providing additional liquidity is
anticipated by the private agents, which induces them to shift their physical invest-
ment and financial asset portfolios towards basic technologies and non-intermediated
130
cash balances, respectively. This adverse constellation, in turn, makes the antici-
pated monetary expansion indeed a best response on behalf of the policy maker
and may give rise to multiple fixed points between private expectations and optimal
policies, conditional on these expectations. Then, besides a low inflation equilibrium
with a favorable investment composition, there would exist a high inflation equilib-
rium with a poor investment composition and low aggregate productivity.58 This
multiple equilibria framework facilitates to formally think about a number of inter-
esting empirical phenomena, especially if the composition of past investments has
an effect on the evolution of aggregate productivity, as stressed in the endogenous
growth model in Evers, Niemann and Schiffbauer (2007).
Finally, the (potential) importance of government debt constitutes another nexus
between the individual chapters of this dissertation. While this is explicit in the
strategic optimal taxation setup of the first two chapters where a measure of the
real value of public liabilities is the key state variable, government-issued bonds can
also play a central role as a means of providing and managing aggregate liquidity in
the context of the economy outlined in the third chapter. Basically, government debt
can fulfill the function of insuring advanced production in a similar way as liquidity
in the form of intermediated money.59 One objective then would be to meaningfully
distinguish between money and bonds as instruments for liquidity provision; an in-
teresting question concerns the substitution between money and (short-term) bonds
over the business cycle and particularly in the context of monetary policy operations.
Again, two recurring characteristics of government debt are important here: First,
even though nominal government bonds are not generally issued as explicitly state
contingent, their returns can be made state contingent in real terms via manipula-
tion of the price level. Second, while inflation may therefore be a way to manage
aggregate liquidity, the fiscal dimension of government debt is likely to bring time
consistency problems back to the stage; the induced distortions in nominal interest
58This is reminiscent of the findings in Albanesi, Chari and Kehoe (2003). Notice also that
the low inflation equilibrium would be characterized by a liquidity trap in the sense that financial
markets do not absorb additional liquidity, thus leaving intact the policy maker’s incentive to
abstain from a monetary expansion.
59The role of public debt as private liquidity for consumption and investment problems is ad-
dressed in Woodford (1990). Against this background, Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) are concerned
with the following agenda: First, do private markets offer sufficient insurance opportunities, or will
the government have a role to play? Rephrased in terms of liquidity: Do private claims on real
investments supply enough liquidity, or can the government enhance liquidity by issuing its own
securities? Second, if so, then how should the government manage aggregate liquidity? The answer
to the first question is that, under incomplete markets, the presence of securities issued by the gov-
ernment can generally improve upon the competitive equilibrium allocation available to the private
sector on its own. The reason for this lies in the fact that, because of its right to levy non-financial
penalties and to collect taxes, the government can create assets which the private sector cannot
replicate due to information or incentive problems. The answer to the last question very much
depends on the assumptions regarding the government’s access to information and commitment.
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rates would then also impinge on the liquidity premium. These issues are also of in-
terest from the perspective of a corporate finance-based approach to asset pricing.60
The key mechansim there is a feedback from the supply of assets to real allocations,
which makes asset prices become sensitive to the supply of liquidity by the corporate
sector and the government. Within this environment, an interesting observation is
that the price of government bonds does not only command a risk premium, but
also a liquidity premium. Hence, liquidity-constrained models might constitute a
valuable framework to explain both the non-neutrality of government deficits over
short and long horizons and the equity premium puzzle, i.e. the persistently low
returns on bonds relative to other assets.
60Holmstro¨m and Tirole (2001) provide a model along these lines, advocating a liquidity-based
concept with supply-side mechanisms in the productive sector to complement the traditional
consumption-based asset pricing models.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Some notation
The aggregate state is zg ≡ Bg(1+R)
Mg
; in the rational expectations equilibrium, the
representative household’s state z and the aggregate state zg coincide, so in what
follows the supersript g is dropped. The current policy rule, which consists of a
fiscal and a monetary rule for the present period, is pi(z) = (pif (z), pim(z)). The
future policy rule, which consists of a fiscal and a monetary rule from the next
period onwards, is ϕ(z) = (ϕf (z), ϕm(z)). We abuse notation by letting the policy
rules map the aggregate state either into the true policy instruments (τ c,M ′) or
alternatively - the primal approach - directly into the allocation (c, z′).
A.2 Objective functions and implementability
constraint
Making a primal approach to the dynamic game operational requires a number of
substitutions which make use of the private equilibrium conditions (1.7), (1.8) and
(1.9). Both authorities’ value functions can be constructed directly from the allo-
cation. The authorities’ preferences over allocations are identical; however, due to
the different dynamic constraints faced by them, we have to distinguish between
two distinct value functions. It is convenient to start from the problem faced by the
authorities when they assume that (i) the policy rule ϕ will govern the play from the
next period onwards and that (ii) the current policy choice by the respective oppo-
nent (in terms of the true policy instrument) is pi−i. Then, for the fiscal authority,
we have:
Vˆ (z; pi, ϕ) = maxpif{[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + βV (z′;ϕ)}
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For the monetary authority, one obtains:
Wˆ (z; pi, ϕ) = maxpim{[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + βW (z′;ϕ)}
For these value functions to make sense, they must be amended by the appropriate
dynamic constraints. In their respective maximization problems, both authorities
are constrained by a sequence of implementability constraints which internalize the
fact that the private households react optimally to the government policies. We
construct these implementability constraints by substituting the private equilibrium
conditions (1.7), (1.8) and (1.9) into the consoldiated government budget constraint
(1.1). A complication which arises as a consequence of decision authority over
policies being decentralized is that each authority’s constraint depends on the policy
implemented by its contemporaneous opponent. This problem is taken care of via the
consistency condition (1.15) which is constructed from the private sector optimality
conditions (1.8) and (1.9) together with the CIA constraints (1.7) for two adjacent
periods:
c(1 + τ c)
M ′
M
= c(1 + τ c)(1 + µ) =
β
α
,
where the first equality simply employs the definition (1 + µ) ≡ M ′
M
. Making use
of above consistency condition, the substitution of the private equilibrium condi-
tions into the consolidated government budget constraint yields two distinct imple-
mentability constraints. For the fiscal authority, we have:
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′
(1 + µ(z′))
− c− β
α
z
(1 + µ)
= 0 (A.1)
For the monetary authority, we have:
β
α
− g + βz′c(z′)(1 + τ c(z′))− c− zc(1 + τ c) = 0 (A.2)
Note that in both cases the implementability constraint’s job is twofold: First, for
a given value of the policy instrument chosen by the other authority, it imposes a
joint restriction on compatible choices of c and z′; secondly, since the feasible set is
contingent on the policy instrument chosen by the other authority, it establishes a
one-to-one mapping between the own policy instrument and the implemented allo-
cation (c, z′). However, note that there is an asymmetry in the two equations: In the
implementability constraint (A.1) faced by the fiscal authority, the choice variable c
appears without cofactor; in contrast, in the monetary authority’s implementability
constraint (A.2), it is scaled up by the cofactor [1 + z(1 + τ c)]. This reflects the
fact that the fiscal authority’s current policy choice has no direct influence on the
contemporaneous price level P , whereas monetary policy, by manipulating the price
level, can also affect the real value of the outstanding stock of government liabilities.
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A.3 Existence of Markov-perfect equilibrium
A.3.1 Preliminaries
We define the following two subsets of C(I), the Banach space of bounded continuous
functions defined on a compact subset I ⊂ R:
1. The effective strategy space of stationary Markov strategies (policy functions)
for the two players i = f,m mapping the current state into the space of
admissible actions Ai = [a
i
min, a
i
max]:
LCMKi ≡ {ϕi : I → [aimin, aimax],∀z1, z2 ∈ I, z1 ≤ z2 have
0 ≤ ϕi(z2)− ϕi(z1) ≤ Ki(z2 − z1) for some finite Ki ∈ R+}
This is the familiy of uniformly Lipschitz-continuous monotone nondecreasing
functions; since this set of functions is closed, bounded and equicontinuous,
by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem LCMKi is a compact subset of C(I).
2. The corresponding space of value functions when the players i = f,m use
strategies in LCMKi :
CM i ≡ {v : I → R, v continuous and nonincreasing}
This is the family of continuous, monotone nonincreasing, bounded functions;
under the sup-metric d(f, g) = supx∈I |f(x)− g(x)| induced by the supremum
norm, CM i is a closed subset of C(I) and thus a complete metric space.
Moreover, a couple of preliminary results are made use of. Specifically, considering
the consistency condition (1.15):
c(1 + τ c)
M ′
M
= c(1 + τ c)(1 + µ) =
β
α
and recalling the restrictions τ cmin(z) > −1 and M ′min(z) > 0 on the admissible
actions, the following results can be inferred:
• From the consistency condition (1.15), given a monetary policy function
M ′(z) ∈ LCMKm , c is continuous and nonincreasing in τ c. Since M ′ is
bounded away from 0 and τ c is bounded away from −1, conditional on some
M ′(z) ∈ LCMKm we have:∣∣∣∣ ∂c∂τ c
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣−βα MM ′ 1(1 + τ c)2
∣∣∣∣ <∞,
i.e. c is Lipschitz-continuous in τ c. It is now immediate to verify that,
conditional on a monetary policy function M ′(z) ∈ LCMKm , c(τ c)(1 + τ c)
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is Lipschitz-continuous in τ c. Using this last result in (1.15), given that
M ′(z) ∈ LCMKm , it follows that c(τ c)(1 + τ c) must be Lipschitz-continuous
in z. Finally, since c is Lipschitz-continuous in τ c, τ c itself must be Lipschitz-
continuous in z. For future reference, we define K(z) ≡ c(τ c(z))(1 + τ c(z)).
• From the consistency condition (1.15), given a fiscal policy function τ c(z) ∈
LCMKf , c is continuous and nonincreasing in M
′. Since M ′ is bounded away
from 0 and τ c is bounded away from −1, conditional on some τ c(z) ∈ LCMKf
we have: ∣∣∣∣ ∂c∂M ′
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣−βα 1(1 + τ c) M(M ′)2
∣∣∣∣ <∞,
i.e. c is Lipschitz-continuous in M ′. It is now immediate to verify that, con-
ditional on a fiscal policy function τ c(z) ∈ LCMKf , c(M ′)M ′ is Lipschitz-
continuous in M ′. Using this last result in (1.15), given that τ c(z) ∈ LCMKf ,
it follows that c(M ′)M ′ must be Lipschitz-continuous in z. Finally, since c is
Lipschitz-continuous in M ′, M ′ itself must be Lipschitz-continuous in z. Since
M is a given constant andM ′ is bounded away from 0, also 1
(1+µ)
= 1
M ′/M must
be Lipschitz-continuous in z. For future reference, we define H(z) ≡ 1
(1+µ(z))
.
• From the consistency condition (1.15), it follows that K(z) and H(z) must
obey the same Lipschitz constant.
A.3.2 Proof
The proof is adapted from Amir (1996) and delivers an existence result based on the
following structure. The first step (Lemmata A.4, A.5) is to postulate a particular
conjecture that player i = f,m holds about its respective opponent’s play. In par-
ticular, the conjectures are chosen such as to guarantee the concavity of the relevant
optimization problems. The next step (Lemmata A.8, A.9) is to infer the properties
of the players’ best responses derived on the basis of their conjectures about the
other one’s play and to verify that the derived best responses and the conjectures
that induce them are mutually consistent. Hence, the system of conjectures and
best responses constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Existence of such an equilibrium is
established via the Schauder fixed point theorem. The following proposition simply
restates Proposition 1.1 from the main text and further characterizes the equilibrium
strategies.
Proposition A.1 The infinite-horizon game has a (differentiable) Markov-perfect
equilibrium in stationary strategies. These strategies are elements of LCMKf ×
LCMKm.
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To prove the proposition, we begin with the following auxiliary Lemma:
Lemma A.1 Let fn, f : I → R. If fn converges uniformly to f on any compact
subset of I, xn ∈ argmax fn and x is a limit point of {xn}, the subsequence {xm}
being convergent to x, then:
f(x) = sup f = limm→∞(sup fm).
Proof: See Kall (1986).
We can now establish the following Lemmata:
Lemma A.2 In the optimization problem for the fiscal authority, if the monetary
authority uses a stationary strategy h ∈ LCMKm such that zH(z) nondecreasing,
then Vh ∈ CM f and Vh is the unique solution to the functional equation:
Vh(z) = maxτc{log(c(τ c))− α(c(τ c) + g) + βVh(z′) (A.3)
s.t.
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′H(z′)− c(τ c)− β
α
zH(z) = 0}
Proof: Define the map T : CM f → CM f by:
T (v)(z) = sup{log(c(τ c))− α(c(τ c) + g) + βv(z′) (A.4)
s.t. z′H(z′) =
c(τ c) + β
α
zH(z) + g − β
α
β β
α
}
First, we show that T indeed maps CM f into itself. To this end, we start by
proving that the supremand in (A.4) is continuous in (z, τ c). Let zn → z and
τ cn → τ c and note from above result that, given h(z) ∈ LCMKm , we have (i) that
znH(zn) → zH(z) and (ii) that c(τ c) is continuous in τ c. Hence, the RHS of the
constraint set is continuous in (z, τ c); it follows that z′nH(z
′
n) → z′H(z′). Since
H(z′) is continuous in z′, we have z′n → z′; and since v ∈ CM f , v(z′n) → v(z′).
The feasible set for τ c, Af , is a continuous correspondence that is nonempty and
compact. Hence, by the theorem of the maximum, T (v) is continuous. Next, we
show that T (v) is nonincreasing. Let z2 ≥ z1. Then, for any given τ c, since zH(z)
is nondecreasing, we have z′2 ≥ z′1, where z′n solves z′nH(z′n) = c(τ
c)+ β
α
znH(zn)+g− βα
β β
α
,
n = 1, 2. Thus, since v ∈ CM f :
log(c(τ c))− α(c(τ c) + g) + βv(z′1) ≥ log(c(τ c))− α(c(τ c) + g) + βv(z′2)
Since T (v)(z1) is the sup of the LHS over τ
c ∈ Af (z1), T (v)(z2) is the sup of the
RHS over τ c ∈ Af (z2), and since Af (z2) ⊂ Af (z1), we have T (v)(z1) ≥ T (v)(z2), i.e.
T (v) is nonincreasing. Hence, T maps CM f into itself. Since CM f is a complete
metric space, it is now easy to verify that T is a contraction with a unique fixed
point Vh ∈ CM f that satisfies (A.3).
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Lemma A.3 In the optimization problem for the monetary authority, if the fiscal
authority uses a stationary strategy k ∈ LCMKf such that zK(z) nondecreasing,
then Wk ∈ CMm and Wk is the unique solution to the functional equation:
Wk(z) = maxM ′{log(c(M ′))− α(c(M ′) + g) + βWk(z′) (A.5)
s.t. z′K(z′) =
c(M ′) + zc(M ′)(1 + τ c(z)) + g − β
α
β
}
Proof: As for Lemma A.2.
We now establish that, if each of the two authorities has an appropriate conjec-
ture about its respective opponent’s play, then the value functions derived on the
basis of these conjectures are strictly concave. The detour involving specific conjec-
tures about the other player’s strategy is needed because in general deterministic
games with simultaneous moves, the players’ best response optimization problems
may fail to be concave due to the presence of the other player’s strategy that has
to be taken into account. Under appropriate conjectures, the simultaneity of moves
does not introduce such non-concavities. Later, Lemmata A.8, A.9 will establish
that the assumed conjectures are consistent with the actual play.
Lemma A.4 If the fiscal authority has a conjecture about the play h of the sequence
of monetary authorities such that zH(z) nondecreasing and convex, then the fiscal
value function Vh is strictly concave.
Proof: Conditional on some conjecture h, the fiscal authority faces a problem
with solution (A.3). In this problem, the state space I is convex, the constraint
set Γ(z) = {c : Z¯H(Z¯) ≥ z′H(z′) = c+
β
α
zH(z)+g− β
α
β β
α
} is non-empty, compact-valued
and continuous, and the period return log(c) − α(c + g) is strictly concave in c.
Now, we show that, if the fiscal authority has a conjecture h that stipulates zH(z)
nondecreasing and convex, then Γ(z) is convex. Let cn ∈ Γ(zn) attain T (v)(zn)
in (A.4), n = 1, 2; let zθ = θz1 + (1 − θ)z2. Then, one can easily verify that
cθ = θc1 + (1− θ)c2 ∈ Γ(zθ) if zH(z) is nondecreasing and convex. That is, Γ(z) is
convex if zH(z) is nondecreasing and convex. Having established the convexity of
Γ(z), all assumptions of Theorem 4.8 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) are satisfied, and
the strict concavity of Vh follows.
Lemma A.5 If the monetary authority has a conjecture about the play k of the
sequence of fiscal authorities such that (i) z(1 + τ c(z)) is nondecreasing and (ii)
zK(z) is nondecreasing and convex, then the monetary value function Wk is strictly
concave.
Proof: As for Lemma A.4.
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Lemma A.6 Under the assumptions of Lemma A.4, if the monetary authority uses
a stationary strategy h ∈ LCMKm, then there is a unique stationary best response k
by the fiscal authority.
Proof: We show that for any z ∈ I the maximand in (A.3) is a strictly concave
function of c(τ c). It is easy to verify that the first term, log(c(τ c)) − α(c(τ c) + g),
is strictly concave in c. As to the second term, fix any feasible c1, c2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]
and observe:
λVh
(
c1 +
β
α
zH(z) + g − β
α
β β
α
H(z′1)
)
+ (1− λ)Vh
(
c2 +
β
α
zH(z) + g − β
α
β β
α
H(z′2)
)
≤ Vh
(
λ
c1 +
β
α
zH(z) + g − β
α
β β
α
H(z′1)
+ (1− λ)c2 +
β
α
zH(z) + g − β
α
β β
α
H(z′2)
)
,
where the weak inequality follows from the fact that, under the conditions of Lemma
A.4, Vh is concave. Since for any given z and stationary h(z) ∈ LCMKm , the feasible
set Γ(z) for c is convex and (by the compactness of the set of admissible choices τ c)
compact, there is a unique argmax (in terms of c) for (A.3). From the consistency
condition (1.15), for a given M ′(z), there is a one-to-one mapping between c and τ c;
hence, the result carries over to τ c and we have a unique stationary best response
by the fiscal authority.
Lemma A.7 Under the assumptions of Lemma A.5, if the fiscal authority uses a
stationary strategy k ∈ LCMKf , then there is a unique stationary best response h
by the monetary authority.
Proof: As for Lemma A.6.
Lemma A.8 Under the assumptions of Lemma A.4, if the monetary strategy is a
stationary h ∈ LCMKm, then the fiscal authority’s unique stationary best response
k, which gives τ c as a function of the state z, is in LCMKf . Moreover, k is such
that (i) z(1 + τ c(z)) is nondecreasing and (ii) zK(z) is nondecreasing and convex.
Proof: From Lemma A.6, we know that k is single-valued. First, we show
that k is nondecreasing. To this end, we establish two auxiliary results: (i) the set
L = {(zH(z), τ c) : zH(z) ≤ Z¯H(Z¯), τ c ∈ A˜f (zH(z)) = [τ cmin(zH(z)), τ cmax(zH(z))]}
is a lattice; and (ii) Vh is supermodular on L; compare e.g. Vives (1999).
To establish (i), it is sufficient to note that τ cmin(z) and τ
c
max(z) are both nonde-
creasing in z and, since zH(z) is nondecreasing in z, also in zH(z). The fact that
L is a lattice follows immediately.
To establish (ii), we show the equivalent result that Vh has nondecreasing differ-
ences in (zH(z), τ c) ∈ L and start from the result (Lemma A.4) that Vh is concave.
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Fix z2 ≥ z1 and τ c2 ≥ τ c1 with τ cmin(zn) ≤ τ cn ≤ τ cmax(zn), n = 1, 2. Define z′ab to be
the solution to z′abH(z
′
ab) =
c(τca)+
β
α
zbH(zb)+g− βα
β β
α
. From the fact that c(τ c) is decreasing
in τ c and zH(z) is nondecreasing in z, it then follows that:
z′12H(z
′
12) ≥ z′nnH(z′nn) ≥ z′21H(z′21),
where the sum of the two outer terms is equal to the sum of the two inner terms.
Hence, there exists λ with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 such that:
z′11H(z
′
11) = λz
′
12H(z
′
12) + (1− λ)z′21H(z′21)
and:
z′22H(z
′
22) = (1− λ)z′12H(z′12) + λz′21H(z′21)
Now, using the concavity of Vh on the two expression above, we have:
Vh (z
′
11H(z
′
11)) + Vh (z
′
22H(z
′
22))
≥ λVh (z′12H(z′12)) + (1− λ)Vh (z′21H(z′21)) + (1− λ)Vh (z′12H(z′12)) + λVh (z′21H(z′21))
= Vh (z
′
12H(z
′
12)) + Vh (z
′
21H(z
′
21)) ,
which implies that Vh has nondecreasing differences in (zH(z), τ
c) ∈ L, i.e. Vh is
supermodular on L.
Now, we have the following: From (i), the correspondence zH(z) →
[τ cmin(zH(z)), τ
c
max(zH(z))] is ascending because τ
c
min(zH(z)) and τ
c
max(zH(z)) are
nondecreasing; from (ii), Vh is supermodular on L. Hence, by Topkis’ theorem, the
fiscal best response k is nondecreasing in zH(z) and, since zH(z) is nondecreasing
in z, also in z, i.e. in case of a differentiable τ c(z), ∂τ
c
∂z
≥ 0. Next, we show that
the slope of k must be bounded by some Lipschitz constant Kf ∈ R+. To this end,
consider the consistency condition (1.15):
c(1 + τ c)
M ′
M
=
β
α
Here, given M ′ ∈ LCMKm , we have established earlier that τ c must be Lipschitz-
continuous in z. Hence, there is a finite Kf such that the fiscal best response
τ c ∈ LCMKf . Finally, we verify that (i) z(1 + τ c(z)) is nondecreasing which is an
immediate implication of the fact that τ c(z) is nondecreasing, and that (ii) zK(z)
is nondecreasing and convex. This last result follows from the consistency condition
(1.15) which can be multiplied by z and rearranged to read zc(τ c(z))(1 + τ c(z)) =
β
α
z
(1+µ(z))
or zK(z) = β
α
zH(z). Here, since zH(z) is nondecreasing and convex, the
desired properties obtain also for zK(z).
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Lemma A.9 Under the assumptions of Lemma A.5, if the fiscal strategy is a sta-
tionary k ∈ LCMKf , then the monetary authority’s unique stationary best response
h, which gives M ′ as a function of the state b, is in LCMKm. Moreover, h is such
that zH(z) is nondecreasing and convex.
Proof: As for Lemma A.8.
Note that the properties of the fiscal best response k derived in Lemma A.8
are consistent with the supposition in Lemma A.5 about the monetary authority’s
conjecture with respect to the fiscal authority’s play k. Similarly, the properties
of the monetary best response h derived in Lemma A.9 are consistent with the
supposition in Lemma A.4 about the fiscal authority’s conjecture with respect to
the monetary authority’s play h. Hence, the system of conjectures and induced
best responses is mutually consistent.
We are now ready to define the best response map BR for the infinite-horizon
game. Note that, as a consequence of Lemmata A.8 and A.9, BR is single-valued.
We have:
BR : LCMKf × LCMKm → LCMKf × LCMKm
(τ c(z),M ′(z)) → (τ˜ c(z), M˜ ′(z)),
where:
Vh(z) = log(c(τ˜
c(z)))− α(c(τ˜ c(z)) + g) + βVh
(
c(τ˜ c(z)) + β
α
zH(z) + g − β
α
β β
α
H(z′)
)
with H(z) ≡ 1
(1+µ(z))
, and:
Wk(b) = log(c(M˜
′(b)))− α(c(M˜ ′(b)) + g) + βWk
(
c(M˜ ′) + zc(M˜ ′)(1 + τ c(z)) + g − β
α
βK(z′)
)
with K(z) ≡ c(τ c(z))(1 + τ c(z)).
We endow LCMKi with the topology of uniform convergence on compact subsets
of I = [Z, Z¯]. The resulting topological space is denoted by LCMKi as well.
Lemma A.10 Under the assumptions of Lemma A.4 and Lemma A.5, BR is a
continuous map from LCMKf × LCMKm to itself.
Proof: We show continuity separately along each coordinate. First, consider
M ′ → τ˜ c. Note that asM ′ varies in LCMKm , by Lemma A.8, the possible fiscal best
responses are in LCMKf and thus form an equicontinuous family. Hence, pointwise
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and uniform convergence are equivalent for the possible τ˜ c’s. Now, let M ′n → M ′
uniformly and suppose τ˜ cn → τ˜ c uniformly. Note that the latter supposition is
without loss of generality since one can pass to a subsequence if necessary, which is
valid because the range of BR is compact by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem. We must
now show that τ˜ c is indeed the best response to M ′. To this end, consider Vhn , the
maximal value to the fiscal authority associated with a given monetary policy rule
M ′n(z):
Vhn(z) = maxτcn
{
log(c(τ cn,M
′
n(z)))− α(c(τ cn,M ′n(z)) + g) + βVhn
(
c(τ cn,M
′
n(z)) +
β
αzHn(z) + g − βα
β βαHn(z
′)
)}
=
{
log(c(τ˜ cn,M
′
n(z)))− α(c(τ˜ cn,M ′n(z)) + g) + βVhn
(
c(τ˜ cn,M
′
n(z)) +
β
αzHn(z) + g − βα
β βαHn(z
′)
)}
(A.6)
Here, since M ′n ∈ LCMKm , by Lemma A.2 Vhn ∈ CM f . Hence, without loss of
generality, we can assume that {Vhn} has a subsequence that converges pointwise to
a limit Vh, where Vh is nonincreasing, but possibly discontinuous. To complete the
proof, we must show that Vh satisfies:
Vh(z) = maxτc
{
log(c(τ c,M ′(z)))− α(c(τ c,M ′(z)) + g) + βVh
(
c(τ c,M ′(z)) + βαzH(z) + g − βα
β βαH(z
′)
)}
=
{
log(c(τ˜ c,M ′(z)))− α(c(τ˜ c,M ′(z)) + g) + βVh
(
c(τ˜ c,M ′(z)) + βαzH(z) + g − βα
β βαH(z
′)
)}
(A.7)
If this is the case, we can also conclude that Vh is continuous since, by Lemma A.2, if
h ∈ LCMKm , then Vh ∈ CM f . To proceed with the proof, we need to establish that,
for a fixed z, the maximand in (A.6) converges uniformly in τ c to the maximand in
(A.7) and then invoke Lemma A.1. Thus, for any fixed z, define the value of the
respective maximands as a function of the control τ c:1
V˜ zhn(τ
c) ≡
{
log(c(τ c,M ′n(z)))− α(c(τ c,M ′n(z)) + g) + βVhn
(
c(τ c,M ′n(z)) +
β
αzHn(z) + g − βα
β βαHn(z
′)
)}
V˜ zh (τ
c) ≡
{
log(c(τ c,M ′(z)))− α(c(τ c,M ′(z)) + g) + βVh
(
c(τ c,M ′(z)) + βαzH(z) + g − βα
β βαH(z
′)
)}
Here, for each fixed z, by virtue of the consistency condition (1.15), c is Lipschitz-
continuous in (τ c, M ′), and the period payoff converges uniformly in τ c. Similarly,
as established in Lemma A.4, a conjecture by the fiscal authority such that zH(z)
is convex guarantees that, for every τ c, the continuation value Vhn converges to a
strictly concave limit Vh. The concavity of Vh implies that it must be continuous on
int(I), and hence the convergence of {Vhn} to Vh is uniform in τ c. It follows that,
for a fixed z ∈ int(I), V˜ zhn(τ c) converges uniformly to V˜ zh (τ c), and under the initial
hypothesis that we have τ˜ cn → τ˜ c uniformly for the respective maximizers, we can
apply Lemma A.1. Then, by Lemma A.1, τ˜ c is indeed the best response to M ′.
1A minor qualification is that the feasible set for choices of τ c in (A.6) depends onM ′n; however,
this issue can be taken care of by the introduction of appropriate penalty functions which ensure
that the maximum is achieved within the relevant feasible set; compare Amir (1996).
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The continuity of τ c → M˜ ′ is established analogously.
We are now ready for the proof of Proposition A.1.
Proof: By the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, the LCMKi are compact subsets of the
Banach space of bounded continuous functions on I with the supremum norm. The
same is true for the product space LCMKf × LCMKm . By Lemma A.10, BR is a
continuous map from LCMKf × LCMKm to itself. Finally, the LCMKi are convex
subsets. Hence, all assumptions of the Schauder fixed point theorem are satisfied,
and BR has a fixed point. This fixed point is a Nash equilibrium in stationary
strategies.
A.4 MPE - step 1: equilibrium for arbitrary pol-
icy rule
Specifying an arbitrary policy rule ϕ allows to calculate the value functions for the
fiscal and monetary authorities resulting from this rule when the economy starts
from aggregate state z. Specifically, for the fiscal authority, conditional on the rule
ϕ, we get V (z;ϕ) as the solution to:
V (z;ϕ) = {[log(c(ϕ))− α(c(ϕ) + g)] + βV (z′;ϕ)}
subject to the fiscal implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′
(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
− c(ϕ)− β
α
z
(1 + µ(ϕ))
= 0 (A.8)
Assuming differentiability and applying an envelope condition to this problem yields:
V ′(z;ϕ)(1 + µ(z;ϕ)) = V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
[
1− z
′ ∂µ(z′;ϕ)
∂z′
(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
]−1
Defining εµ(z;ϕ) ≡ ∂(1+µ(z;ϕ))/∂z(1+µ(z;ϕ))/z , the elasticity of (gross) monetary expansions (1 +
µ(z;ϕ)) in response to changes in the aggregate state z, we get:
V ′(z;ϕ)(1 + µ(z;ϕ)) = V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 , (A.9)
where εµ(z;ϕ) ≥ 0. Moreover, the envelope condition employed above yields:
V ′(z;ϕ) = −λf β
α
[(1 + µ(z;ϕ))]−1,
where the nonnegativity of λf , the Lagrange multiplier on the fiscal implementabil-
ity constraint (A.8), together with the fact that (1 + µ(z;ϕ)) > 0 implies that
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V ′(z;ϕ) ≤ 0.
Although the monetary authority’s period payoff conincides with the fiscal au-
thority’s one, its relevant implementability constraint is different. Specifically, for
the monetary authority, conditional on the rule ϕ, we get W (z;ϕ) as the solution
to:
W (z;ϕ) = {[log(c(ϕ))− α(c(ϕ) + g)] + βW (z′;ϕ)}
subject to the monetary implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + βz′c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))− c(ϕ)− zc(ϕ)(1 + τ c(ϕ)) = 0 (A.10)
Again assuming differentiability, applying an envelope condition to this problem
and making use of the definition εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ) ≡ ∂c(z;ϕ)(1+τ
c(z;ϕ))/∂z
c(z;ϕ)(1+τc(z;ϕ))/z
for the elasticity
of the private gross-of-tax consumption expenditure in response to changes in the
aggregate state z, we get:
W ′(z;ϕ)
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
=
W ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[
1 + εc(1+τc)(z
′;ϕ)
]−1
,
where εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ) ≤ 0. Importantly, total differentiation of the consistency con-
dition (1.15) reveals that εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ) = −εµ(z;ϕ). Using this relation, we can
substitute and get:
W ′(z;ϕ)
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
=
W ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (A.11)
Moreover, the envelope condition employed above yields:
W ′(z;ϕ) = −λmc(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ)),
where the nonnegativity of λm, the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability
constraint (A.10), together with the nonnegativity of consumption an the fact that
(1 + τ c(z;ϕ)) > 0 implies that W ′(z;ϕ) ≤ 0.
A.5 MPE - step 2: Optimal current policy rule
for given future policy rule
A.5.1 The fiscal problem
The current fiscal authority, having inherited the aggregate state z, takes the current
monetary authority’s action pim = M
′(z) as a given number and the continuation
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play ϕ(z′) as a given function of the future aggregate state z′. The problem for the
fiscal authority then is:
Vˆ (z; pi, ϕ) = maxc,z′{[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + βV (z′;ϕ)} (A.12)
subject to the fiscal implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′
(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
− c− β
α
z
(1 + µ(z; pim))
= 0 (A.13)
The solution to this problem are policy functions cf (z; pi, ϕ) and z
′
f (z; pi, ϕ) for the
fiscal authority. The first order condition with respect to cf is:
1
c
− α = λˆf = −α
β
Vˆ ′(z; pi, ϕ)(1 + µ(z; pim)) (A.14)
From the envelope theorem, the optimal choice of z′f must satisfy:
Vˆ ′(z; pi, ϕ)(1 + µ(z; pim)) = V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (A.15)
Here, the expression on the RHS depends on the continuation policy ϕ; specifically
we have from (A.9):
V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ)) = V ′(z′′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′′;ϕ)]−1 (A.16)
A.5.2 The monetary problem
The current monetary authority, having inherited the aggregate state z, takes the
current fiscal authority’s action pif = τ
c(z) as a given number and the continuation
play ϕ(z′) as a given function of the future aggregate state z′. The problem for the
monetary authority then is:
Wˆ (z; pi, ϕ) = maxc,z′{[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + βW (z′;ϕ)} (A.17)
subject to the implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + βz′c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))− c− zc(1 + τ c(z; pif )) = 0 (A.18)
The solution to this problem are policy functions cm(z; pi, ϕ) and z
′
m(z; pi, ϕ) for the
monetary authority. The first order condition with respect to cm is:
1
c
− α = − Wˆ
′(z; pi, ϕ)
c(1 + τ c(z; pif ))
(1 + z(1 + τ c(z; pif )) (A.19)
From the envelope theorem, the optimal choice of z′m must satisfy:
Wˆ ′(z; pi, ϕ)
c(1 + τ c(z; pif ))
=
W ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[
1 + εc(1+τc)(z
′;ϕ)
]−1
(A.20)
Here, the expression on the RHS depends on the continuation policy ϕ; specifically
we have from (A.11):
W ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
=
W ′(z′′;ϕ)
c(z′′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′′;ϕ)]−1 (A.21)
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A.5.3 The system of equations
The set of necessary conditions characterizing the dynamic evolution of the economy
as governed by the Nash equilibrium policy response pi(ϕ) to an arbitrary contin-
uation policy ϕ is given by equations (A.14), (A.15), (A.19), (A.20) and the two
relevant implementability conditions (A.13), (A.18), one of which is redundant be-
cause in equilibrium they coincide due to the consistency condition (1.15). For a
given future policy rule ϕ, the functions V (z′;ϕ) and W (z′;ϕ) as well as their deriv-
atives and εµ(z
′;ϕ) (or equivalently εc(1+τc)(z′;ϕ) = −εµ(z′;ϕ)) are determined via
(A.16) and (A.21). We then have a system of five equations in the five unknown
variables c(z; pi, ϕ), z′(z; pi, ϕ), λˆf (z; pi, ϕ), λˆm(z; pi, ϕ) and εµ(z; pi, ϕ). That is, the
optimal current policy rule pi(ϕ), existence of which follows by standard arguments
on the existence of Nash equilibrium (e.g. Theorem 2.7 in Vives, 1999), is uniquely
defined with respect to the allocation (c, z′) it implements in the current period and
the elasticity εµ(z) of the monetary policy instrument.
A.6 MPE - step 3: Policy fixed point
Finally, the time consistent MPE policy rule is found as the fixed point of the func-
tional mapping pi : ϕ→ pi(ϕ). Existence of such a fixed point has been established
in Appendix A.3.
A.7 Computational procedure
The numerical algorithm to find a MPE of the dynamic policy game proceeds as
follows:
1. Guess a continuation policy rule ϕ.
2. For the given continuation policies ϕ, solve for the optimal current policy rule
pi; this is done by solving the system of equations collected in Appendix A.5.3.
For a given future policy ϕ, this constitutes a system of five equations in the
five unkowns c, z′, λf , λm and εµ(z). We solve this system via a collocation
method on a one-dimensional state space and obtain the current best response
rule pi∗(ϕ).
3. Update the continuation policy by substituting the guess for ϕ by pi∗(ϕ).
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 until pi∗(ϕ) = ϕ.
Convergence of above algorithm to a specific time consistent policy rule ϕ is condi-
tional on the initial guess employed in step 1. Since we suspect existence of multiple
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MPE, we employ different initial guesses: The first one conjectures some continua-
tion policy ϕ which depletes the stock of debt via the inflation tax implemented by a
responsive monetary policy (εµ(z) > 0). The second guess involves the continuation
policy ϕ which keeps the stock of debt constant and balances the government budget
via the consumption tax (εµ(z) = 0). For both of these initial guesses, convergence
to the conjectured MPE policy rule obtains.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Some notation
The aggregate state is zg ≡ Bg(1+R)
Mg
; in the rational expectations equilibrium, the
representative household’s state z and the aggregate state zg coincide, so in what
follows the supersript g is dropped. The current policy rule, which consists of a
fiscal and a monetary rule for the present period, is pi(z) = (pif (z), pim(z)). The
future policy rule, which consists of a fiscal and a monetary rule from the next
period onwards, is ϕ(z) = (ϕf (z), ϕm(z)). We abuse notation by letting the policy
rules map the aggregate state either into the true policy instruments (τ c,M ′) or
alternatively - the primal approach - directly into the allocation (c, z′). Barred
variables refer to predetermined private expectations.
B.2 Objective functions and implementability
constraints
We employ a primal approach to solve the authorities’ respective dynamic prob-
lems. Accordingly, the problem of finding optimal combinations of policy instru-
ments is recast as a problem of finding optimal implementable allocations, where
implementability requires that it must be possible to decentralize the allocation via
the available distortionary policy instruments. This methodology requires a number
of substitutions which make use of the private equilibrium conditions (2.7), (2.8)
and (2.9). Both authorities’ value functions can be constructed directly from the
allocation. Due to the presence of the inflationary loss term in the monetary au-
thority’s payoff and the different dynamic constraints faced by the two authorities,
we have to distinguish between two distinct value functions. It is convenient to start
from the problem faced by the authorities when they assume that (i) the policy rule
ϕ will govern the play from the next period onwards and that (ii) the current policy
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choice by the respective opponent is pi−i. The authorities take private expectations
as arbitrary given functions of the aggregate state. Then, for the fiscal authority,
we have:
Vˆ (z; pi, ϕ) = maxpif {[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + βV (z′;ϕ)}
For the monetary authority, one obtains:
Wˆ (z;pi, ϕ) = maxpim
{
−γ
(
c¯(z)(1 + τ¯ c(z))
c(1 + τ c(z;pif ))
)2
+ (1− γ)[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + βW (z′;ϕ)
}
For these value functions to make sense, they must be amended by the appropriate
dynamic constraints. In their respective maximization problems, both authorities
are constrained by a sequence of implementability constraints which internalize the
fact that the private households react optimally to the government policies. We
construct these implementability constraints by substituting the private equilibrium
conditions (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) into the consoldiated government budget constraint
(2.1). A complication that arises as a consequence of decision authority over policies
being decentralized is that each authority’s constraint depends on the policy imple-
mented by its contemporaneous opponent. This problem is taken care of via the
consistency condition (2.11) which is constructed from the private sector optimality
conditions (2.8) and (2.9) together with the CIA constraints (2.7) for two adjacent
periods:
c(1 + τ c)
M ′
M
= c(1 + τ c)(1 + µ) =
β
α
,
where the first equality makes use of the definition (1 + µ) ≡ M ′
M
. Making use of
above consistency condition, substitution of the private equilibrium conditions into
the consolidated government budget constraint yields two distinct implementability
constraints. For the fiscal authority, we have:
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′
(1 + µ(z′))
− c− β
α
z
(1 + µ)
= 0 (B.1)
For the monetary authority, we have:
β
α
− g + βz′c(z′)(1 + τ c(z′))− c− zc(1 + τ c) = 0 (B.2)
Note that in both cases, the implementability constraint’s job is twofold: First, for a
given value of the policy instrument chosen by the other authority, it imposes a joint
restriction on compatible primal choices of c and z′; secondly, since the feasible set
is contingent on the policy instrument chosen by the other authority, it establishes
a one-to-one mapping between the own policy instrument and the implemented
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allocation (c, z′). However, there is an asymmetry in the two equations: In the
implementability constraint (B.1) faced by the fiscal authority, the choice variable c
appears without cofactor; conversely, in the monetary authority’s implementability
constraint (B.2), it is scaled up by the cofactor [1 + z(1 + τ c)]. This reflects the
fact that the fiscal authority’s current policy choice has no direct influence on the
contemporaneous price level P , whereas monetary policy, by manipulating the price
level, can also affect the real value of the outstanding stock of government liabilities.
B.3 The economy as a game
The structure of the two authorities’ problem to determine their policies can
be described as an infinite-horizon dynamic game of almost perfect information,
whose building block is a two-player simultaneous-moves stage game G(z;ϕ) =(
f,m;Af (z), Am(z); Vˆ (z; pi, ϕ), Wˆ (z; pi, ϕ)
)
. We are now going to define the compo-
nents of the stage game. To begin with, the game is not of a repeated variety due to
the presence of the endogenous state variable z ≡ B(1+R)
M
. The players are the fiscal
and the monetary authority, indicated by i = f,m respectively. In each period,
their actions are af = τ
c and am = M
′. The strategy/action spaces for the two
players are compact and time-invariant and are given by Af (z) = [τ
c
min(z), τ
c
max(z)]
and Am(z) = [M
′
min(z),M
′
max(z)], where, for all z, τ
c
min(z) > −1, M ′min(z) > 0 and
τ cmax(z),M
′
max(z) < X¯ for some finite X¯. Note that, if the aggregate state variable z
is assumed to live in a compact interval I = [Z, Z¯], then consistency dictates that the
admissible action spaces depend on z. However, the interval I can be assumed to be
sufficiently large such as not to constrain the players’ equilibrium choices. Finally,
the restriction of the players’ strategy spaces to comprise only mappings from the
aggregate state z into actions qualifies the model as a discounted Markov-stationary
game with uncountable state and action spaces.
B.4 MPE - step 1: equilibrium for arbitrary pol-
icy rule
Specifying an arbitrary policy rule ϕ allows to calculate the value functions for the
fiscal and monetary authorities resulting from this rule when the economy starts
from aggregate state z. Specifically, for the fiscal authority, conditional on the rule
ϕ, we get V (z;ϕ) as the solution to:
V (z;ϕ) = {[log(c(ϕ))− α(c(ϕ) + g)] + δV (z′;ϕ)}
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subject to the fiscal implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′
(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
− c(ϕ)− β
α
z
(1 + µ(ϕ))
= 0 (B.3)
Assuming differentiability and applying an envelope condition to this problem yields:
V ′(z;ϕ)(1 + µ(z;ϕ)) =
δ
β
V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
[
1− z
′ ∂µ(z′;ϕ)
∂z′
(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
]−1
Defining εµ(z;ϕ) ≡ ∂(1+µ(z;ϕ))/∂z(1+µ(z;ϕ))/z , the elasticity of (gross) monetary expansions (1 +
µ(z;ϕ)) in response to changes in the aggregate state z, we get:
V ′(z;ϕ)(1 + µ(z;ϕ)) =
δ
β
V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 , (B.4)
where εµ(z;ϕ) ≥ 0. Moreover, the envelope condition employed above reads:
V ′(z;ϕ) = −λf β
α
[(1 + µ(z;ϕ))]−1,
where the nonnegativity of λf , the Lagrange multiplier on the fiscal implementabil-
ity constraint (B.3), together with the fact that (1 + µ(z;ϕ)) > 0 implies that
V ′(z;ϕ) ≤ 0.
Similarly, for the monetary authority, conditional on the rule ϕ, we get W (z;ϕ)
as the solution to:
W (z;ϕ) =
{
−γ
(
c¯(z)(1 + τ¯ c(z))
c(ϕ)(1 + τ c(ϕ))
)2
+ (1− γ)[log(c(ϕ))− α(c(ϕ) + g)] + βW (z′;ϕ)
}
subject to the monetary implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + βz′c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))− c(ϕ)− zc(ϕ)(1 + τ c(ϕ)) = 0 (B.5)
Again assuming differentiability, applying an envelope condition to this problem
and making use of the definition εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ) ≡ ∂c(z;ϕ)(1+τc(z;ϕ))/∂zc(z;ϕ)(1+τc(z;ϕ))/z for the elasticity
of the private gross-of-tax consumption expenditure in response to changes in the
aggregate state z, we get:
W ′(z;ϕ)
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
+
2γ εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ)z
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
=
W ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[
1 + εc(1+τc)(z
′;ϕ)
]−1
,
where εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ) ≤ 0. Importantly, total differentiation of the consistency con-
dition (2.11) reveals that εc(1+τc)(z;ϕ) = −εµ(z;ϕ). Using this relation, we can
substitute and get:
W ′(z;ϕ)
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
− 2γ
εµ(z;ϕ)
z
c(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ))
=
W ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1
(B.6)
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Moreover, the envelope condition employed above reads:
W ′(z;ϕ) = 2γ
εµ(z;ϕ)
z
− λmc(z;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z;ϕ)),
where we observe that W ′(z;ϕ) ≤ 0. Formally, this follows from the first order
condition with respect to z′:
W ′(z′;ϕ) = −λmc(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)] ,
where the nonnegativity of λm, the Lagrange multiplier on the monetary imple-
mentability constraint (B.5), together with the nonnegativity of consumption an
the fact that (1 + τ c(z;ϕ)) > 0 implies that W ′(z;ϕ) ≤ 0.
B.5 MPE - step 2: Optimal current policy rule
for given future policy rule
B.5.1 The fiscal problem
The current fiscal authority, having inherited the aggregate state z, takes the current
monetary authority’s policy pim = M
′(z) as a given number and the continuation
play ϕ(z′) as a given function of the future aggregate state z′. The problem for the
fiscal authority then is:
Vˆ (z; pi, ϕ) = maxc,z′{[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + δV (z′;ϕ)} (B.7)
subject to the fiscal implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + ββ
α
z′
(1 + µ(z′;ϕ))
− c− β
α
z
(1 + µ(z; pim))
= 0 (B.8)
The solution to this problem are policy functions cf (z; pi, ϕ) and z
′
f (z; pi, ϕ) for the
fiscal authority. The first order condition with respect to cf is:
1
c
− α = −α
β
Vˆ ′(z; pi, ϕ)(1 + µ(z; pim)) (B.9)
From the envelope theorem, the optimal choice of z′f must satisfy:
Vˆ ′(z; pi, ϕ)(1 + µ(z; pim)) =
δ
β
V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′;ϕ)]−1 (B.10)
Here, the expression on the RHS depends on the continuation policy ϕ; specifically,
we have from (B.4):
V ′(z′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′;ϕ)) =
δ
β
V ′(z′′;ϕ)(1 + µ(z′′;ϕ)) [1− εµ(z′′;ϕ)]−1 (B.11)
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B.5.2 The monetary problem
The current monetary authority, having inherited the aggregate state z as well as
predetermined private expectations c¯(z), τ¯ c(z) , takes the current fiscal authority’s
policy pif = τ
c(z) as a given number and the continuation play ϕ(z′) as a given
function of the future aggregate state z′. The problem for the monetary authority
then is:
Wˆ (z;pi, ϕ) = maxc,z′
{
−γ
(
c¯(z)(1 + τ¯ c(z))
c(1 + τ c(z;pif ))
)2
+ (1− γ)[log(c)− α(c+ g)] + βW (z′;ϕ)
}
(B.12)
subject to the implementability constraint:
β
α
− g + βz′c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))− c− zc(1 + τ c(z; pif )) = 0 (B.13)
The solution to this problem are policy functions cm(z; pi, ϕ) and z
′
m(z; pi, ϕ) for the
monetary authority. The first order condition with respect to cm is:
2γ
1
c
+(1−γ)
(
1
c
− α
)
= −Wˆ
′(z; pi, ϕ) + 2γ
εc(1+τc)(z;pif )
z
c(1 + τ c(z; pif ))
[1+ z(1+ τ c(z; pif )] (B.14)
From the envelope theorem, the optimal choice of z′m must satisfy:
Wˆ ′(z; pi, ϕ) + 2γ
εc(1+τc)(z;pif )
z
c(1 + τ c(z; pif ))
=
W ′(z′;ϕ)
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
[
1 + εc(1+τc)(z
′;ϕ)
]−1
(B.15)
Here, the expression on the RHS depends on the continuation policy ϕ; specifically,
we have from (B.6):
W ′(z′;ϕ)− 2γ εµ(z′;ϕ)
z′
c(z′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′;ϕ))
=
W ′(z′′;ϕ)
c(z′′;ϕ)(1 + τ c(z′′;ϕ))
[1− εµ(z′′;ϕ)]−1 (B.16)
B.5.3 The system of equations
The set of necessary conditions characterizing the dynamic evolution of the econ-
omy as governed by the Nash equilibrium policy response pi(ϕ) to an arbitrary
continuation policy ϕ is given by equations (B.9), (B.10), (B.14), (B.15) and the
two relevant implementability conditions (B.8), (B.13), one of which is redundant
because in equilibrium they coincide due to the consistency condition (2.11). For
a given future policy rule ϕ, the functions V (z′;ϕ) and W (z′;ϕ) as well as their
derivatives and εµ(z
′;ϕ) (or equivalently εc(1+τc)(z′;ϕ)) are determined via (B.11)
and (B.16). We then have a system of five equations in the five unknown variables
c(z; pi, ϕ), z′(z; pi, ϕ), λˆf (z; pi, ϕ), λˆm(z; pi, ϕ) and εµ(z; pi, ϕ). That is, the optimal
current policy rule pi(ϕ) is uniquely defined with respect to the allocation (c, z′) it
implements in the current period and the elasticity εµ(z) of the monetary policy
instrument.
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B.6 MPE - step 3: Policy fixed point
Finally, the time consistent MPE policy rule is found as the fixed point of the
functional mapping pi : ϕ → pi(ϕ). Existence of such a fixed point follows from
results obtained in chapter one.
B.7 Computational procedure
Traditionally, dynamic games have been attacked by linear-quadratic methods which
allow for relative simple algorithms to find a solution. However, in many economic
applications, linear-quadratic applications deliver highly inaccurate approximate so-
lutions; see e.g. the discussion in Miranda and Fackler (2002). Particularly, since
linear-quadratic methods are local in nature, this is the case at points far away from
the certainty-equivalent steady state or if the true payoff and transition functions
are not well-approximated by second- and first-degree polynomials over the entire
domain. Therefore, standard linear-quadratic methods do not seem appropriate to
solve our model; the main complication stems from the presence of the endogenous
state variable z whose steady state value z∗ is a priori unknown. Projection meth-
ods have recently been proposed as an efficient way to solve functional equation
problems, and, more specifically, dynamic games. To the best of our knowledge, the
application to a primal approach problem in a general equilibrium context is new.
The numerical algorithm to find the MPE of the dynamic policy game proceeds as
follows:
1. Guess an arbitrary continuation policy rule ϕ.
2. For the given continuation policy ϕ, solve for the optimal current policy rule
pi; this is done by solving the system of equations collected in Appendix B.5.3.
For a given future policy ϕ, this constitutes a system of five equations in the
five unkowns c, z′, λf , λm and εµ. We solve this system via a collocation
method on a one-dimensional state space and obtain the current best response
rule pi∗(ϕ).
3. Update the continuation policy by substituting the guess for ϕ by pi∗(ϕ).
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 until pi∗(ϕ) = ϕ.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Competitive equilibrium and financial con-
tracting
Below, we present the optimality conditions characterizing the solution to the model
economy’s agents’ decision problems, lay out the details of the financial contracting
scheme between entrepreneurs and the financial intermediary and then define a
competitive equilibrium.
C.1.1 Optimal decisions: Households
The solution to the household problem (3.4) can be summarized by a set of optimal-
ity conditions which determine the household’s equilibrium behavior. First, there
is the Euler equation describing the optimal intertemporal allocation of nominal
wealth:
Et−
{
uc(c
H
t , h
H
t )
Pt
− βR˜tuc(c
H
t+1, h
H
t+1)
Pt+1
}
= 0 (C.1)
Next, there are two Euler equations which determine the sequence of dynamic deci-
sions between consumption and technology-specific capital investments; for i = k, z,
they read:
uc(cHt , h
H
t ) [1 + Φ2(it, it+1)] = βEt
{
uc(cHt+1, h
H
t+1) [(1− δ)− Φ1(it+1, it+2)] + β
uc(cHt+2, h
H
t+2)
Pt+2
Rit+1
}
(C.2)
An immediate implication of the two equations (C.2) is that the technology-specific
returns to capital must be equal in expectation, i.e. Et{Rkt+1} = Et{Rzt+1} =
Et{Rt+1}. Similarly, there are two optimality conditions which govern the house-
hold’s consumption-leisure choice, thus pinning down the optimal supply of labor to
either production plan i = k, z:
uh(c
H
t , h
H
t ) +
[
θ
uc(c
H
t , h
H
t )
Pt
+ (1− θ)βEt
{
uc(c
H
t+1, h
H
t+1)
Pt+1
}]
W i,Ht = 0 (C.3)
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Here, it follows that, in all states of the world, the technology-specific wage rates
must be identical because the household cares only about aggregate labor supply;
hence, we have W k,Ht = W
z,H
t = W
H
t .
C.1.2 Optimal decisions: Entrepreneurs
Basic technology: The entrepreneur’s problem (3.5) when employing the basic
technology reduces to a standard classical production plan: By constant returns
to scale, efficient factor employment implies that marginal costs are independent
of the quantity produced, i.e. C(W kt , R
k
t , R˜t; y
k
t ) = MC
k
t (W
k
t , R
k
t , R˜t; 1)y
k
t . Then,
from the assumption of perfectly competitive intermediate goods markets, it follows
that the price of the basic intermediate good equals marginal costs, i.e. P kt =
MCkt (W
k
t , R
k
t , R˜t). From the Cobb-Douglas specification of ϕ(kt, l
k
t ), optimal factor
demands for the basic production plan are:
kt =
αkP kt y
k
t
Rkt
and lkt =
(1− αk)P kt ykt
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W kt
(C.4)
Finally, the price for the basic intermediate good is:
P kt =
1
At
(
Rkt
αk
)αk (
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W kt
(1− αk)
)(1−αk)
(C.5)
Advanced technology: Production by means of the advanced technology is
subject to an entrepreneurial ex post moral hazard problem. This agency problem
is dealt with via a financial contract whose specification closely follows Homstro¨m
and Tirole (1998) and is described next.
C.1.3 Financial contracting
Optimal factor input ratio and the cost function: Part of an optimal contract
must be to use factor inputs in a cost minimizing combination. Since factor demands
are determined via the constrained-efficient contract Ct solving program (3.7), they
will not only reflect the entrepreneur’s profit maximization objective, but also the
intermediary’s need to break even in expectation. From the Cobb-Douglas speci-
fication, the possibility of project failure then requires that factors earn constant
shares not of project revenue, but of the total costs C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
associated
with a targeted production scale y˜zt . Hence, the demands for capital and labor to
be employed in a generic advanced project are:
zt =
αzC
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
Rzt
and lzt =
(1− αz)C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(C.6)
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Furthermore, from constant returns to scale and the Cobb-Douglas specification of
the technology, we can write:
C
(
W zt , R
z
t , R˜t; y˜
z
t
)
=MCzt
(
Wt, R
z
t , R˜t
)
y˜zt =
1
Vt
(
Rt
αz
)αz ( [1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(1− αz)
)(1−αz)
y˜zt ,
where MCzt (·) are the per unit costs of producing a targeted output level y˜zt ; since
the technology displays constant returns to scale, these per unit costs coincide with
marginal costs. As a consequence, the program to find the optimal contract is
linear in the project size y˜zt .
First best - the socially optimal contract: Consider the first best contract
where b = 0 such that the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem plays no role,
but liquidity is scarce and has an opportunity cost R˜t. The questions asked here
are: What is the maximum overall return on investment? And how does the cor-
responding socially optimal contract look like? Suppose for the moment a binding
participation constraint for the investor; indeed, we will later verify that this is
the case in a well-specified problem.1 Substituting from the binding participation
constraint (3.7b) into the entrepreneur’s net return (3.7a) yields:
ΠFt =
[∫
Γt(ξt)
P zt
MCzt (·)
(
1− ξtR˜t
)
dG(ξt)− 1
]
MCzt (·)y˜zt
Let ξˆt denote the cutoff value for the liquidity shock such that the project is continued
if and only if ξt ≤ ξˆt; using this rule for the indicator function Γt(ξt) then allows to
rewrite the entrepreneur’s net return as:
ΠFt (ξˆt) = λt(ξˆt)MC
z
t (·)y˜zt , (C.7a)
where:
λt(ξˆt) ≡
[∫ ξˆt
0
P zt
MCzt (·)
(
1− ξtR˜t
)
dG(ξt)− 1
]
(C.7b)
In definition (C.7b), λt(ξˆt) denotes the net social marginal return on one unit
invested in the individual advanced project, given a cutoff value ξˆt. Since
P zt
MCzt (·) > 0,
λ(ξˆt) is maximized at the socially optimal cutoff value ξˆ
FB
t =
1
R˜t
. Moreover, from
(C.7a), it is clear that the entrepreneur is the residual claimant and receives the
full social surplus from the project.
1By well-specified, we mean (i) that there is no self-financing, and (ii) that the solution to the
constrained-optimal contract features a finite investment level.
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Second best - entrepreneurial moral hazard: Now consider the case where
b > 0. Notice that general equilibrium considerations imply that the marginal
net social return under both the first and the second best solution must be posi-
tive.2 Then, given a positive value for λt(ξˆt), the entrepreneur will seek to maximize
ΠFt (ξˆt) by choosing the maximum investment volumeMC
z
t (·)y˜zt that still guarantees
investor participation. But from (3.7b), this is achieved by maximizing the state
contingent per unit transfer τt(ξt) to the investor. Accordingly, the second best con-
tract prescribes to retain the minimum amount of profits that is still consistent with
incentive compatibility. Hence, the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint
(3.7c) is binding at the maximum pledgeable unit return:
τt(ξt) =
Γt(ξt)(1− b)P zt y˜zt
MCzt (·)y˜zt
(C.8)
We can now solve for the largest investment volume MCzt (·)y˜zt that is compatible
with both the investor’s participation constraint and the entrepreneur’s incentive
constraint by substituting (C.8) into the investor’s participation constraint (3.7b)
to obtain:[
1−
∫
Γ(ξt)
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
) P zt
MCzt (·)
dG(ξt)
]
MCzt (·)y˜zt = Et (C.9)
Here, the expression in squared brackets represents the difference between marginal
cost of investment to an outside investor and the expected marginal return to such
outside investment. Let ξˆ0t ≡ (1−b)R˜t denote the cutoff value that maximizes the
expected marginal return to outside investors, and note that (C.9) implies that,
given some Et > 0, the expected (subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) marginal
return on outside investment is strictly smaller than one.3
Solving (C.9) for the maximum investment volume conditional on a given cutoff
value ξˆt, allows to write the project’s investment capacity as:
MCzt (·)y˜zt = µt(ξˆt)Et, (C.10a)
2To see this, suppose to the contrary that λ(ξˆFBt ) ≤ 0 such that the optimal contract would
prescribe zt = lzt = 0, i.e. zero investment for any level of entrepreneurial equity Et. However, this
implies y˜zt = 0 which contradicts a general equilibrium with positive consumption and investment,
and the price of the advanced intermediate good would adjust such as to guarantee a positive
marginal net social return. By the same token, the second best solution must also involve a cutoff
rule ξˆt with positive marginal net social return.
3Indeed, if this was not the case, investment would be self-financing and there would be no
demand for liquidity at all in that the investor’s participation constraint would be non-binding. A
sufficient condition for ruling out self-financing is:
∫ ξˆ0t
0
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
)
P zt
MCzt (·)dG(ξt) < 1. Observe
that rewriting this condition yields λt(ξˆ0t ) < b
P zt
MCzt (·)G(ξˆ
0
t ); then, it is apparent that ξˆ
FB
t = ξˆ
0
t if
b = 0, which leads to the conclusion that, in order to rule out self-financing, a positive wedge
ξˆFBt − ξˆ0t > 0 and therefore b > 0 are essential.
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where:
µt(ξˆt) ≡ 1
1− ∫ ξˆt
0
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
)
P zt
MCzt (·)dG(ξt)
(C.10b)
is an equity multiplier, whose denominator specifies the amount of internal funds that
the entrepreneur has to contribute per unit of investment in order to compensate
the outside investor for the shortfall implied by the expression in squared brackets
in (C.9). Finally, using (C.7a) and (C.10a), the entrepreneur’s expected net payoff
becomes:
ΠFt (ξˆt) = λt(ξˆt)µt(ξˆt)Et (C.11)
It now remains to determine the second best continuation threshold, to be denoted
ξˆ∗t . Given an entrepreneurial equity position Et, the second best cutoff ξˆ
∗
t maximizes
(C.11). It is clear that ξˆ∗t ∈ [ξˆ0t , ξˆFBt ]: If ξt < ξˆ0t , both parties prefer to continue
ex post because both parties can realize gains on the sunk stage one investment; if
ξt > ξˆ
FB
t , both parties prefer to abandon the project because the net social mar-
ginal return of continuing is negative. Within the interval [ξˆ0t , ξˆ
FB
t ], there emerges
a trade-off: On the one hand, increasing ξˆt implies that continuation is possible in
more contingencies, and thus the marginal net social return λt(ξˆt) on each unit of
initial investment is increased. On the other hand, decreasing ξˆt allows to increase
the amount of initial investmentMCzt (·)y˜zt by increasing the equity multiplier µt(ξˆt).
After substitution from the definitions (C.7b) and (C.10b) into (C.11), it is straight-
forward to show that the optimal continuation value ξˆ∗t can be found as the solution
to the following problem:
min
ξˆt
R˜t
∫ ξˆt
0
ξtdG(ξt) +
MCzt (·)
P zt
G(ξˆt)
, (C.12)
which has the interpretation that the second best cutoff value minimizes the expected
unit cost of total expected investment. The first order condition to this problem is:∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt =
MCzt (·)
P zt
1
R˜t
(C.13)
Finally, using the optimality condition for the cutoff value allows to rewrite the
entrepreneur’s expected net return in the following compact form:
ΠFt (ξˆ
∗
t ) =
1
R˜t
− ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − (1−b)R˜t
Et =
ξˆFBt − ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − ξˆ0t
Et (C.14)
Observe how this expression reflects the trade-off underlying the choice of ξˆ∗t ∈
[ξˆ0t , ξˆ
FB
t ]. For reference, we define the expected net return per unit of entrepreneurial
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equity Et as:
Π˜Ft (ξˆ
∗
t ) ≡
1
R˜t
− ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − (1−b)R˜t
Since the optimal contract is linear in the individual entrepreneur’s equity posi-
tion, any individual entrepreneur’s conditions are also relevant in the aggregate. As
a result, the first order condition (C.13) pins down the price level for the intermediate
goods produced by means of the advanced technology:
P zt =
1
R˜t
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt
1
Vt
(
Rzt
αz
)αz (
[1 + θ(R˜t − 1)]W zt
(1− αz)
)(1−αz)
(C.15)
C.1.4 Implementation and discussion of second best policy
Aggregating across advanced projects, we can derive two measures of aggregate
liquidity demand. The first one is relevant if liquidity provision is organized in a
way that disregards the scope for risk sharing across entrepreneurs:
D¯t = ξˆ
∗
tP
z
t y˜
z
t (C.16a)
In contrast, the second measure of overall liquidity demand is relevant if liquidity
risk can be pooled across projects:
D∗t =
[∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt
]
P zt y˜
z
t < D¯t (C.16b)
It is clear that this latter concept requires some form of financial intermediation.
Hence, drawing on Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), we turn to the institutional details
supporting the implementation of the second best policy.
One possibility is to have the financial intermediary initially extend the amount
MCzt (·)y˜zt − Et to the entrepreneur together with an irrevocable line of credit of
maximum size ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t to be drawn from as needed at the interim stage. Given
our assumptions on the details of the moral hazard problem which does not en-
visage distraction of resources on the part of the entrepreneur, this credit line
implements the second best solution as long as it is provided free of charge, ir-
respective of the amount ξtP
z
t y˜
z
t ≤ ξˆ∗tP zt y˜zt of liquidity actually requested. Since
the liquidity shocks are independent across projects, the aggregate amount of re-
sources needed to cover refinancing needs at the interim stage is then given by D∗t .
At the level of an individual entrepreneur, an alternative would be via a liquidity
covenant which involves the financial intermediary initially extending the amount
[1+ (P zt /MC
z
t (·))ξˆ∗t ]MCzt (·)y˜zt −Et to the entrepreneur, whereby the requirement is
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imposed that the amount ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t is not sunk in the project, but kept in the form
of readily marketable assets. However, at the aggregate level across all projects,
implementation of the second best policy via liquidity covenants is seen to require
strictly more resources D¯t > D
∗
t because liquidity is kept separately for each project,
thus forgoing the potential to pool liquidity across them.4
Given our empirical interest, the question arises whether there is a second best
policy which features the productive sector (rather than the intermediary) holding
liquidity. We now give an example for such a policy. For that purpose, first de-
fine a number ξˇt which is implicitly given by D
∗
t = ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t ; then, a policy of the
desired kind is constructed as follows: At stage one, the intermediary extends the
amount [1 + (P zt /MC
z
t (·))ξˇt]MCzt (·)y˜zt −Et to the entrepreneur. The financial con-
tract further stipulates that the amount ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t must be held in the form of liquid
assets. The entrepreneur will then use the obtained external finance to complement
her own equity position Et sunk in the project by the maximum admissible amount
MCzt (·)y˜zt − Et and deposit her remaining liquid assets with the intermediary (at
zero interest). Now, at stage two, when hit by a liquidity shock ξt, the entrepreneur
must first use up her own asset position of ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t ; only then can she approach the
intermediary for additional funds, which the latter will residually provide up to the
second best quantity ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t . The intermediary is able to provide this liquidity by
calling idle funds from those projects who receive shocks ξt < ξˇt. Obviously, this
policy replicates the second best in terms of both the initial investment scale and
the cutoff ξˆ∗t . Thus, it only remains to check whether above arrangement is feasible,
which is the case since, from the definition of ξˇt, the supply of and demand for liq-
uidity are equal at the aggregate level: P zt y˜
z
t ξˇt = D
∗
t = P
z
t y˜
z
t
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt. Further
variations on the institutional structure implementing the second best, involving
advanced sector projects holding assets other than cash (e.g. corporate debt issued
by the basic sector firms) as well as liquid assets earning non-zero rates of retun,
are possible.
C.1.5 Competitive equilibrium
Definition C.1 (Competitive Equilibrium) Given initial conditions
4In the benchmark section of their paper which features an exogenous supply of liquidity, Holm-
stro¨m and Tirole (1998) establish equivalence of the two discussed methods of providing liquidity.
This result stems from the fact that their economy allows for a technology (”cash”) to transfer
wealth across the stages of the financial contracting problem and the additional assumption that
”cash” is not scarce. Conversely, in our economy ”cash” is available, but its (limited) supply is
determined in general equilibrium via households’ financial deposits and monetary policy. Impor-
tantly then, liquidity is costly (it sells at a premium R˜t − 1 > 0), and agents have an incentive
to economize on its usage. The consequence is that intermediated credit lines and decentralized
corporate liquidity holdings are no longer equivalent.
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{k0, z0, A0,M0} and realizations for aggregate shocks {At,Vt,Jt}∞t=0 and
idiosyncratic shocks {ξit}∞t=0, a competitive equilibrium is a list of al-
locations {cHt , hk,Ht , hz,Ht , xt, kt+1, zt+1, Qt,Mt+1}∞t=0 to households and
{(cEt , hk,Et , hz,Et , Et, At+1)i}∞t=0∀i to entrepreneurs, of technology-specific
and economywide aggregates {ct, lkt , lzt , Lt, Kt+1, ykt , yzt , yt}∞t=0 and of prices
{Pt, P zt , P kt ,Wt,W kt ,W k,Ht ,W k,Et ,W zt ,W z,Ht ,
W z,Et , Rt, R
k
t , R
z
t , R˜t}∞t=0 such that:
1. given prices, the allocation solves the household problem (3.4) as well as the
basic and advanced production problems (3.5) and (3.7);
2. entrepreneurs follow their behavioral rules and the financial intermediary
breaks even;
3. aggregation across agents and sectors as well as among the entrepreneurs ob-
tains, i.e. for a generic variable (vEt )
i belonging to the allocation to entrepre-
neurs:
∫
i
vE,it di = v
E
t ;
4. the financial market as well as the markets for final goods, intermediate goods
and factor inputs clear.
C.2 TFP accounting
Our model assumes that entrepreneurial firms can employ two different Cobb-
Douglas technologies which are homogenous in their two respective input factors,
capital and labor: ϕ(kt, l
k
t ) = (kt)
αk((1 + γ)tlkt )
(1−αk) and f(zt, lzt ) = (zt)
αz((1 +
γ)tlzt )
(1−αz). Thus, the equations determining the distinct intermediate outputs read
ykt = Atϕ(kt, lkt ) and yzt = G(ξˆ∗t )y˜zt = VtG(ξˆ∗t )f(zt, lzt ). Totally differentiating both
equations and dropping time subscripts yields:
dyk = dAϕ(k, lk) +A (ϕk(k, lk)dk + ϕl(k, lk)dlk)
dyz =
(
dVG(·) + Vg(·)dξˆ∗
)
f(z, lz) + VG(·) (fz(z, lz)dz + fl(z, lz)dlz)
Dividing these equations by Aϕ(k, lk) and VG(·)f(z, lz), respectively, one obtains
the approximate percentage deviations (denoted by hats) of the two intermediate
outputs:
ŷk = Â+ αkk̂ + (1− αk)l̂k
ŷz = V̂ + ωG
ξˆ∗
̂ˆ
ξ∗ + αz ẑ + (1− αz)l̂z,
where x̂ ≡ dx
x
and where ωG
ξˆ∗
= g(ξˆ
∗)ξˆ∗
G(ξˆ∗)
denotes the elasticity of the survival probability
with respect to the cutoff value for liquidity shocks ξˆ∗. Since we measure TFP-
growth by the part of output growth which is not explained by the growth of the
165
input factors, it follows that productivity growth for the basic technology is:
T̂FP k = ŷk − αkk̂ − (1− αk)l̂k = Â,
where the first equality is an implication of the definition (in terms of subaggregates
for the respective intermediate goods) of TFP as the Solow residual. Similarly, for
the advanced technology, we get:
T̂FP z = ŷz − αz ẑ − (1− αz)l̂z = V̂ + ωG
ξˆ∗
̂ˆ
ξ∗
From these equations, we can deduce overall TFP-growth as the weighted sum of
productivity growth of the different technologies. Specifically, from (3.11), aggregate
output is given by a CES aggregation of the intermediate outputs produced with
the different technologies. Aggregate output growth can then be expressed as the
composite of technology-specific growth rates:
ŷ = ζ
1
ρ
(
yk
y
) ρ−1
ρ
ŷk + (1− ζ) 1ρ
(
yz
y
) ρ−1
ρ
ŷz = ωyykŷ
k + ωyyzŷ
z
Hence, combining the expression for aggregate output growth with the results for
the intermediate output growth rates, aggregate TFP-growth, i.e. innovations to
aggregate output growth which cannot be attributed to changes in capital or labor
growth, is measured as:
T̂FP = T̂ = ŷ − ωyyk
(
αkk̂ + (1− αk)l̂k
)
− ωyyz
(
αz ẑ + (1− αz)l̂z
)
= ωyykT̂FP
k + ωyyzT̂FP
z
= ωyykÂ+ ωyyz
(
V̂ + ωG
ξˆ∗
̂ˆ
ξ∗
)
C.3 Calibration and data sources
To operationalize the calibration exercise, functional forms need to be specified. As
to household preferences, we postulate a Cobb-Douglas utility function in consump-
tion cH and leisure (1− hH):
u(cH , hH) =
1
1− σ
[
(cH)µ(1− hH)1−µ]1−σ , 0 < µ < 1
The production functions describing the two available technologies have already been
introduced with a Cobb-Douglas specification. Thus, it only remains to specify the
adjustment cost function associated with variations in the technology-specific capital
stocks i = k, z:
Φ(it, it+1) =
φ
2
it
(
it+1 − it(1 + γ)
it
)2
,
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which guarantees that, as the economy grows, the average resources spent in terms
of adjustment costs remain constant and that along a balanced growth path these
costs are zero. Finally, the exogenous productivity shocks to intermediate goods
production are assumed to obey the following autoregressive process:(
ln(At)
ln(Vt)
)
=
(
ρa 0
0 ρv
)(
ln(At−1)
ln(Vt−1)
)
+
(
0
(1− ρv)ln (χ)
)
+
(
a,t
v,t
)
(
a
v
)
∼ N
( (
0
0
)
,
(
σ2a σav
σav σ
2
v
) )
,
where χ is a measure of the productivity gap between the advanced sector and the
basic sector along the balanced growth path.
The parameters we set beforehand are the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ =
2 as well as Ω and η which determine the relative importance of the entrepreneurs in
the economy with respect to their labor supply and their accumulated wealth; in view
of the parametrizations employed in the literature, we set Ω = 0.95 and η = 0.97.5
As to the parameters determined from the data, we first resort to relevant time
series for the US at quarterly frequency (1959:1-2006:2) which were obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2006).
Specifically, we set γ = 0.0037 to match the average growth rate of real output
per hour worked over our sample of 0.37% per quarter and β = 0.98 to match
the average implied real interest rate - the difference between the nominal interest
rate and the rate of inflation - of 2.7% over this sample. The preference parameter
µ = 0.167 is calibrated to be on average consistent with the consumption-leisure
FOC (C.3), while αk = αz = α = 0.31 are set to match the labor share of income.6
Finally, δ = 0.0112 is pinned down such as to match the average consumption of
fixed capital. The investment adjustment cost parameter φ = 12.5 is determined
such as to match the empirical volatility of aggregate investment of 5.60%.
The critical parameter for our analysis is the fraction θ of the firms’ wage bill
that needs to be paid in advance because it pins down the quantitative importance of
liquidity relative to overall short-term credit. We calibrate θ using the information
on firms’ balance sheets reported in Opler et al. (1999). There, the sample mean
(median) of liquid assets over total assets net of liquid assets is at 18% (6%), while
total (= short-term plus long-term) leverage is at 28% (25%). These numbers imply
a ratio of liquid assets to total debt of 0.54 (0.23). The corresponding model statistic
is D
D+θWL
; we choose θ = 0.25 such that the steady state value for this expression is
at 0.36, falling in between the empirical reference statistics.
5Compare e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and the references therein.
6The restriction αk = αz is imposed due to the lack of informative data. Note also that we treat
entrepreneurs’ wage earnings as part of the overall labor earnings and that the labor share needs
to be adjusted since, due to the firms’ advance financing requirement, part of the income is used to
pay interest; specifically, we exploit the following steady state relation: labor share = (1−α)
[1+θ(R˜−1)] .
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The composition of economic activity is mainly determined by the parameters
ρ, ζ and χ, which we calibrate from industry data, as well as by the agency cost
parameter b and the moments µξ, σξ of the liquidity shock distribution G(·), which
is assumed to be lognormal. The parameters b = 0.15, µξ = −0.75, σξ = 0.75 are
jointly calibrated such as to generate a steady state with (i) an advanced project
survival rate of 83% (corresponding to a failure rate of 4.6% across both technolo-
gies). In order to pin down the parameters ρ and ζ, we recover estimates for these
parameters using annual industry-level data from the UNIDO (2002) industry data-
base covering the period 1963-2000. These data provide disaggregate information
on value added and output prices at industry level according to the Standard Indus-
trial Classicication (SIC) system; we drop the government and the financial sector
as well as industries with missing data and are left with 36 industries (see Table 7).
We organize these remaining industries into two subaggregates, whereby the sorting
criterion is the standard deviation of each industry’s growth rate of value added
over time. We interpret these subaggregates as the two intermediate production
technologies in our model economy and use the associated relative prices to infer
the parameters of interest from (3.12). In particular, from total differentiation of
these relative demand schedules, one obtains (with hats denoting relative changes):(̂
yi
y
)
= −ρ
(̂
P i
P
)
This allows to isolate the elasticity of substitution ρ = 1.66. Now, (3.12) and (3.14)
can be solved for the relative sectoral weights ζ = 0.73 and (1− ζ) = 0.27 as well as
the elasticities of aggregate output with respect to the sectoral intermediate output
levels:
ωyyk = ζ
1
ρ
(
yk
y
) ρ−1
ρ
and ωyyz = (1− ζ)
1
ρ
(
yz
y
) ρ−1
ρ
The productivity difference parameter across the two subaggregates is estimated
from the respective value added data as χ = 1.26. Similarly, we exploit the time
series properties of value added in the two industrial subaggregates in order to
parametrize the relevant stochastic processes for technology. We directly infer
ρa = 0.79, ρv = 0.66 and ρav = 0.67; the volatility parameters σa and σv are
also estimated from the relevant value added data, but adjusted (keeping relative
values constant) to be consistent with the volatility of aggregate TFP, which yields
σa = 0.0075 and σv = 0.0111. Finally, ρj = 0.35 and σj = 0.0069 are calibrated
from the empirical process for M2.
Data sources:
• Section 3.3: CPI inflation and GDP deflator, real GDP, government and pri-
vate investment shares are all from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006);
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the own rate of M2 and Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield are
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2006); the financial controls are
from Beck and Levine (1999).
• Section 3.6.1: The growth rate of value added at 3-digit SIC level is from the
UNIDO (2002) industrial statistics database - the data are identical to the
OECD-STAN (2003) data for the US; the other data sources are as for Section
3.3.
• Section 3.6.2: The firm-level data employed on top of the aggregate data come
from the Compustat database; apart from the larger period of time covered,
they coincide with the data employed by Opler et al. (1999).
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